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Abstract
“Balanced budget” in Indonesia means there is no deliberate and 
persistent domestic monetary financing, and describes official foreign 
borrowing to finance the deficit as foreign “revenue” . This policy in 
Indonesia has always been associated with the government’s determination 
to conduct prudent and cautious fiscal policy on the assumption that this 
policy has no negative impact on the economy, compared to domestic 
monetary financing to finance the deficit. It is believed that fiscal policy in 
Indonesia skillfully blended with other policies, such as monetary policies 
and exchange rate policy, has been responsible for the success story of 
Indonesia’s macroeconomic management, praised by many observers. In 
this connection, this study tries to examine the truths behind this assertion.
The findings show that “balanced” budget being financed by 
government’s net resource inflow or net official (government) foreign 
borrowing minus foreign interest payment, has indeed no negative impacts 
on the trade balance, either in the long run or in the short run. Verifying 
that a case of “twin deficits” does not exist in Indonesia; however, the 
government, by no means, should not do cautious policies on foreign 
borrowing.
The noticeable rising amount of net resource transfer outflow for 
debts and interest payments, in the last few years having been persistently 
taking place up to the present, draw cautious and scrutiny supervisions. 
Other studies also revealed that public investment often crowds out private 
investment, typically when public enterprises compete with private firms.
In the meantime, surplus on balance of trade on oil, favourable real 
exchange rate, and world’s economic growth have contributed positively
on the trade balance surplus, both in the long run and the short run. While 
gross domestic product has a negative impact on the balance of trade 
surplus.
Fiscal policy along with other financial policies is proven to be 
successful in achieving sustainable growth and maintaining stability of 
Indonesia economy, without succumbing to serious external debts. Non oil 
export and non oil GDP growth showed promising accomplishment. Open 
capital account policy, which was uniquely put in advance of other policy 
adjustments, necessitated the government to consistently implement very 
cautious monetary and exchange rate policies.
The policy option available for the government to affect balance of 
trade in the period of the study and in the future is to keep the real 
exchange rate at a competitive rate and to create always favourable trade 
climates. This task of achieving the proper real exchange rate falls on 
managing a moderate domestic inflation and adjusting a proper and timely 
nominal exchange rate. In daily practices, however, handling the former is 
not as easy as executing the later.
The critical policy implication is a constant effort to the government 
to promote non oil-exports, restrain imports, mobilise domestic savings and 
consistently maintain competitive exchange rates. These rigourous 
commitments would have to be met vigilantly and sensibly in the future. 
Implementing all of these policies in the face of a more competitive global 
economy nowadays has constantly become unavoidable challenges, should 
Indonesia wish not to be trapped in a serious debt problem.
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1.1. The aims of the study
No slogan or “catch-phrase” has been more central in the 
Indonesia’s New Order economic philosophy than that of the “balanced” 
budget. It is no exaggeration to say that this policy has been regarded by 
many as one of the main underpinnings of the success story of the 
Indonesian economy. The remarkable success of the Indonesian economy 
has been cited by many observers including international institutions such 
as the World Bank and the IMF1}.
The aims of this study are: first, to investigate whether there is an 
effect of fiscal deficit on the trade balance in Indonesia, or to ask: “Is there 
a case of twin deficit in Indonesia?”; and second, to examine and observe 
the Indonesia’s financial policy adjustments and performance which give 
the background and have complementary and mutually enforcing aspects 
with the conduct of fiscal policy.
The ’’balanced” budget concept defined by the Indonesian 
government so far is simply the refusal to finance any deficit through 
money creation and to describe official foreign borrowing to finance the 
deficit as foreign “revenue”. Although there is no money creation to 
finance the deficit, in this study we also take into account net government 
position vis-a-vis domestic monetary system namely “cash deficit” as a 
part of the source of deficit financing. In other words the study attempts to
l
examine how far it is true that this “balanced” budget has had no impact on 
the trade balance.
The belief that there is no “twin deficit” in Indonesia will might, on 
one hand, have given a sense of comfortable accomplishment to the policy 
makers in Indonesia, with their abiding by “balanced budget” policy. On 
the other hand awareness of the likely negative effect on the economy of 
budget deficit, mostly financed by official foreign borrowing, will perhaps 
move policy maker towards more efficient and effective use of foreign 
borrowing.
The second purpose of the study is to examine and observe the 
financial policy adjustments - with special emphasise on monetary and 
balance of payments policy - that have been implemented by Indonesian 
government mainly since 1980s in response to various kind of the external 
shocks. This second purpose on one hand, will give a related, complete 
and broader understanding of Indonesia’s fiscal policy, which is the main 
aspect of the first aim of the study in the framework of macroeconomic 
policy. On the other hand, the financial adjustment policies have become 
interesting issue of the Indonesia’s policy adjustments, as they are unique 
in being applied in a reverse sequence to that suggested by the theories.
1.2. The scope, methodology and limitation of the study
The scope of the study will primarily examine the budget deficit 
impacts on balance of trade and financial policy adjustments with special 
reference to Indonesia. In so doing the study will exercise on factors 
affecting trade balance of which budget deficit is one of the main 
determinants, by using linear regressions and to observe the policy
2
implications thereupon. Seen from the other side this study, considering the 
characteristic of source of budget deficit financing in Indonesia mentioned 
above, can also be regarded as a study on the effect of official foreign
f
borrowing on the trade balance. From a balance of payment point of view 
this study can also be said to be a study on the effect of one of 
accommodating transaction (below the line); official foreign borrowing, 
on the main component of autonomous transactions (above the line); 
balance o f  trade and services.
Owing to inconsistency and non-availability of the data, all data 
have to be tested and some of them have to be interpolated and derived. 
Trying to find, to track and to get consistent data has been very time 
consuming and painstaking. Discussion of statistical issues and data 
derivations are discussed further in the Appendix I.
As the aims of the study are to examine the effect of budget deficit 
on the balance of trade, and to observe financial policy adjustments, it will 
not go any further by examining the sustainability of budget deficit which 
is in the case of Indonesia, at present has to mean the sustainability of 
official foreign borrowing or external debt.
1.3. Presentation of the study
We discuss the aims, scope and limitation of the study in Chapter 
One. Chapter Two surveys various competing theoretical approaches to 
explaining the determination of external balance, such as the elasticity 
approach, the absorption approach as well as monetary and the fiscal 
approach. In one of these approaches, the fiscal approach, discusses 
exclusively the effect of fiscal deficit on balance of payment.
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Having discussed the theoretical approach to the balance of 
payments determination and the relevant approach to Indonesia, in Chapter 
Three, we examine how Indonesia as an oil exporting country responses to 
external shocks, taking the form mainly of the rises and falls of oil price. A 
series of broad range of adjustment measures launched by Indonesian 
government underline a proper macro economic management in 
maintaining macro economic stability and achieving sustainable economic 
growth. The discussion will also reveal the ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy and the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the macroeconomic 
stabilisation policy. Given the fact that Indonesia is a developing country 
will give limitation to the application of generally accepted approaches to 
those for developed countries. Related to this, we will refer to some 
studies that have dealt with those issues.
Chapter Four is the follow-up of Chapter Three and concerns the 
second purpose of the study in which the results of the economic 
adjustments using standard economic performance such as price stability, 
economic growth, balance of payments development, etc., and problem 
areas and policy issues in the future are surveyed and observed. The 
observations will give insight and practical implementation to the 
management of Indonesia’s macroeconomic policy which has strong and 
mutual relationship with the conduct of budget policy as the first aim of the 
study.
Chapter Five discusses general concepts of budget deficit, 
Indonesia’s budget system, some proposed concepts of fiscal deficit on 
Indonesia, and concept of budget deficit which is chosen in this study 
related to the first aim of the study.
4
Chapter Six deals with the empirical model and estimation process 
that are used in the study.
Chapter Seven discusses the empirical results and policy 
implications, in which the discussion also covers tests on the stationarity of 
the variables, long-run equilibrium of the trade balance, error correction 
model, and an observation of the application of Mundell-Fleming Model in 
Indonesia.
Chapter Eight summarises the results of the study, some suggestions 
to be proposed and the remaining issues need to be addressed.
5
FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER I
1} See for example Jeffrey D. Sachs “Developing Country Debt antf the World 
Economy”, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989, The University of Chicago 
Press, p.4, in which it is cited that Korea and Indonesia are the only two countries did 
not undergo debt rescheduling during period 1975-86 compared to other countries 
such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey. Gillis, Perkins, 
Roemer, and Snodgrass in Economics o f Development, 4th Edition, 1996, W.W. 
Norton & Company praise Indonesia for having been able to avoid the Dutch Disease 
in contrast to Nigeria (p.479) and for the success story of stabilization program 
(p. 129). Malcolm Gillis and David Dapice on Indonesia as saying ’’Economic performance 
in Indonesia during the past two decades has been widely regarded as successful. External adjustment 
policies played a significant role in the success. Some lessons may be learned from Indonesia’s 
adjustment process” in “77/e Open Economy: Tools for Policy Makers in Developing 
Countries” edited by Rudiger Dombusch and F. Leslie C. H. Helmers, EDI Series in 
Economic Development, Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, 1989, p.307. Hall Hill 
in “The Indonesian Economy since 1966. South East Asia Emerging Giant”. 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, by putting Indonesia in comparative perspective 
with neighboring ASEAN such as Philippines and Thailand (sharing proximity and 
some ethnic/cultural similarities) or China and India, large Asian states with percapita 
income not too far below that of Indonesia or some of the large OPEC nations such as 
Mexico and Nigeria, has praised Indonesia for performing well by most comparative 
indicators : economic and social (p.7). Sadiq Ahmed and Ajay Chibber in the “How 
Can Indonesia Maintain Creditworthiness and Noninflationary Growth?, The World 
Bank Working Papers, October 1989 gave comment on the cover page as “Indonesia- 
unique among middle-income oil-producing countries-adjusted rapidly to oil price shocks, and it 
begins a new decade with good prospects for noninflationary growth and better creditworthiness. What 
is the country’s secret?” In the Document of International Monetary Funds from the 
Acting Secretary to Members of the Executive Board on the Subject: Indonesia - Staff 
Report for the 1995, Article IV, Consultation, June 23, 1995, it is mentioned “Indonesia 
shares with its ASEAN regional partners—especially Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand—a record 
over the last few decades of impressive economic management, which has been characterized by high 
level of savings and investment, strong growth in manufacturing and exports, and a substantial build 
up in international reserves” . Lazaros E . Molho described it as: “Indonesia stands out among 
countries with a similar burden of external debt for its exemplary debt-servicing record. A successful 
mix prudent macroeconomic policies and market-oriented reforms is undoubtedly a key factor behind 
this achievement” in “Fiscal Adjustment in Oil-Exporting Country: The Case of 
Indonesia”, IMF Paper on Policy Analysis And Assessment, International Monetary 
Fund, South East Asia Department, 1994, pp 18. Finally Sarath Rajapatirana, Director, 
’’Macroeconomic Policies, Crisis, and Growth in the Long Run” Research Project 
Chief, Trade, Finance, and Private Sector Development Technical Department Latin 
America and the Caribbean Region in his foreword of “Macroeconomic Policies, 
Crises, and Long - Term Growth in Indonesia, 1965-90” by Wing Thye Woo, Bruce 
Glassbumer and Anwar Nasution, World Bank, Comparative Macroeconomic Studies, 
1994 mentions “The Indonesian economy did very well in the 1965-90 period. Per capita income 
growth averaged 4.3 percent a year despite four economic crisis : hyper inflation in 1965 and 1966, 
the 1975 default by Pertamina (the state oil company), the serious weakening of Indonesia’s non­
energy tradable sector by “Dutch disease” between 1973 and 1978, and the post-1982 fall in the price
6
of oil, one of Indonesia’s chief exports. All four crises were handled competently and had no adverse
consequence for long-term growth Indonesia’s experience challenges two conventional views
about macroeconomic management. It challenges the claim that “ announcement effects” make price
stabilization easier when a credible program is undertaken by the government The Indonesian
case also suggests that the customary recommendations about the optimal sequencing of economic 
reforms may be flawed. Indonesia reversed the recommended sequence but still reaped benefits from 
the realistic exchange rate that had to be adopted in light of its open capital account”. -  -
In contrast to all cited above, in his book Economic Development (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1968), Benjamin Higgins labeled Indonesia as: “the number one failure 
among the major underdeveloped countries”.
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CHAPTER II:
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURES
2.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight those part of the literature 
on the relationship between fiscal deficit and balance of trade, and to a 
large extent of the theory of balance of payment from which we may draw 
macroeconomic policy theory of the open economy suitable for Indonesia.
There are at least four theoretical approaches to the balance of 
payments determination namely the elasticity, the absorption, the monetary 
and the fiscal approach. There is also policy approach which was 
developed by Mundell and Fleming. Though monetary approach is usually 
the last in the series of approaches to the balance of payments, we place 
Mundell and Fleming approach as the last in this series of discussions, 
simply because is regarded as a policy approach rather than a theoretical 
one. Below are the reviews of those approaches.
In Section 2.2. we discuss the elasticity approach to the balance of 
payments. The elasticity approach dominated the economic analysis 
balance of payments for quite a long time after the collapse of the 
international gold standard in 1931. This approach centered on the effect of 
exchange-rate changes and the price elasticities of demand for exports and 
imports in international trade. The next section is the absorption approach. 
This approach criticises the elasticity approach for being partial- 
equilibrium in the sense that it considers only the effect of exchange-rate 
variations in the market for exports and imports, and everything else is held
constant, so that the position of the demand curves for exports and imports 
themselves are held constant. It argued that movements in the balance of 
payments can only be understood in relation to how expenditure is affected 
relative to output. The monetary approach which is the last in this series of 
approaches will be discussed in Section 2.4. and is essentially an extension 
of the absorption approach, stressing balance of payments deficits as a 
monetary phenomenon to be corrected by monetary means.
In contrast to the monetary approach, the fiscal approach which is 
taken up in Section 2. 5. is rooted in the writing of Nicholas Kaldor (1971, 
1975), and suggests that when analysing the current account of the balance 
of payments one should focus on the government budget deficit and the 
private sector demand for financial assets, rather than directly on the 
determinants of exports and imports. Lastly, the Mundell-Fleming 
approach tries to reconcile the conflict between internal and external 
balance by using a policy mix, that is fiscal policy to achieve the former 
and monetary policy to achieve the latter goal.
2.2. The Elasticity Approach
This approach is the first in a historical series of approaches to the 
balance of payments adjustment mechanism. The elasticity approach 
basically provides an analysis of what happens to the current account 
balance when the country devalues its currency. This approach makes 
some simplifying assumptions by focusing on demand conditions and by 
assuming that the supply elasticities for domestic export goods and foreign 
import goods are perfectly elastic, so that changes in demand volumes 
have no effect on prices. In effect, these assumptions mean that domestic
9
and foreign prices are fixed so that changes in relative prices are caused 
solely by changes in the nominal exchange rate.
The central message of the elasticity approach is that there are two 
possible and opposing direct effects of a devaluation on the current 
account balance, one of which works to reduce a deficit, whilst the other 
actually contributes to making the deficit worse as discussed below.
From a position of equilibrium in the current account, a devaluation 
will improve the current account, only if the sum of the foreign elasticity of 
demand for exports (percentage change in exports over the percentage 
change in price represented by the percentage change in the exchange rate) 
and the home elasticity of demand for imports (percentage change in 
imports over the percentage change in price represented by the percentage 
change in the exchange rate) is greater than unity. If the sum of these two 
elasticities is less than unity then a devaluation will lead to a deterioration 
of the current account (Marshall - Lemer condition).
There are two effects in play once a currency is devalued namely the 
price effect and volume effect ]). The price effect works when exports 
become cheaper measured in foreign currency and imports become more 
expensive measured in the home currency. If after the devaluation, the 
value of exports is less than the value of imports, then devaluation has an 
effect of worsening the current account of the country. The volume effect 
happens when exports become cheaper, encouraging an increased volume 
of exports and that imports become more expensive, leading to a decreased 
volume of imports. The volume effect will then contribute to improving the 
current account.
The net effect of these two forces depends upon whether the price or 
volume effect is more dominant. There could be three possible scenarios
10
following a devaluation. If the increased exports and decreased imports do 
not result in a net increase in receipts, the balance of trade is adversely 
affected. The second case is if the increased export volumes and decreased 
volume of imports exactly match the decreased earnings per unit of exports 
and increased expenditure per unit of imports so that the current balance is 
unchanged. The last case is whenever the increased volume of export sales 
and decreased volume of imports are enough to outweigh the price effects, 
then the current balance improves following a devaluation.
A great deal of time and effort has been expended by economists in 
attempts to measure the supply and demand elasticities for exports and 
imports. Economists divided up into two camps popularly known as 
'elasticity optimists' who believed that the sum of these two elasticities 
tended to exceed unity (devaluation might reduce the excess demand for 
foreign exchange) and 'elasticity pessimists' or Structuralists who believed 
that these elasticities tended to less than unity. The Structuralists argued 
that a devaluation may work better for industrialised countries than for 
developing countries. Many developing countries are heavily dependent 
upon imports so that their price elasticity of demand for imports was likely 
to be very low. While for industrialised countries that had to face 
competitive export markets the price elasticity of demand for their exports 
may be quite elastic. The implication of the Marshall - Lemer condition 
was that devaluation may be a cure mainly for developed countries' 
balance of payments deficits but not for others2).
A general consensus accepted by most economists is that elasticities 
are lower in the short run than in the long run, in which case the Marshall- 
Lemer condition may not hold in the short run but may hold in the medium 
to long run. The possibilities that in the short run the Marshall-Lemer
11
condition may not be fulfilled although it generally holds over the longer 
run, leads to the phenomenon of what is popularly known as the / -  curve 
effect, because diagramatically the response of the trade balance looks like 
a J 3).
2.3. The Absorption Approach
Elasticities analysis has been widely criticised because it ignored the 
income-expenditure effects of devaluation. The elasticity approach is based 
on assumption that changes in export and import volumes brought about by 
a devaluation will have no implication on national income. Absorption 
approach launched by Sidney Alexander and further elaborated by Harry 
G. Johnson4) incorporates the income effect of a devaluation. However, 
like elasticity approach, absorption approach concentrates exclusively on 
the current account (without touching capital inflow or outflow). One of 
the major defects of the elasticity approach is that it is based upon the 
assumption that all other things are equal. However, changes in export and 
import volumes will have implications for national income and 
consequently income effects need to be incorporated in a more 
comprehensive analysis of the effects of a devaluation. According to the 
absorption approach, current account imbalance can be viewed as the 
difference between domestic output and domestic spending (absorption). 
The absorption approach does not reject the importance of supply and 
demand elasticities but its focus is on the macro level. Using the income 
identity, it defines income (Y) as the sum of domestic absorption (A = C + 
I + G) and net export, X - M (or current account; CA). Taking the equation 
for national income :
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Y = C + I + G + X - M (1)
and defining domestic absorption as A = C + 1 + G, the above equation can 
be rearranged as follows : __
C A = X - M = Y - A (2)
The last equation says that the current account balance represents 
the difference between domestic output and domestic absorption. A current 
account surplus means that domestic output exceeds domestic spending, 
while a current account deficit means that domestic output is less than 
domestic spending. The effect of devaluation on the current account 
balance will depend upon how it affects national income relative to how it 
affects domestic absorption. If a devaluation raises domestic income 
relative to domestic spending the current account improves. To improve 
the balance of payments, devaluation should either increase the country's 
total output or must reduce its domestic absorption if the country is already 
at full employment. If not, devaluation will simply cause inflation in the 
case of a full employment economy. To ensure the positive effects of 
devaluation or "expenditure switching" policy, it must be supplemented 
with an " expenditure reducing" policy such as tighter fiscal and monetary 
policies.
Initially, it was believed that the absorption approach was an 
alternative to the elasticities approach, the elasticities approach 
concentrating on price effects while the absorption approach concentrated 
on income effects. In fact, economists show that the two models are not 
substitutes; rather they are complementary, as shown by Tsiang (1961) and 
Alexander (1959)5). Consider the effects of a devaluation on income.
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Exports will increase more than imports, so raising income only if the 
Marshall - Lemer elasticities condition is fulfilled. If the Marshall - Lemer 
condition is not fulfilled, then exports will rise by less than imports, 
implying that income will fall. Hence, the Marshall - Lemer is relevant to 
the absorption approach.
2.4. The Monetary Approach
The monetary approach to the balance of payments, as developed by 
the IMF and the University of Chicago at the end of the 1950s, stresses the 
essentially monetary nature of balance of payment imbalances. Its essence 
is to put at the forefront of analysis the monetary rather than the relative 
price aspects of international adjustment as Harry G. Johnson put i t 6):
Accordingly, surpluses in the trade account and the capital account 
respectively represent excess flow supplies o f goods and o f securities, and a 
surplus in the money account reflects an excess domestic flow demand for 
money. Consequently, in analysing the money account, or more familiarly the 
rate o f increase or decrease in the country's international reserves, the monetary 
approach focuses on the determinants o f the excess domestic flows demand for 
or supply o f money”.
The historical origin of monetary approach to the balance of 
payments (Mabop) can be traced back to the price-specie flow mechanism 
which sees purchasing power parity as determining either domestic price 
level under a fixed exchange rate system, or the exchange rate via 
adjustment in domestic money supply under a floating exchange rate 
regime. Monetary processes, therefore, can cure the balance of payments 
disequilibrium. Since it is particularly interested in the equilibrium 
condition of the money market, the balance of payments approach is 
defined as the financing or accommodating transaction or the official
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settlement balance that constitutes the monetary account. So unlike 
elasticities and absorption analyses, which represent improvements in, or 
modifications to, the analysis of the current account, the Mabop is an 
alternative approach that scraps separate analysis of the components of the 
current account and capital accounts and replaces it by a theory of the 
overall balance of payments7).
The fundamental basis of the monetary approach is that the balance 
of payments is essentially a monetary phenomenon. Not only is the balance 
of payments a measurement of monetary flows but such flows can only be 
explained by a disequilibrium in the stock, demand for and supply of 
money. The fundamental message is that disequilibrium in the balance of 
payments reflects disequilibrium in the money market. Consequently, 
balance of payments analysis needs to focus on both the supply of and the 
demand for money.
There are three key assumptions underlying the monetary model. 
Those are a stable money demand function, full employment condition 
(vertical aggregate supply schedule) and purchasing power parity (PPP) 
concept.
The stable money demand function. The keystone of the Mabop is 
that there is a stable demand for money function which is made up of only 
a few variables. The monetarists use the quantity theory of money as the 
basis of the money demand function. The demand for money function is 
written as :
Md = £Py where k>0 (3)
where Md is the demand for nominal money balance, P is the domestic 
price level, y is real domestic income, and k  is a parameter that measures
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the sensitivity of money demand to changes in nominal income. The 
reciprocal of k  is the ‘‘velocity” of money.
The demand for money is positive function of the domestic price 
level. This is because the demand for money is a demand for real money 
balances. A rise in the domestic price level will reduce real money 
balances (Md/P) and accordingly lead to an equiproportionate increase in 
the demand for money. The demand for money is positively related to real 
domestic income; a rise in real income will ceteris paribus lead to an 
increase in the transactions demand for money. The money demand 
function forms the basis of the aggregate demand schedule, where price 
level is inversely related to real income and interest rate has no influence 
on demand for money.
Full employment (vertical aggregate supply). The simple monetary 
model assumes that the labour market is sufficiently flexible and that the 
economy is continuously at the full employment level of output. In other 
words, wages are constantly at the level that equates the supply and 
demand for labour. For example, a rise in the domestic price level does not 
lead to an increase in domestic output because wages adjust immediately 
to the higher price level so that there is no advantage for domestic 
producers to take on more labour. This means that the aggregate supply is 
vertical at the full employment level of output. An improvement in 
productivity due to technological progress may shift the aggregate supply 
curve8).
Purchasing power parity (PPP). The final assumption that underpins 
the monetary model is the assumption of purchasing power parity. In its 
simplified version the theory says that the exchange rate adjusts so as to 
keep the following equation in equilibrium:
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P = EP* (4)
where E is the exchange rate defined as domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency so that a rise is a depreciation while a fall is an 
appreciation of the domestic currency. P is the domestic price level in the 
domestic currency and P* is the foreign price in the foreign currency. If the 
PPP relationship holds, the long run movement of the nominal exchange 
rate will be equal to the difference between the monetary growth rates in 
the domestic and foreign economies.
The three assumptions with the use of some accounting identities 
developed a theory of the balance of payments.
X - M +  / * F + K = AR = ARM - AD (5)
Reading from the left to the right of the equation above, we can see that 
exports, X, minus imports, M, plus net factor income from foreign 
investment, /*F, gives the current account surplus. When the surplus on 
capital account, K, is added the result is the balance of payment surplus, 
AR. Addition to foreign exchange reserves, AR, and addition to domestic 
assets, AD, form the base, ARM, for monetary expansion by the banking 
system.
The domestic money supply (Ms) in the economy is made up of the 
following components :
Ms = m*RM=m (R+D) (6)
where Ms is domestic money supply, m is conventional money multiplier 
and RM is reserve money (high powered money : monetary liabilities of 
monetary authorities). The reserve money (RM) can come into circulation 
in one of two ways :
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(i). The authorities may conduct an open market operation 
(OMO), which is a central bank purchase of treasury bonds 
held by private agents. This increases the central bank’s 
monetary liabilities but increases its assets of domestic 
bond holdings which is the domestic component of the 
monetary base.
(ii).The authorities may conduct a foreign exchange operation 
which is a purchase of foreign currency assets (money or 
foreign treasury bonds) held by private agents by the 
central bank. This again increases the central bank's 
liabilities but increases its assets of foreign currency and 
foreign bonds.
By assuming m=l (which could happen under a non-fractional 
banking reserve system), then RM is equal to Ms. From the equation above 
by taking the first differences we can derive :
AR = AMs - AD (7)
where clearly AR is the change in foreign reserves, AD is the change in the 
domestic component of the money supply or domestic credit expansion and 
AMs is the change in the money stock which in the Mabop literature is the 
flow demand for money.
Equation (7) tells us in a simple way given AR (balance of payments 
target) and AMs (target of money supply) how much domestic credit, AD, 
can be extended consistent with AR and expected growth in money 
demand. Thus to control a balance of payments deficit domestic credit 
expansion has to be controlled relative to the flow demand for money.
Policy implications of the Mabop, under a fixed exchange rate 
regime, are summarised as follows :
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1. Money supply is endogeneously determined. The monetary 
authority of a country cannot determine the country's real money supply. In 
other words, the real stock of money supply is endogenous. This was 
Mundell-Fleming’s conclusion in the economic policy approach too, as we 
will see in section 2.7. All the monetary authority can do is to influence the 
components of the monetary base between domestic credit and foreign 
exchange reserve. The monetary authority controls the volume of domestic 
credit and through that it can affect the balance of payments and the 
foreign exchange reserve of the country. If the monetary authority lets 
domestic credit expand beyond the public demand for money, the public 
will get rid of the excess balances by increasing their expenditure on 
goods, services and securities. If domestic supplies are unable to meet 
public demand for them, (full employment, for example), people simply 
import goods and securities from abroad to respond to the expansion in the 
volume of domestic credit which lead to country’s foreign reserves losses. 
On the other hand, if domestic credit is restricted to less than the public 
demand for it, people will export goods and securities abroad, thereby 
importing money to satisfy their excess demand. In this case, the foreign 
exchange reserves of the country grow.
2. Balance o f payments deficits are temporary and se lf correcting 
phenomena. The Mabop regards the balance of payments deficits resulting 
from the expansion in the money stock to be merely a temporary and self 
correcting phenomenon. An expansion of the money supply causes a 
temporary excess of money, lowers interest rates, increases spending and 
leads to a current and capital account deficit which to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate, necessitates intervention in the foreign exchange market 
that eventually eliminates the excess supply of the currency. A monetary 
contraction, by raising interest rates and reducing spending, reduces
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income and therefore imports. This result could also be achieved by tight 
fiscal policy, and so there is nothing especially monetary about this 
interpretation of remedies for external balance9^  ,
3. Balance o f payments disequilibrium is monetary in essence._ 
Since the balance of payments disequilibrium is monetary in essence, it can 
only be cured by the use of domestic monetary policy. The authority may 
be able to support an external deficit without self-correcting monetary 
policy only if it is ready to sacrifice its foreign exchange reserve and is 
able to borrow from abroad to fill the deficits. This situation cannot 
continue indefinitely. On the other hand, the monetary authority may be 
able to sterilise its holding of foreign reserves at the cost of a reduction in 
the rate of domestic credit creation. Such policies are generally viewed as 
unnecessary and are only effective in the short run since no small country 
can afford to borrow or reduce the rate of its domestic credit expansion for 
a long period of time.
4. Devaluation will have a transitory beneficial effect on the 
balance o f payment. Devaluation is a once and for all increase in domestic 
value of foreign currencies. Starting from external balance, the argument is 
that in the short run a devaluation improves the competitive position vis-a- 
vis the foreign sector. This causes a surplus in the trade balance and 
therefore an increase in foreign reserves. This increase also makes the 
money supply grow (via equation 7). Assuming this increase is not 
sterilised and as people will strive to maintain their money balances, 
excess demand for goods and services will drive up prices and imports
until the surplus on the current account is eliminated.
The effect may also work through another channel, that is when
sterilisation takes place. As prices increase, the demand for nominal money 
also increases to maintain the certain previous level of real stock demand,
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while the stock of real money supply declines. If stock demand is not 
satisfied from domestic sources by domestic credit expansion, people 
restore the money market disequilibrium by importing money from abroad
f
(borrowing from abroad/capital inflow or selling foreign bonds). This tends 
to cause domestic currency to appreciate. To prevent domestic currency 
from appreciating, the monetary authority has to sell domestic currency to 
buy up the foreign assets the public now hold in order to stabilise the 
exchange rate at its depreciated level. Thus, the country gains foreign 
exchange reserves. The adjustment process continues until the money 
market equilibrium is restored. In other words, the effect of devaluation is 
viewed as transitory and incapable of bringing about a lasting change in the 
balance of payments.
Because fixed exchange rates make it impossible to control the 
money supply, it is not difficult to see why monetarists were the vanguard 
of those who argued for abandonment of fixed exchange rates10).
2.5. The Fiscal Approach
The fiscal approach is also known as the New Cambridge School’s 
balance of payments theory. The views of the Cambridge School are 
related to the writings of Kaldor (1955, 1966, 1971, 1975) and his 
followers (e.g. Wood 1975). Their view is that when analysing the current 
account of the balance of payments one should focus on the government 
budget deficit and the private sector demand for financial assets, rather 
than directly on the determinants of exports and importsU). By assuming 
that the private sector is in balance, then a deficit in the budget would lead 
to a balance of payments deficit. This was the basis of the so-called New
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Cambridge theory which ascribed the UK’s balance of payments deficits in 
the 1960s and early 1970s to government budget deficit, basing the theory 
on the empirical observation that the private sector of the economy staysf
roughly in balance. The theory did not last long, as it was confounded by 
contrary empirical evidence, and the theory died a quick death12).
In contrast with the absorption approach, the fiscal approach focuses 
on public sector saving as the only relevant determinant of the current 
account of the balance of payments. In common with the monetary 
approach, the fiscal approach extends the balance of payments theories of 
the 1960s to consider stock demand for assets as well as expenditure 
decisions. The demand for net stock of financial assets is assumed to be a 
’'small and stable" proportion of the disposable income of the private 
sector. Interest rates are fixed and investment demand is totally interest- 
inelastic. Hence, the fiscal approach (which ignores net factor income and 
transfer from abroad) models the current account of the balance of 
payments, X-M, as determined by the fiscal balance, T-G, and private 
balance, S-I, as follows13).
X-M = (S-I) + (T-G)
These two approaches, the fiscal and monetary approach under 
certain conditions can be considered mirror images of each other : the 
monetary approach concentrates on the official settlement accounts and 
lumps everything else into "items above the line". The fiscal approach 
concentrates on the current account and lumps everything else into "items 
below the line"14).
In equilibrium conditions the commodity and money markets can be 
written as follow:
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Foreign sector Gov’t Sector Private
Sector
Fiscal approach (X-M) = (T-G) + (S-I)
Monetary approach AR = -ADC + AMs
With capital movements equal to zero, the sum of each column 
equals zero, showing the perfect similarity of the theoretical form of the 
fiscal and monetary approaches.
But the fiscal approach and the monetary approach have different 
views as regards to the labour market and price and output flexibility. 
Whereas most versions of the Mabop assume continuous fu ll employment, 
the fiscal approach considers output and employment to be flexible . 
Therefore, fiscal expansion according to the fiscal approach will bring 
results;
- The fiscal deficit will be less than the initial fiscal expansion, 
because it raises output brought about by raising tax revenue 
(owing to the assumption of less than full employment);
-No crowding out of the private sector (based on an 
assumption of a perfect, open financial market which implies 
domestic interest rates are equal to interest rate abroad, i = i*, 
and an assumption of a marginal private propensity to spend 
for both consumption and investment to be unity).
Accordingly, the policy recommendations of the two approaches for 
achieving equilibrium of the external balance are different. Below are the 
differences:
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The fiscal approach suggested that import restrictions be used for 
offsetting government expenditure and that they should continue to play a 
role in supporting domestic demand. The argument was that increasing 
tariffs would have the same results as an autonomous reduction in the 
import propensity of the UK economy15).
The monetary approach contends that the burden of adjustment 
should fall on domestic credit creation and on the government deficit, 
which is considered the main cause of increases in domestic credit.
The differences in the policy recommendation depend on the 
sensitivity of exports to changes in domestic prices and of prices to change 
in demand.
In the monetary approach : - the price sensitivity of exports tends
toward infinity because of the 
assumption of a small, open economy 
for which purchasing power parity 
holds and demand for exports is 
infinite.
- the parameter that measures the price 
effect of changes in demand in the 
price equation is equal to infinity 
because the labour supply curve is 
vertical.
In the fiscal approach : - the price sensitivity of exports has a
positive but finite value.
- the price effect of changes in demand 
is equal to zero, because any change 
in demand will change the output, 
rather than the price.
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Both approaches assume that the sensitivity of prices to a change in 
the exchange rate is equal to unity, because of the no money illusion.
The fiscal approach framework implies that the balance of payments 
is equal to the net domestic financing of the government and private sector, 
and throws light on the fact that the domestically financed government 
deficit is the proper macro-economic fiscal target that can be used to 
influence the current account. The definitions in the equation above are 
important because they emphasise the need for consistency between 
current account, budget deficit and net private savings. Specifically, it 
stresses the fact that the current account deficit may depend on two sets of 
policies:
(i) those that influence the net private savings
(ii) those that influence the budget deficits.
However, this two domestic sector financial balances that 
correspond to the current account deficit does not imply that the two 
balances are independent of each other in a policy sense. Changes in policy 
instruments (for example, tax rate, subsidies, etc.) that change the fiscal 
deficit may change the private sector deficit or surplus. Similarly, policies
that change the private sector balance (for example, interest rate, credit
policy, etc.) may also change the fiscal deficit.
Related to this issue, at a global level it is quite interesting that the 
argument might arise among developed countries regarding their balance of 
payments problems that particularly afflicting the USA:
"The Japanese net export surplus is matched by an excess of private 
savings over investment. The USA complained that its own external deficit was 
the result of what it perceived as an exogenous Japanese external surplus. The 
USA laid the blame on excessive saving (low total spending) and insufficient 
investment spending in Japan. The Japanese countered that their external 
surplus and savings were largely an endogenous response to the US budget and
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external deficit. For the EC (European Communities) as a whole, the excess of 
savings over investment was mirrored in the averaged budget deficit. Within the 
EC the situation varied considerably, with some countries running large deficits 
and others large surpluses. As a whole, the Europeans blame America’s twin 
deficits for pushing interest up and discouraging investment world-wide, siding 
on this issue with Japan. They also complained that weak demand in Japan had 
depressed world incomes, thus siding with the USA. Both Japan and the USA 
thought the Europeans should put their house in order and cut their own budget 
deficits. There is an element of truth in each of these assertions : what separates 
them out is the assumptions about what is exogenous - the US and EC budget 
deficits, or weak Japanese demand. Using macroeconomics correctly requires a 
lot more information” 16).
2.6. Barro- Ricardian Equivalence
Discussing the fiscal approach to the balance of payments without 
referring to Barro-Ricardian equivalence is not complete. Economists 
generally agree that an increase in the budget deficit caused by a temporary 
increase in government purchase or expenditure will reduce national 
savings, which will in turn increase current account deficit (through the 
crowding out effect). But as regards that whether an increase in the budget 
deficit caused by a tax cut reduces national savings, investment or current 
account is controversial. The last issue is known as Barro-Ricardian 
equivalence issue.
The theory proposed that under certain circumstances a change in 
the path of taxes over time - lower taxes in the present, and higher taxes in 
the fixture, say - does not affect private expenditure and therefore does not 
affect national savings, investment, or current account.
In a very simple way the theory states that at the aggregate level, 
government deficit (due to lower taxes), financed by borrowing will 
increase the demand for loanable loans, shifting the demand curve (Figure 
below) to D l. Households, recognising that the increased government
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deficit will bring increased future taxes to pay the additional interest 
charges, cut their consumption and increase their saving (households try to 
maintain their permanent income). The supply curve of loans will shift to 
the right to SI. The equilibrium quantity of loans increases in such a way 
that the interest rate is left constant and there is no crowding out. Some 
economists argue that Barro - Ricardian equivalence breaks down because 
people only take into account future tax liabilities that will be borne by 
themselves and not by their children and their grandchildren. Proponents of 
the Barro - Ricardian equivalence proposition argue that it makes no 
difference whether future tax liabilities are going to be borne by those 
currently alive, or by their descendants. If the taxes are going to be borne 
by their children and their grandchildren, the current generation takes into 
account those future taxes and adjusts its own consumption so that it can 
make bequests on a large enough scale to enable those taxes to be paid.
Figure 2.1. : Barro-Ricardian Equivalence
Most economists are convinced that the proposition cannot be 
empirically relevant. The issue of this Ricardian equivalence took on an 






proposed cutting taxes in the face of an already - large deficit, which is 
followed by private savings declined sharply. This is one piece of 
evidence against the proposition17). ,
2.7. The Mundell-Fleming Approach
The James Fleming - Robert Mundell approach is sometimes called 
a policy approach, as this approach deals with which policy should be 
taken when a country having an assignment problem. That is to assign 
correct macroeconomic policies so as not to destabilise the economy. 
Mundell argued that the proper assignment is of monetary (interest rate 
policy) policy to external balance and fiscal policy to internal balance18). 
This is because interest rates have a relatively greater effect on the balance 
of payments - through international capital flows - than on the domestic 
economy, while the reverse is true of fiscal policy.
The Mundell-Fleming policy approach deals with a small open 
economy. A small open economy is defined as one that cannot influence 
interest rates in international financial markets and at the same time is also 
a price taker in the world's goods market. Like the income - absorption 
approach, this policy approach directly addresses the macro policy 
problems and ignores changes in terms of trade by simply assuming that 
the Marshall - Lemer condition is always satisfied. However, the policy 
approach allows domestic monetary authorities to use monetary policy to 
affect short run capital flows in and out of the country. Under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, the balance of payments need not be zero, and as a 
result the central bank's holding foreign exchange reserve changes. The 
major contribution was to incorporate international capital movements into 
formal macroeconomics models based on the Keynesian IS-LM
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framework. Their studies led to some dramatic implications concerning the 
effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy for the attainment of internal 
and external balance. ,
Under fixed exchange rates and perfect capital mobility, the 
monetary authorities are not able to choose both the money supply and the 
exchange rate since households may convert their domestic money into 
foreign assets as they see fit. In other words, monetary policy is 
endogenous or a country cannot pursue an independent monetary policy. 
For example, if a country wishes to raise interest rates by implementing 
tight monetary policy, immediately portfolio holders worldwide shift their 
wealth to take advantage of the new rate. As a result of the huge capital 
inflow the balance of payments shows a gigantic surplus; foreigners try to 
buy domestic assets, tending to cause the exchange rate to appreciate, and 
forcing the central bank to intervene to hold the exchange rate constant. It 
buys foreign money, in exchange for domestic money. This intervention 
causes the domestic money stock to increase. As a result the initial 
monetary contraction is reversed. The process comes to an end when home 
interest rates have been pushed back down to the initial level.
On the contrary, fiscal expansion under fixed exchange rates with
perfect capital mobility is extremely effective. With the money supply
initially unchanged, a fiscal expansion moves the IS curve up and to the
right (I'S'; Figure 2.2 below), tending to increase both the interest rate (to
i') and the level of output (move from Y0 to Yi). The higher interest rate
sets off a capital inflow that would lead the exchange rate to appreciate. To
maintain the exchange rate, the central bank has to expand the money
supply, thus increasing income further (to Y2). Equilibrium is restored
when the money supply has increased enough to drive the interest rate 
back to its original level, i=if to L’M’ . In this case with endogenous money
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supply, the interest rate is effectively fixed, and the simple Keynesian 
multiplier applies for a fiscal expansion.
interest
rate
i  =  i f
M'
income
Figure 2.2: Short-run effect of fiscal policy under fixed 
exchange rate
The description above is a short run analysis. In the long run nothing 
changes. Why is it so? There are three observations that characterise long 
run circumstances19).
First, the government budget constraint implies that there can be no 
permanent fiscal expansion: eventually the aggregate demand curve must 
return approximately to its initial position AD (Figure 2.3.).
Second, the economy will return to the long-run aggregate supply curve 
(LAS), so there can be no permanent real effect of a fiscal expansion.
Thirds and most importantly, inflation cannot differ forever, not even for 
very long - from foreign inflation if the exchange rate is to remain fixed. 
The economy must come back to its long run purchasing power parity line 









Figure 2 .3 : Long run effect o f  fiscal policy under fixed exchange 
rate.
Under flexible exchange rates, the inflation rate is determined by the rate 
o f growth o f the nominal money supply. It is only under flexible exchange 
rate that the monetary authorities are free to set the money growth rates. 
Some independence can be achieved under fixed exchange rates by the use 
o f capital control. Under flexible exchange rates, fiscal policy is 
ineffective.
2.8. The impacts of budget deficit.
We close the discussion on the theoretical approaches to the balance 
o f payments by observing the impact o f  budget deficit on the balance o f  
payments or current account. The discussion is then followed by trying to 
find the appropriate approach for Indonesia.
There has been a long debate regarding the relationship between 
budget deficit and current account or balance o f  payments. Some argue 
that there is a relationship between the two and is often called "twin
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deficit”. Others, however, argue against any relationship. Economists 
generally agree that an increase in the budget deficit caused by a temporary 
increase in government purchase or expenditure will reduce national 
savings, which in turn increases the current account deficit (crowding out 
effect), but whether an increase in the budget deficit caused by a tax cut 
reduces national savings is unsettled. In analysing the impact of budget 
deficit on current account, Sadiq Ahmed asserts that it works through two 
channels20):
The first channel or direct effect is the impact of higher expenditure 
on imports financed directly by government borrowing.
The second channel, which works indirectly, is the impact of fiscal 
deficit on inflation, and leads to an appreciation in the real exchange rate. 
The latter in turn, leads to higher imports and lower exports and therefore a 
higher current account deficit. In assessing the impact of budget deficit on 
the current account, using econometric modelling, therefore, those two 
variables - nominal exchange rate and budget deficit as a share of GNP - 
are put separately in the equation. However, his statistical results do not 
seem convincing.
Related to the exchange rate policy, Rudiger Dombusch maintain 
that exchange rate policy cannot be separated from fiscal policy. 
Inflationary financed budget deficit by money creation is then only a 
crawling - peg exchange rate system that is sustainable. Under such a 
system, the exchange rate is depreciated at a rate approximately equal to 
the difference between home and foreign inflation. But if a deficit is 
financed by debt, exchange rate policy becomes more difficult. Current 
borrowing finances a deficit in the external balance and allows a high real 
exchange rate. But when debt servicing starts, a real depreciation is
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necessary to improve the external balance. Failure to move the exchange 
rate implies overvaluation and borrowing to finance exchange rate 
misalignment, and that means wasting resources21}.
f
The way an increase in budget deficit will affect current account is 
discussed by Ahsan H. Mansur. In his study, using simultaneous equations, 
he asserts that it will have two direct effects: aggregate real domestic 
demand will increase, and so will the nominal supply of money22^  These 
direct effects will tend to increase the price level, real income, and real 
level of imports through different channels and feedback effects of other 
variables. Imports will be affected indirectly through three channels; (i) 
higher aggregate demand owing to an increase in real government 
expenditure; (ii) increased private sector absorption resulting from a higher 
income effect; (iii) the general price level rising relative to import prices, 
leading to an appreciation in the real exchange rate. This last in turn, leads 
to higher imports and lower exports and therefore a higher current account 
deficit.
As regards the effect of fiscal deficit on private investment, it is best 
understood by beginning with the familiar national income identity:
G - T = ( Sp - Ip ) + ( M - X )
At a very simple level, one can see that an increase in the fiscal 
deficit (G - T) without recourse to increased foreign borrowing (M - X ) 
must imply an increase in net private savings - an increase in private 
savings or a decline in private investment or a combination. How much of 
the adjustment is borne by private investment depends on how fiscal 
deficits affect the cost and availability of credit. It is, therefore, necessary
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to distinguish between economies in which interest rates are uncontrolled 
versus those where credit is allocated by non - price mechanisms23).
If interest rates are controlled and credit is allocated, there is a one 
to one negative relationship of fiscal deficit (higher credit to the public 
sector) and reduced credit to the private sector. If instead the government 
increases expenditure and resorts to monetary financing, this will in turn 
lead to a rise in the rate of inflation, a fall in real interest rate (since 
nominal rates are fixed), and if private savings fall24), the availability of 
loanable funds to the private sector decline.
A further complication may arise in the form of a reduction in tax 
revenues due to higher inflation (Tanzi effect), leading to higher deficit 
financing requirement. In any case, irrespective of the financing option 
chosen a higher fiscal deficit with repressed financial markets will lead to a 
reduction in credit to the private sector.
In the case in which interest rates are market determined, the 
financing through domestic borrowing (commercial banks or non-bank 
private sector), assuming no access to foreign financing, will raise the 
interest rate, and so the interest payment on short-term debt held by the 
government. On the positive side, with a higher real interest rate, the same 
level of inflation tax revenue is available at a lower inflation rate as the 
demand for money also rises.
Recourse to monetary financing instead of domestic borrowing 
raises both the rate of inflation and the real interest rate. So irrespective of 
the method of financing a larger fiscal deficit with uncontrolled interest 
rates will always lead to higher real interest rates.
Another observation on budget deficit impact was proposed and 
summarised by Michael M. Hutchison as follows 25):
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Table 2.1
Financing channels of budget deficit: Advantages, 
Draw-backs, and Tensions Created
Possible outcome Foreign finance
Domestic Finance
Monetary finance Captive Institutions Market Finance
Advantages Limited domestic 
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Source : Michael IV . Hutchison
Hutchison further stated that domestic financing by monetary financing will 
increase base money of the central bank, while non-monetary domestic 
financing may work through non market (captive) debt placement and 
market debt placement. As regards foreign financing, there are two 
sources, namely international institutions such as IMF, BIS, World Bank 
where financing in this category, often falls within the “concessionary” 
category and market finance through direct debt placement, foreign
35
commercial banks, etc. It is worth noticing the effect of foreign finance 
deficit financing, as might be relevant to Indonesia.
Turning to empirical ground, we can refer to the studies of Milne
f
and Iqbal. Milne investigates the validity of the Cambridge New School 
fiscal approach to the balance of payments by testing the empirical 
relationship between the government deficit and the current account 
deficit. The findings support the fiscal approach to the balance of payments 
in slightly more than half the countries 26\
The same result is also found by Iqbal Mehdi Zaidi. In his study on 
the relationship between current account and budget deficit, he observes 
the scatter plots of changes (and cumulative changes) in the average fiscal 
balance/GNP against changes in the average current account balance/GNP 
of sample countries (20 non-oil developing countries), over the period 
1968-72, 1974-77 and 1978-81. It was found that there is an indication of 
positive correlation between improvements in the current account balance 
and in the fiscal balance27).
He further tested the relationship between government deficit and 
the current account deficit for the sample countries by using pooled cross- 
section time series data, for the period 1972-80 (yielded 180 observations 
for the variables). He came up with the result as follows:
(CA/GNP) = 0.66 (FB/GNP)
(5.94)
R2 adj.= 0 .52 SEE = 0.038, where figures in parentheses are ^-values.
The regression results also support the proposition of a positive 
relationship between the government deficit and the current account
36
deficit, but do not identify the direction of causation. The causal test 
between the current account and fiscal balance gives mixed results, each 
affecting the other as often as not. For two of the five countries, the resultsf
indicate feedback. For Greece, unidirectional causality exists from the 
budget deficit to the current account deficit, while for Thailand it is the 
reverse. The presence of bi-directional causality between fiscal and current 
account balance is not a surprising result. On the one hand higher export 
earnings will not only improve the current account, but also reduce the 
fiscal deficit (since tax on export earnings are a significant source of 
revenue in many developing countries). Furthermore, raised domestic 
income generated by exports will also lessen the need for an expansionary 
or countercyclical fiscal policy. In both of these accounts, an improvement 
in the current account balance could be expected to be reflected in an 
improvement in the fiscal balance.
On the other hand, governments running large budget deficits have 
borrowed heavily in international capital markets. Further, even when 
budget deficit is financed by money creation there is likely to be an 
adverse effect on the current account in countries with a fixed exchange 
rate, through disequillibrium in the money market and increased imports.
Another finding about the relationship between budget deficit and 
trade deficit for developed countries like the USA was proposed by 
Joachim Zietz and Donald K. Pemberton. Three main results were implied. 
First, it appears that the persistence of the US trade deficit of the 1980s 
can not be fully explained by macroeconomic fundamentals alone. There 
seems to be a role also for microeconomic explanations (they mention such 
as US quality of goods) 28). Second, the budget deficit affects the trade 
deficit mainly through its impact on domestic absorption and income rather
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than through higher interest rates and exchange rates. Third, sluggish 
foreign income growth has contributed to the US trade deficit, though it is 
not a dominant factor.
f
The last studies to be mentioned are those conducted by the World 
Bank concluding that fiscal adjustment and its consequences are complex. 
In some of the eight developing countries it is observed that the deficits 
result in high and variable inflation, in some others are in a debt crisis, and 
in the rest others the moderately high deficits seem not to generate any 
macro imbalance whatsoever. The ways of financing affect the correlations 
of fiscal deficits with macroeconomic performance29).
The conclusion of the effect of budget deficit on current account can 
be summarised as follows :
The effects of budget deficits on the economy are the subject of 
debates among economists in both industrialised and developing countries. 
We can, at least, identify three distinctive schools of thought regarding the 
economic impact of budget deficits, namely, Neo-classical, Keynesian and 
Ricardian.
1. The neo-classical view regards consumers as farsighted 
individuals who are able to plan consumption over then- 
own life cycles. Budget deficits are bound to raise total 
lifetime consumption by postponing taxes to the next 
generations. In a full employment economy, this increase in 
consumption implies a decrease in savings. Therefore, 
interest rates must rise to bring capital markets to balance. 
Hence, persistent deficits “crowd out” private capital 
accumulation.
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2. The Keynesian view regards a significant fraction of the 
population as possessing a very high propensity to 
consume out of disposable income. Hence, a temporary taxf
reduction would have an immediate and quantitatively 
significant impact on aggregate demand. Assuming that 
initially the resources of the economy are underemployed, 
national income rises, thereby generating second round 
effects and the Keynesian multiplier. Savings and capital 
accumulation need not be adversely affected inasmuch as 
deficits are seen as stimulating both consumption and 
national income. Therefore, deficits occurring at the 
appropriate times have beneficial effects.
3. As has already been touched on the previous discussion on 
the effect of budget deficit on balance of payment, the 
Ricardian view suggests the presence of intergenerational 
linkages among successive generations, manifested in 
altruistically motivated transfers of resources. This would 
imply that consumption is a function of the total resources 
of an individual and all his descendants. Under this view, 
deficits merely shift the payment of taxes to future 
generations. Therefore, the total resources of the individual 
and all his descendants are in the aggregate unaffected.
This being the case, the individuals would be indifferent to 
deficits.
Regarding the altruistic reasons, there are at least four schools of 
thought that can be mentioned. Robert Barro, among others, has suggested
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that people leave bequests because they care about their children, and try 
to raise children’s well-being by income transfers. While others, like 
Douglas Bemheim and Andrei Schleifer, argued that parents have lessf
altruistic motives. A third school holds that bequest are largely 
unintended. Finally there are those who hold the view that much wealth 
accumulation is not for future consumption in any event, but rather simply 
for the power and prestige it brings30).
The size of the deficit as well as its source of financing determine 
the impact of budgetary shortfalls on the economy. Direct borrowing from 
the Central Bank is regarded as inflationary, while borrowing from the 
bank and non-bank private sector may induce increases in interest rates or 
may crowd out private business. Foreign borrowings may have 
implications on the balance of payments.
Hence, it would appear that one can find support for any position 
taken on the effects of budget deficits be it detrimental, beneficial or 
irrelevant. The effects would of course depend on the particular 
circumstances faced by the individual countries.
2. 9. The relevant approach to Indonesia
We will now try to find the appropriate policy approach for 
Indonesia. From the point of view of policy making, based on the facts that 
Indonesia is a small open economy (its import prices are given and export 
prices for most products are determined at the world level), with a high 
degree of capital mobility (though not perfectly mobile), and de facto  
maintaining fixed (managed) real exchange rate system, then the Mundell- 
Fleming approach provides a very convenient and powerful reference31
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However, in his previous study Sadiq Ahmed mistakenly asserted that the 
exchange rate in Indonesia was endogenously determined32). My objection 
(the writer’s) to his opinion was then supported by him. f
Using the standard IS-LM approach, only the balance of payments 
equilibrium line (BB) needs to be modified as capital mobility is not 
perfect. The BB schedule is upward sloping because higher levels of 
income cause a deterioration in the current account; this necessitates a 
reduced capital outflow/higher capital inflow requiring a higher interest 
rate. The BB curve slopes upwards reflecting imperfect capital mobility, 
instead of horizontal (Figure 2.4.). The imperfection of capital mobility is 
measured by off set (sterilisation) coefficient, a coefficient which shows 
the degree of Central Bank intervention in maintaining the money supply. 
Thus, a country suffering a deficit in balance of payments, that is selling 
foreign exchange and correspondingly reducing its money supply, may 
offset this reduction by open market operation to restore the money supply, 
or it can be seen as the magnitude of the decline of official foreign reserves 
due to an increase in domestic credit. For Indonesia a suggested value of 
this coefficient is 0.48 for the first quarter and 0.60 for the long run which 
is considered in the medium range33).
The higher the coefficient the less perfect is the capital mobility, and 
the steeper is the BB curve. While the higher the degree of capital mobility 
then the flatter the BB schedule. This is because for a given increase in 
income which leads to a deterioration of the current account, the higher the 
degree of capital mobility, the smaller the required rise in the domestic 
interest rate to attract sufficient capital inflows to ensure overall 
equilibrium. It is also assumed that the BB schedule is flatter than the LM 
schedule, which means that capital flows are relatively sensitive to interest
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rate change, while money demand is relatively inelastic with respect to the 
interest rate.
From the description above, fiscal policy which follows the 
Mundell-Fleming hypothesis, is more effective than monetary policy. An 
expansionary fiscal policy would shift the IS curve to the right, increase 
income and interest rates. The latter rise due to an increase in the demand 
for money and will invite capital inflow, increase in reserves and expansion 
of money supply. The rise in money supply will shift the LM curve to the 
right, and a new equilibrium will be reached at point b, associated with 
higher income. The associated worsening of current account balance is 
financed through capital flows. The strength of fiscal expansion will 
depend upon the degree of capital mobility. The lower the mobility, the 






Figure 2.4. : Mundell-Fleming Approach under Indonesian 
conditions
To include domestic prices factor (assuming that world prices are 
constant) in considering the effect of those two policies, will only alter the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy but does not change the efficacy of monetary 
policy. In Indonesia, with abundant supply of labour, especially in the
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informal sector, the supply curve in the aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply model is assumed to be relatively flat, and positive function of the 
price level (so to follow Keynesian aggregate supply), as shown by curve 
AS0 on Figure 2.5.
The results of expansionary fiscal policy depend upon the flexibility 
of prices and wages. The more flexible the prices, the less the sustaining 
effects of fiscal policy on income. Conversely, the more sticky the prices, 
the more the sustaining effects of fiscal policy on income. This can be seen 
in Figure 2.5. In the top panel, as the IS curve shifts to the right (to ISO, 
due to an expansionary fiscal policy, the intersection with LMo implies 
income level Yi. Therefore, the aggregate demand curve shifts to the right
t
oy the distance Yi-Yf, or aggregate demand curve moves up to A D . The
/
intersection of AD with the short run aggregate supply curve (ASo) is at 
point c, implying short-run equilibrium output of Y2 at price level p2. In the 
top panel it can be noted that higher price level reduces the real quantity of 
money, shifting the LM curve to LM1. In the long run (where the real 
wages adjust gradually), represented by aggregate supply curve AS], once 
all adjustments have been made, output returns to Yf, the price level rises 


















Figure 2.5 : Long run effect o f fiscal policy under fixed exchange 
rate
By proposing the Mundell-Fleming model as an appropriate model 
for Indonesian macroeconomic policy does not, o f  course, necessarily 
mean that other approaches such as elasticity and absorption approach are 
not to work in the Indonesian economy. The Mundell-Fleming model 
which is a short run model assumes that Marshall-Lemer conditions hold, 
yet this assumption is one o f the criticisms raised to this approach, because 
to this assumption is least likely to be met in the short-run34).
The relevance o f  the Mundell-Fleming approach to Indonesia should 
be seen in comparison with the monetary approach whose assumptions 
such as full employment and wage flexibility are hardly to be met in the 
Indonesian economy. The practical implication through an empirical
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observation on Indonesia economy discussed in Chapter Seven sheds lights 
on how Mundell-Fleming found its applicability in Indonesia.
f
2.10. Conclusion
The elasticity approach like the absorption approach does not 
provide an unambiguous answer to the question of whether a devaluation 
leads to improvement in the current account balance. It depends on how 
economic agents respond to the change of relative prices caused by a 
devaluation. Demand elasticities are higher in the long run than in the short 
run leading to possible J  curve. Despite their simplistic assumptions and 
ambiguous conclusion the two approaches have remained influential, as 
they contain useful tools for policy makers. A devaluation is more likely to 
succeed when elasticities of demand for imports and exports are high and 
when it is accompanied by measures such as fiscal and monetary restraint 
that boost income relative to domestic absorption.
The monetary approach sees the balance of payments disequilibrium 
being a flow response to stock disequilibrium in the money market. A 
significant contribution of the Mabop is that it provides a set of policy 
recommendations. A country that adopts a fixed exchange rate will lose its 
monetary autonomy and a monetary expansion will lead to temporary 
balance of payments deficits. Whereas a country that allows its currency to 
float will have monetary autonomy but a monetary expansion then leads to 
a depreciation of its currency. Hence, this approach provides a warning to 
policy makers that reckless monetary policy can lead to balance of 
payment problems under fixed exchange rates or a currency problem under 
floating exchange rates. With regard to the effect of devaluation, the result 
is unambiguously transitory surplus in balance of payment.
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The fiscal approach is the other side of the coin of Mabop in the 
sense that the first stresses the current account as an autonomous 
determining factor, while the latter concentrates on the official settlement 
accounts or the monetary flows as autonomous items and the purchases 
and sales of goods/services and investments are viewed as accommodating 
items. A fiscal approach emphasises that the fiscal balance is the proper 
macro-economic target that can be used to influence the current account.
The main contributions of policy approach or Mundell-Fleming 
approach a re :
- the independent policy instruments should be as many as 
the targets of economic policy.
- the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy is very 
much dependent upon the choice of exchange rate regime 
and the degree of capital mobility. With perfect capital 
mobility, monetary policy is more effective under a floating 
exchange regime while fiscal policy is more effective under 
a fixed exchange rate regime. Under fixed exchange rate 
regime and perfect capital mobility, like in the monetary 
approach to the balance of payment, money supply or 
monetary policy is endogeneously determined.
While the criticisms of this approach include :
- the assumption that the Marshall - Lemer condition always 
holds.
- neglect of budget constrains. No private or public sector 
will run a deficit financed indefinitely by capital inflow, 
without becoming an ever increasing debtor to the rest of 
the world.
- neglect the supply - side factors.
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Finally, it was found that the Mundell-Fleming approach was the 
most suitable and appropriate approach for Indonesia. And as we will see 
in the next chapter about Indonesia’s economy and policy responses 
against external and internal shocks, and empirical observation in Chapter 
Seven, this approach seem to have been proven well fitted.
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3.1. Indonesia’s Adjustment Program: A Brief Summary
This chapter discusses the policy adjustments that have been 
continuously implemented by Indonesia in response to external shocks, 
with special emphasize on financial policies such as monetary and fiscal 
policy. In Chapter Four we will explore the performances and results of the 
adjustments.
The 1970s were a period of unprecedented growth of Indonesian 
economy, with the main stimulus provided by a sharp increase in oil prices. 
Since 1981, the country has experienced a series of external shocks 
resulting from a collapse of oil prices (in contrast to what most developing 
countries were experiencing), worldwide recession of the early 1980s, and 
depreciation of the US dollar. Indonesia's adjustment program was 
basically initiated in 1983 when the adverse effect of the worldwide 
recession on export volumes was especially severe and the decline in other 
commodity prices hurt Indonesia's balance of payments, although lower 
imports prices provided partial relief. The adjustment programs were then 
intensified after the second collapse of oil prices in 1986.
The depreciation of the US dollar after mid 1985 adversely affected 
Indonesia’s external balance since a large proportion of Indonesia's foreign 
debt is denominated in currencies that have appreciated in relation to the 
dollar. As a consequence, Indonesia's total debt in dollar terms has surged.
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These currency fluctuations, together with the loss of export revenue 
because of falling oil prices, significantly increased Indonesia's debt 
service payments (interest and principal). But, unlike many other 
developing countries, especially in Latin America, Indonesia did not have 
its debt service burden seriously increased by higher international interest 
rates, mainly because of the predominantly concessional nature and fixed 
interest rate of its debt. Another factor in Indonesia's favor was its low 
borrowing requirements (because of its large oil earnings) during 1978-81 
when international borrowing rates surged.
How great was the magnitude of the adverse effects of external 
shocks on the Indonesian economy is illustrated on Table 3.1 below^
Table 3.1
Effects of External Shocks in Indonesia, 1984-89, as a percentage of GNP
Effect 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989a 1984-
88
Terms of trade (1981 
prices)
2.5 2.0 5.7 15.6 13.3 14.1 8.9
Exchange rate (1981 
exchange rate)
-0.2 -0,3 -0.4 0.3 0.9 1.5 0.3
Interest rate (1981 
interest rate)
0.6 0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.1
Total effect of 
External Shocks
2.9 2.1 5.4 15.9 13.7 15.6 9.3
a. Estimated
Source : Ibid., Ahmed, Sadiq, pp. 362.
On average, Indonesia suffered an income loss equivalent to about 9 
percent of its annual gross national product (GNP) due to external 
disturbances during 1984-88. The loss of income was especially large in 
1987 and 1988. The terms of trade effect was dominant, while the interest 
rate effect was minimal. The loss of income from international currency 
fluctuations increased significantly in 1987-88. The burden of external 
shocks was substantial and posed a major challenge to policy makers.
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Without a forceful and quick policy response, this large loss of income 
could easily have destabilized the economy.
Since the first major burst of reform deregulating the banking sector 
in June 1983, there have been more than a dozen major policy reform 
packages and deregulation became the new 'catch-word' for policy-makers 
since then. The discussion below is to examine Indonesia's adjustment to a 
series of external shocks since 1981, the role of the various policy 
instruments in the process of stabilization and structural change, and to 
evaluate Indonesia’s economic performance. However, before going into 
details of the adjustment policies themselves, it is worth outlining the 
policies, to grasp the overall picture and main idea of them.
The main thrust of the reform was to allow the private sector to be 
more initiative and to play an active role in the economy, and thereby a 
change in the government's role from an omnipotent presence to a mere 
facilitator of a more conducive business environment that placed the 
private sector in a more important position. The Government's strategy 
towards the private sector development since then changed significantly. It 
has recognized that the main source of financing new investment and in 
generating new employment opportunities and increasing non-oil export 
earnings will have to emanate from the private sector. As a result, the 
Government undertook a phased program of reforms designed to improve 
the incentive framework, to simplify economic regulations and to 
deregulate the financial sector.
The key elements of this structural adjustment program include a 
range of measures to strengthen domestic resource mobilization, to expand 
non-oil exports and to promote a more competitive and dynamic non-oil 
economy. The policy measures can be grouped under five broad
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categories: (a) fiscal policy (b) exchange rate management (c) monetary 
policy (d) trade regime and (e) other regulatory reforms.
There are around 13 important deregulation measures that were 
introduced between June 1983 and June 1989. In examining them, it 
should be borne in mind that deregulation measures should be seen as 
policies that go together with other policies, such as “balanced” budget, as 
a reflection of fiscal prudence, and a relatively controlled and sound 
monetary and credit policy which ensures that inflation is kept in check.
3.2. A Broad Based Adjustment
Indonesia is often cited as a country that has been singularly 
successful in adjusting to a series of severe external shocks since the early 
1980s. Prudent and timely macroeconomic policies and a broad range of 
adjustment measures have combined to reduce macroeconomic 
imbalances, lower distortions in the incentive regime and stimulate strong 
recovery. Consequently, the Indonesian economy is favorably placed to 
sustain a higher growth path.
The main deregulatory measures introduced are as follows2):
1. The first banking deregulation of 1 June 1983. This was a major 
financial reform that removed interest rate and credit ceilings for 
state bank operations and introduced new instruments of 
monetary control. The quantity variable (credit being reserved for 
state banks) was switched to a more market based mechanism 
(which allowed state banks to determine their own deposit and 
lending rates).
55
2. Major tax reforms of 1 January 1984 on income tax and 1 April 
1984 on value added tax represented a simplification and 
clarification of previous laws. Income tax rates were limited to 
three, with the highest rate set at 35 percent. A ’self-assessment’ 
system was introduced for taxpayers to pay tax and reducing 
official interference in the tax system.
3. Presidential instruction (Instruksi Presiden or Inpres) No.5/1984 
gave departments and governmental institutions legal power for 
further deregulation, especially in licensing for investment, 
production, and other forms of government and private sector 
relationships. As a result of this Presidential Instruction, some 
departments, as well as the Central Bank, reduced licensing and 
procedural requirements related to private business activities.
4. Presidential Instruction No.4/1985, issued in April of that year 
was regarded as the most substantial deregulation measure taken 
up to that time. It covered reorganizing customs, ports and 
shipping to reduce freight costs and cut procedural time. The most 
dramatic of all the elements of this instruction was the removal of 
customs responsibility for international trade from the Directorate 
General of Customs and Excise of the Department of Finance to a 
private Swiss based firm, Societe General de Surveillance. With 
this measure, what many regarded as corrupt activities on the part 
of the Directorate General of Customs and Excise disappeared 
instantaneously. The Instruction also decreed a reduction in the 
number of tariff categories, and a lowering of the maximum 
nominal rate of protection for most items to 60 percent.
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5. The 6 May 1986 package, formulated by the Co-ordinating 
Economic Minister, and mainly involving a decree by the 
Ministers of Finance and Trade. This package basically provided 
internationally priced inputs to exporters. This package exempted 
manufacturers who exported at least 85 percent of their output 
from duties and limitations on the import of inputs. For 
manufacturers exporting less than 85 percent of their output, 
import restrictions could still be waived provided locally supplied 
inputs were uncompetitive in terms of price and/ or quality, and 
could claim a rebate of part of any duty paid.
6. The 25 October 1986 Package. In this package, government 
reduced QR/NTB on several imported commodities, and put tariff 
barriers in their places.
7. The 15 January 1987 package. This package took the shift from 
‘quantity variable’ limitations on imported commodities to ‘price 
variable’ limitations much further than had been done in the 25 
October 1986 package.
8. The 24 December 1987 package continued the switch from 
QR/NTBs to tariffs as a means of regulating imports. It also 
allowed a reduction in the number of licenses required for various 
investment activities, especially those related to tourist 
development. For instance it was observed prior to this reform, 
that to build a hotel required 33 licenses or permits and even then 
they were valid for only one year. After the announcement of this 
package, only two permits were required, valid for five years.
9. The 27 October 1988 package on the financial sector and 
financial institutions. This essentially liberalized the whole
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financial sector of the economy. Although since 1967 Indonesia 
had had an open capital account and free foreign exchange 
regime, this latest deregulation package opened up the country 
totally to foreign capital and financial institution. For example, 
previously the banking business was closed, and the only way for 
new enterprises to enter the business was through the purchase of 
existing banking licenses. Under the new regulations, a bank with 
paid-up capital of RplO billion, or less than US$6 million, could 
apply for a banking license in its own right. New foreign banks 
could enter the banking business either in their own right or 
through joint ventures with domestic private banks. Foreign banks 
were also permitted to open branches in six major cities outside 
Jakarta (Surabaya, Semarang, Bandung, Medan, Ujung Pandang, 
and Denpasar). State banks lost their monopoly of deposits by 
state-owned enterprises, the latter now being permitted to lodge 
up to 50 percent of their funds in private banks.
10. The 21 November 1988 package on trade, shipping and the 
industrial and agricultural sectors. This package was regarded as 
the most sweeping NTB reduction so far. Its coverage include the 
import of plastics, a highly sensitive commodity involving a 
monopoly by a state-owned enterprise, in co-operation with a 
private firm. Equally substantial were the reforms in the shipping 
sector. Another measure of great significance was the substantial 
deregulation of maritime activities to reduce costs and encourage 
private participation.
11. The 22 December 1988 package. In this package the capital 
market was deregulated even further, making foreign participation
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more possible. Other financial activities like appraisal, venture 
capital, and insurance were also opened up to the market in ways 
not previously possible.
12. The March 1989 package was an elaboration of the October and 
December 1988 packages. Banks would now only be permitted to 
hold 25 percent of their assets in foreign currency (known as net 
open position). Together with a reduction of reserve requirements 
to 2 percent (reduced from 15 percent in the October 1988 
Package), this has created a much greater degree of liquidity in 
the money market. With the rapid growth of the capital market 
which had grown tremendously in 1989, the money and capital 
market became a dynamic financial sector of the economy.
13. The June 1989 Package on reform of state-owned enterprises. 
Each of these enterprises was classified into one of four broad 
categories: very healthy, healthy, less healthy, and unhealthy. The 
categorization was to be based on the enterprise's liquidity, 
profitability, and solvency.
3.3. Fiscal Poiicv
A country's fiscal system and its fiscal performance is best seen in a 
historical context. In the 1950s the Indonesian fiscal system was heavily 
dependent on revenues from foreign trade. In the late fifties these reserves 
began to decline as a percentage of total revenues, as a consequence of 
unfavourable world market conditions, and over valued multiple exchange 
rate and complex trade regulation. In the years 1967-73, under a new 
regime, the government launched the economic stabilization and
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rehabilitation program to eliminate the main cause of inflation-budget 
deficit. Fiscal discipline was introduced by instituting a balanced budget
policy and quarterly budget programming. In the past, certain departments
*
and agencies had been able to maintain their own budgets outside of the 
control of financial policy makers. From 1967 onward, all budget decisions 
were centralized at the Ministry of Finance.
Under the standby arrangement - the IMF program to help member 
countries - the IMF limited the government's expenditure to no more than 
10 percent of GNP. On the revenue side, concerted efforts were made to 
increase taxes on international trade, particularly: custom duty collection, 
proceeds from excise and sales taxes, and non-tax revenues. As foreign aid 
became available, the government was able to balance its budget in 1968. 
In line with this, to be able to create larger government saving, routine 
expenditure has been maintained at its minimum level. The results were 
quite impressive. Since 1969, the beginning of The First Five Year 
Economic Development Plan, the routine budget has been in surplus. Ever 
since then, the government has been able to set aside some domestic 
revenue to finance its development expenditure. Under the existing 
structure of the government budget, with the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the tax and budget expenditure system, the government budget plays a 
significant role in promoting economic development.
In pursuit of its aim of stabilization, rehabilitation and development 
in the field of budget policy, the measures can be summarized as follows:
- The budget was to be balanced in the sense that total expenditure 
would equal total revenues from both domestic and foreign 
sources, including foreign borrowing. To balance the budget, 
current expenditures, including wages and salaries of government
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employees and expenditure to maintain public utilities, were kept 
at minimal level. Prestige and other non-economic projects were 
abolished. Price controls were removed by reducing subsidies and 
letting prices be determined by market forces.
- Government savings (defined as domestic revenues minus routine 
expenditure) were to increase over time to reduce gradually the 
dependency on foreign aid as a means of financing development 
expenditure. This had become popularly known as “dynamic 
balanced budget”.
- The tax base was progressively widened so that it became fairer 
and in due time should increase tax revenues. This was to be done 
by intensifying assessment and simplifying collection procedures.
- Government emphasised directly productive development 
expenditure rather than routine expenditure or subsidies to state 
enterprises, which were to be encouraged to be financially viable.
- Budgetary policy was designed to encourage possible maximum 
use of domestic resources, including labour, in order to expand 
domestic output. For this purpose domestic producers were to 
receive fiscal incentives to use labour-intensive production 
techniques and where necessary were to be protected against 
foreign competition.
Before discussing the tax reforms, it would be useful firstly to see 
the patterns of central government revenue. Indonesian government 
revenues can be broadly classified into three categories : non-oil domestic 
revenues, oil tax revenues, and receipts from official foreign borrowing 
including foreign aid and credits. The oil tax needs to be separated out 
from other domestic revenue because it accounts for such a large share of
61
Indonesian government revenue. Besides, the collection procedures and the 
economic implications differ from those other domestic taxes. Non-oil 
domestic revenues comprise all other direct and indirect taxes and non-tax 
revenue items. Some argue it is slightly misleading to refer to all these 
revenues as non-oil because they do include some revenues from the 
domestic sale of petroleum products, and indirect taxes derived from 
imports of petroleum products. However, unlike the main oil company 
taxes, both these categories of revenues directly reduce domestic 
purchasing power. There will be further discussion of the impact of oil 
related revenues in Chapter Five. Non-tax revenues include royalties 
(timber royalties being the most important), receipts from government 
services provided to the public, fines and profits from state enterprises and 
budget surplus from previous years.
The third major category of government income, which is classified 
as a source of revenue, rather than source of financing of the deficit, in the 
Indonesian budget documents, is official foreign borrowing. This includes 
both aid flows and the very substantial amount of official overseas 
borrowing at market rates of interest and concessional loans. Official 
foreign borrowing can take different forms, such as project aid and foreign 
exchange for local costs. Domestic borrowing from the non-bank sector is 
not yet available in contrast to many other Asian countries. This is largely 
due to the absence of any organized money market and undeveloped 
capital market where government securities could be traded.
The broad trends in government revenue patterns may be 
summarized as follows: (Refer to Table 4.7 in Chapter Four).
1. The oil company tax revenue has risen from under 10 percent of 
total revenues in 1967 to more than 60 percent in 1981/82. The
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increase was particularly rapid after 1973/4 and then fell to only 
26 percent in 1992/93.
2. Partly as a result of the boom in oil tax receipts, non oil domestic
*
revenues have fallen steadily as a proportion of total revenues 
since 1967. In 1978/9 it comprised less than 40 percent of the 
total but in 1992/93 reversed to 55 percent of total revenues.
3. Within the non oil domestic revenues category the share of direct 
taxes in total revenues has gradually increased to more than 15 
percent since 1989/90 compared to an average of 13 in the 
previous period. Most of the overall decline in the relative 
importance of non-oil domestic revenues is due to the falling 
revenue share of indirect taxes, though this has started to increase 
again since 1985/86.
4. Revenues from project aid and export credits rose sharply after 
1974/5. This was, at least, partly due to a rapid increase in public 
development expenditure, which occurred in the wake of the oil 
boom but needed to be substantially financed out of suppliers' 
credits when Pertamina's (State Oil Company) crisis took place. 
After a short term reduction in the late 1970s around 15 percent, 
total foreign borrowing and aids as a share of total revenues since 
1986/87 has increased to an average of 23 percent. The falls in oil 
revenue seem to have increased government foreign borrowing to 
maintain the targeted rate of economic growth.
The most notable feature of the 1970s Indonesian's fiscal 
development is the central government's increasing reliance on oil as its 
chief source of revenue. Oil revenue as a share of total government
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revenue rose from 14 percent in 1969-70 to a peak at 62 percent in 1981- 
82 (Table 4.7). Non-oil revenue - GDP ratio fell from the 1969-1971 
average of 8 percent (not shown) to the 1982-83 average of 4 percent
f
(Table 4.8). The fiscal danger of such a narrow tax base was brought home 
dramatically in 1982 when the global recession caused oil prices to 
collapse. It was detected that oil revenue, expressed in 1980 rupiahs, fell 
from Rp7.8 billion in 1981-82 to Rp6.9 billion in 1982-1983, causing real 
total revenue to fall for the first time in the Indonesia history.
All of this development gave a clear message that greater internal 
resource mobilization was inevitable. Recognizing the weak non-oil tax 
effort, and the risk of lower oil revenues, the government introduced a 
comprehensive package of tax reforms. This sweeping tax reform 
implemented in 1984-1986 boosted non-oil tax revenue and improved the 
efficiency of the tax system. A completely revised personal and corporate 
income tax code came into force in January 1984, a value added tax in 
April 1985, and a consolidated property tax in 1986. The main objectives 
of the tax reform were to :
1. reduce the heavy dependency of government revenues on oil/ 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) taxes.
2. improve the efficiency of the tax system in the term of coverage 
and collection rate, and streamline the tax administration.
3. improve domestic resource mobilization and raise the buoyancy of 
tax revenues in relation to income growth over the long term and
4. enhance the elements of equity and social justice in the tax 
system.
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The main features of the tax reform package are as follows :
a. The income tax reform introduced in January 1984 included :
(i) a vastly simplified tax structure, based on three relatively low 
rates ( 15%, 25% 35% ) and limited deductions;
(ii) “self assessment” of tax liability, with considerable emphasis on 
witholding at source;
(iii) a drastic simplification of the tax code, including revised 
procedures for appeals and refunds.
b. The value added tax (VAT) introduced in April 1985 replaced the old 
sales tax. The basic tax rate is 10%.
Although confined to the manufacturer-importer level, the VAT has 
increased revenue potential by:
(i) subjecting domestic sales of petroleum and tobacco products to 
VAT;
(ii) imposing an additional tax (10-20%) on luxury goods.
c. The new property tax (PBB) introduced in January 1986 replaced 
seven ordinances, including the old land (IPEDA) and net wealth taxes. 
The new law is conceptually simpler than its predecessors, based on a 
proportion of the market value of land buildings, and a single tax rate 
of 0.5%.
3.4. Exchange Rate Policy
Indonesia’s exchange rate policy is characterized by three distinct 
phases in the period 1966 until now. The first is from October 1966 to July 
1971, in which there was a steady dismantling of the multi-tiered exchange 
rate system into a unified exchange rate. This phase revealed a readiness to
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have medium-sized devaluation to restore competitiveness, eroded by the 
high inflation. In the the second phase, from August 1971 to October 1978, 
there was a fixed exchange rate. The reason for this remarkable stability is 
straightforward: the balance of payment was very strong throughout the 
period, despite the squandering of several billion dollars of revenue by 
Pertamina (the state oil company). The rapid development of the oil sector 
together with the 1973’s OPEC price increase caused Indonesian oil 
exports to rise from US$ 0.9 billion in 1972 to US$4.6 billion in 1974 
(Table 4.9). The macroeconomic condition also did not warrant any 
additional stimulus which a devaluation would bring. The sustained high 
income growth rates of this period - 7.9 percent per year - were achieved 
with substantial over heating of the economy. The average 1973-78 
inflation rate was 22 percent (as calculated from Table 4.2) compared with 
8 percent in 1970-1972 (not shown), whereas it was around 10 percent in 
most developed countries. Such considerable differences between home 
and foreign inflation had brought about a steady real overvaluation of the 
rupiah with a fixed exchange rate. In sum, the fixed exchange rate during 
1971-1978 had brought Indonesia’s trade to rely heavily on oil, 
discouraging the development of the labour-intensive agricultural export 
sector. This was not in line with the equity and employment objectives of 
national economic development.
The third episode, from 1978 until today, represents a major change 
in Indonesia's exchange rate system, switching from the fixed exchange 
rate regime to a managed floating one. The practical mechanism of the 
authorities' intervention is basically the same as the one with the fixed rate 
system, in the sense that the central bank determines the exchange rate and 
is obligated to purchase and to sell foreign reserve without limitations. The
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only difference is that the exchange rate is determined on a daily basis and 
is subject to change on the next day. It was officially announced that the 
rupiah is no longer virtually (only) pegged to the US dollar, but rather it is 
linked to a basket of eight currencies of Indonesia’s main trading countries, 
in which Japan and the USA get greater weight. Under the new system, the 
central bank must be more active in determining an appropriate exchange 
rate, considering contemporaneous movements of other related economic 
variables, such as exchange rate movements in trading partners, changes in 
the level of official foreign reserves and the condition of the domestic 
markets. In the longer run, say quarterly or yearly, Indonesia’s exchange 
rate movements may also reflect the development of the real sector such as 
the terms of trade measuring the competitiveness of domestic tradable 
goods in world trade.
The third episode involved three large devaluations: in November 
1978, March 1983, and September 1986, separated by moderately long 
periods of gradual exchange rate depreciation. The first devaluation was 
taken on November 15, 1978, increasing the nominal exchange rate by 50 
percent, from Rp415 to Rp625 for each US dollar. Second, in March 1983, 
the rupiah was devalued by 28 percent, from Rp707 to Rp970 per US 
dollar. Between the two major devaluations, in fact, there had been a very 
small and gradual adjustment in the exchange rate, from Rp625 in 
November 1978 to Rp707 for each US dollar in March 1983. However, 
until 1981 the exchange rate, in effect, was moving only in a very narrow 
band; between November 1978 and December 1980 the exchange rate was 
devalued by only 1 percent, while domestic prices had increased by 40 
percent. Beginning in late 1981, the government through the Central Bank 
introduced a more flexible exchange rate policy under which the rupiah
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was gradually depreciated vis-a-vis the US dollar through a series of small 
daily movements in the exchange rate. This more flexible approach, which 
can be described as a "crawling peg" system, was continued after the 28% 
devaluation of the rupiah on March 30, 1983. After 1981 the exchange rate 
moved a little more rapidly, between January 1981 and March 1983 the 
exchange rate was devalued by 12 percent. The third major devaluation 
was taken on September 12, 1986, where the exchange rate was increased 
by 45 percent, from Rpl,134 to Rpl,644 per US dollar. There are two, 
mutually compatible, explanations for the 50 percent devaluation in 1978. 
The first explanation is that it was an anticipatory action to the inevitable 
drop-off in oil export earnings due to resource depletion. The second 
explanation emphasizes the economic difficulties and political tensions 
associated with the reallocation of resources being forced upon the 
economy by the overvalued exchange rate. The overvaluation of rupiah 
was the result of maintaining the exchange rate at Rp415 to the US dollar 
despite the high domestic inflation from 1974 to 1977. The March 1983 
and September 1986 devaluations were mainly undertaken to boost non-oil 
exports in the face of large declines in oil export eamings3).
As a result of two maxi devaluations, a managed float policy and the 
government's ability to restrain inflation, Indonesia's real effective 
exchange rate depreciated by about 46 percent between December 1985 
and December 1992 (Table 3.2.). The downward trend of the real effective 
exchange rate was generally maintained throughout the adjustment phase. 
The substantial depreciation of the real exchange rate played a crucial role 











Relative Prices3) Real effective 
rate2)
1985
March 1.099 76.4 124.3 95
December 1,125 63.9 127.7 81.6
1986
March 1,127 59.7 129.1 77.1
December 1,651 38.7 137.7- 53.3
1987
March 1,6^7 36.8 139.3 51.3
December 1,651 33.2 146.9 48.8
1988
March 1,660 33.0 147.9 48.8
December 1,726 31.5 150.2 47.3
1989
March 1,751 32.2 152.5 49.1
December 1,796 32.2 153.7 49.5
1990
March 1,820 32.4 154.7 50.2
December 1,892 28.7 161.0 46.2
1991
March 1,927 29.0 161.9 47.0
December 1,988 27.3 170.9 46.6
1992
March 2,015 27.6 173.0 47.7
December 2,060 26.4 175.1 46.2
Notes : 1) Exchange rate notification index. Non-oil trade-weighted; price series are 
seasonally adjusted
2) Increase in the index indicates appreciation of the rupiah
3) Increase in the index indicates higher inflation in Indonesia than in trading 
partner countries.
Source : IMF, Information Notice System
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3.5. Financial and Monetary Policy
3.5.1. The Institutional Setting
The financial system in Indonesia is composed of an organized 
sector and an unorganized sector. The organized sector or the monetary 
system consists of the monetary authorities, the banking system and non 
bank financial institutions. The unorganized sector comprises all financial 
intermediaries outside the monetary system such as informal intercompany 
and interpersonal markets. It is undoubtedly believed that the latter sector 
has a significant role in the economic conduct of the country by serving the 
needs of a huge number of small scale enterprises which lack accessibility 
to commercial bank credits. The monetary authorities include the central 
bank and the Treasury (Ministry of Finance).
Unlike the central banks of many industrial countries, Bank 
Indonesia (BI), the central bank of Indonesia, is not an independent agency 
but it is an integral part of the government. It is owned wholly by the state. 
The management of the bank is vested in the Board of Directors, presently 
composed of one Governor as Chairman and seven Managing Directors as 
members. The Board of Directors are appointed by the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Indonesian monetary policy decision making is 
entrusted to the Monetary Board which consists of three members: 
ministers supervising the fields of finance and economy, and the Governor 
of BI, with the Minister of Finance as Chairman. In the Monetary Board, 
however, the Governor of BI has a special position, in the sense that he has 
the authority to submits his own views individually to the President of the 
Republic whenever a decision taken by the Board is, in his opinion, not in 
line with the current situation, objectives and economic principles. In
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addition, the Governor is also an ex officio member of the Economic 
Stability Council which is chaired by the President. Overall economic 
policies are directed by this council.
The structure of the Indonesian banking system consists of a central 
bank, commercial banks, savings banks and rural credit banks. The 
commercial banks include 5 very large state banks, 130 private national 
banks, and 29 foreign banks; the development banks include 1 state bank, 
27 regional development banks (owned and run by provincial 
governments) and 1 private bank. In addition, there is 1 state savings bank 
and 2 private savings bank 4)
The Indonesian banking system, for historical reasons, is dominated 
by the public sector in the sense that the major part of all banking activities 
belongs to state owned banks. The share of state banks in the total assets 
of all money deposits banks (excluding BI) is on average 70 percent. The 
state banks’ credits (plus direct credits by BI) constituted the major part of 
all bank credits, accounting for on average 88 percent during 1973-1980 
and declining to 79 percent during 1981-1987. The share of the private 
domestic banks in all bank credits was still minor, though there was a 
considerable increase in this share from only on average 6 percent during 
1973-80 to 15 percent during 1980-87; by the end of March 1992 it 
accounted for 39 percent. The private foreign banks contributed around 5-7 
percent to all bank credits over the entire period. The increase in the 
private domestic bank credits is the result of monetary reform launched in 
1983, as a part of the structural adjustment in the financial sector.5)
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3.5.2. Monetary Reforms
A special feature of the Indonesian monetary system is that it has 
two special characteristics: an open capital account (since 1971) and the 
government's policy of refraining from domestic financing of budget 
deficits. These characteristics imposed certain restrictions on monetary 
policy's role in influencing major economic and financial variables. Given 
the open capital account, foreign factors have a major influence on 
monetary policy, as it is very difficult to sustain domestic rates of interest 
that vary to any significant degree from those prevailing abroad over a long 
period without inducing capital flows. An expansionary monetary policy to 
achieve low interest rate would be self-defeating over the longer term, 
leading to inflation, capital flight and balance of payments difficulties. The 
domestic interest rate over the long term, then, will be determined by the 
international interest rate and the expected rate of depreciation of the 
rupiah. This standard dilemma was exacerbated by a huge increase in 
foreign exchange from oil earnings that had led to rapid expansion of bank 
credit. To limit excessive money supply expansion resulting from bank 
credits, government then imposed direct control over domestic credit in 
1974. This policy was widely known as credit ceiling and lasted until 
1983.
With all of those pictures and dilemmas as backgrounds, a major 
financial reform of June 1983 was launched, in which the main element 
was decontrol of domestic interest rate and the main aim was to mobilize 
domestic savings through the banking system. The sharp rise in bank 
deposit rates accompanied by lower inflation caused real deposit rates to 
become strongly positive, increasing from 7 percent in 1981 to 14 percent
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in 1985. During most o f the period through 1982, the incentive for 
financial saving was low as the real deposit rate was negative. Since then, 
the financialization of private savings in Indonesia has progressed very 
rapidly. Private saving intermediated through the financial system as a 
proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), known as quasi money, grew 
from an annual increase averaging 6.2 percent during 1974-83 to 16 
percent during 1983-92 (Table 4.16, Chapter IV). The main reason for this 
impressive performance was the rise in the reward for holding financial 
assets made possible by the financial liberalization measures of 1983, 
especially the decontrol of deposit rates. Thus, the rising nominal and real 
interest rates since 1983 have contributed to the growth of the financial 
system as well as to the efficiency of investment financing. The challenge 
for the financial service industry is to increase further the financialization 
of savings (as a matter of fact it is still low compared to say, Malaysia and 
Thailand) and to channel them effectively to their highest value added uses.
The removal of the ceiling on lending rates also led to an increase in 
the average lending rate. High lending rates since 1983 have generated 
some concern about their adverse effect on private investment. As a study 
shows that there is a statistically negative relationship between the real 
interest rate and private investment in Indonesia6*. One factor underlying 
the high domestic lending rates is the cost of financial intermediation, 
reflecting inefficiencies that have persisted in the financial sector despite 
the 1983 financial reform. The October-December 1988 financial measures 
attacked some of these outstanding problems, through increasing 
competition.
There were three variables affecting exchange rate expectations in 
the past: the swap premium rate, the differential between domestic and
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international inflation, and last but not least the price of oil. As oil prices 
tend to be relatively stable and the swap premium is to be based on market 
value, international interest rate differential, the main way in which 
monetary policy can affect the long term interest rate is by sustaining low 
inflation rates and thereby dampening fears of an exchange rate 
depreciation.
Before the financial reform of June 1983, the Indonesian authorities 
proved the stringent monetary controls to be effective in limiting the 
expansion of bank credits, and by and large in controlling domestic 
inflation. In this regard, for example, the growth of liquidity credits, which 
induced the development of favoured economic sectors including 
agriculture and small enterprises, was offset by the build-up of government 
deposits at the central bank. However, such a policy produced undesirable 
effects. It inhibited mobilization of funds and discouraged the development 
of an efficient and professional operation of banks. In the first place, the 
excessive amount of central bank liquidity credit became a major source of 
finance to banks, discouraging banks from attracting public savings. The 
liquidity credit has led not only to a misallocation of resources over the 
years but also to the distortion of interest rates because of subsidized 
lending to borrowers. In the second place, the low nominal interest rate on 
bank deposits adjusted for the rate of inflation also inhibited the 
development of public funds mobilization. In the third place, the credit 
ceilings were considered to be binding. During 1974-1977 the actual 
amount of bank credits fell short of the special ceiling, and during 1978- 
1982 was slightly above the ceilings. The conflicting measures of easy 
liquidity credits and credit ceilings eventually led banks to accumulate 
large surpluses of funds held in the form of both rupiah and foreign
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exchange, hence raising their shares in total net foreign assets at the 
expense of Bank Indonesia. Beside such unfavorable results, the decline in 
the oil revenues in the late 1982 called for a necessary reform.
As oil prices fell, the orientation of macroeconomic policy shifted 
from the oil economy to a more diversified non-oil economy. The 
government also attempted to shift from avoiding the inflationary 
consequence of too large a foreign exchange inflow to conserving the 
available supply of foreign exchange and encouraging greater mobilization 
of domestic financial resources. Some major policy measures took place in 
1983, including a large devaluation, tightening up of fiscal policy by 
reducing investment expenditures and implementing new taxes, and on the 
monetary side, removing credit ceilings and interest rate controls. The 
implementation of the 1983 monetary reform was considered as being 
highly satisfactory, reflected by a rise in funds mobilized by banks 
mentioned above. Time and savings deposits in nominal term, which were 
only Rp0.6 trillion in 1974 increased significantly to Rp7.1 trillion in 1983 
and finally reached Rp90.3 trillion in 1992 (Table 4.16). As proportion of 
GDP also increased significantly. The rise in the amount of funds 
mobilized enabled banks to expand their lendings. The expansion in 
lendings also included those extended to promote the business of the 
economically weak group and to expand non-oil exports.
The financial sector reforms initiated in June 1983 set in motion a 
number of sharp changes in the assets preference of domestic savers and 
the lending practices of financial institutions. The main objectives of the 
reform were:
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(a) to reduce the dependence of the banking system on Bank 
Indonesia liquidity credits;
(b) to stimulate private financial savings;
(c) to improve the allocation of financial resources; and
(d) over the longer term, to improve bank performance through 
increased competition, and assist in meeting the needs of the 
economy for more sophisticated financial services.
Consequently, banking institutions were allowed to set their own 
deposit rates (except for selected savings scheme) and.lending rates 
(except for loans refinanced through liquidity credits), credit ceilings were 
abolished for all banks, and the number of programs qualifying for new 
Bank Indonesia liquidity credits was substantially reduced.
Following the 1983 reform, in October 1988 Indonesian authorities 
adopted indirect instruments of monetary policy, including reserve 
requirement, discount window, open market operations and moral suasion. 
Through these instruments, the central bank has access to influencing the 
movement of base money, more precisely of bank reserves, and in turn 
pursuing aggregate monetary growth objectives. With regard to the 
implementation of macro economic policy, the financial reform of 1983 
and the consecutive reforms have brought a gradual transition from highly 
controlled to market-based monetary policies.
It has been acknowledged that the implementation of such indirect 
measures, particularly the open market operations, will work effectively if 
it is supported by the presence of well functioning financial markets. In this 
regard, the Indonesian government also took necessary steps toward 
building up the domestic financial market simultaneously. In order to make
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open market operations feasible, Bank Indonesia, in February 1984, 
introduced certificates of Bank Indonesia or CSBF which can be used by 
banks as a temporary outlet of their excess reserves. In addition, money 
market securities or ‘SBPU’, debt obligations maturing in 30 to 90 days 
(later extended to 180 days), were introduced in February 1985.
Notwithstanding the satisfactory results of the 1983 monetary 
reform, there remained some structural weaknesses regarding the 
institutional setting and climate that led to discouraging efficiency of the 
financial system and hence inhibited the optimal fulfillment of the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. With respect to banking and other 
financial institutions, a number of regulations inhibited the advancement of 
initiative and creativity of banks in carrying out their operation. The 
network of banking services had not reached all areas in the country, 
implying that the potentials of those regions have not been fully developed. 
Furthermore, non-bank financial institutions and stock markets had not 
been adequately developed to support sufficiently the mobilization of long 
term finance for real investment. Consequently, there was an imbalance in 
the funds' term structure with the vast majority of funds concentrated at the 
short end of the term spectrum. With a view to improve the soundness and 
the efficiency of the financial system, in October 1988, the government 
took a series of further adjustments in the area of finance, monetary, and 
banking. The October 27, 1988 package is quite comprehensive and 
contains several modifications of the regulatory framework governing 
financial, monetary and banking operations. These policies have been 
designed to promote the following:
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1. Mobilization of funds.
2. Non-oil exports
3. Efficiency in the operations of banks and other financial institutions.
4. Effectiveness in the implementation of monetary policy.
5. Development of capital market.
According to this package, deposit money banks are now allowed to 
open their branches in district levels. While, non-bank financial 
institutions, as well as foreign banks, can now open their branches in 6 big 
cities. Through these policy measures, it is expected to improve and 
expand the financial intermediation that contributes to a more intensive and 
efficient mobilization of public funds. In this respect, the new measures 
permit the opening of branch offices of banks and non-bank financial 
institutions and the establishment of new private banks, joint-venture 
banks and rural credit banks. In order to promote further non-oil exports, 
the new measures also grant various facilities, including upgraded status 
from non-foreign exchange to foreign exchange, the opening of sub-branch 
offices of foreign banks and money changers, and the establishment of 
joint-venture banks. Another important measure was the sharp reduction of 
the reserve requirement from 15 percent to 2 percent of deposits. This 
policy will enhance the implementation of monetary policy. As regards the 
revitalization of the capital market as an alternative source of finance, the 
policy package covers some important measures, such as the imposition of 
15 percent witholding tax on interest earned from deposits so as to 
equalize the tax treatment on income earned from holding securities.
The October 1988 policy package to a great extent has contributed 
to a rapid development of the financial sector. The number of banks
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increased by 40 banks, from 111 before the new measures to 151 banks at 
the end of March 1990; bank branches grew by 930 offices, from 1914 to
2844 offices. This enlarging of banking services has greatly supported a
*
rapid increase in public funds mobilization as we will see in Chapter Four. 
At the same time bank credits extended to the domestic sector grew 
roughly at the same pace. In addition, the stock market was booming, 
building up more funds available to finance domestic investment.
3.6. Trade Policy and Other Regulatory Reforms
From the 1970s until mid 1986, there had been a growing rate of 
protection in Indonesia's trade policy. Trade protections were not only in 
the form of high rates of tariffs on imported goods (both consumers and 
intermediate goods) but also in the form of widespread quantitative 
restrictions (quotas, licenses, etc.). Between 1980 and 1985, hundreds of 
products were added to the list of imports subject to some sort of 
restriction, so that 28 percent (about 1500 items) of imports in 1985 
required some form of registration, regulation, quotas or license. The 
import licenses were usually given to two or three traders, or to the few 
firms producing competing goods domestically, and thus conferred a 
monopoly position to their holders. Likewise, exports were also subject to 
some sort of restrictions, rather than only export taxes and licenses. 
Examples include the ban on the export of copra, quotas on log exports 
during 1981-84, and a total ban on log exports in 19857). Exports as well as 
imports, moreover, required a complex network of administrative 
procedures. What needs to be stressed here is that there had been 
conflicting measures in the conduct of Indonesia's trade policy during
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1980-85. On the one hand, the conduct of trade policy was essentially an 
anti-export bias policy stemming from the fact that high and uneven rate of 
protection discriminated sharply in favor of import-substitution industries 
and against exportables. On the other hand, a number of other measures 
had been initiated to promote non-oil exports, particularly of manufactures. 
Such measures included the export certificate scheme8), the opening of 
export processing zones and special credit facilities. It was the authorities’ 
intention since the 1978 devaluation to promote non-traditional exports, 
but the practice of external policies was discouraging. The root of the 
problem, the unfavorable industrial structure due to high protectionist and 
interventionist trade policy, remained deeply entrenched at least until early 
1986. The net effect of the conflicting measures was probably to retard 
activity in almost all sectors (not only in imports and exports) until 1986, 
when substantial deregulations of export procedures were undertaken.
Another important observation that can be inferred from trade policy 
conducted during 1980-85, is that it was not supportive to the exchange 
rate policy. The three large devaluations (November 1978, March 1983 
and September 1986), have been considered to some extent successful in 
bringing about a favorable competitiveness of Indonesia's non-oil exports, 
but the intrusion of a non-supportive trade policy caused substantial 
movements in relative prices which were unfavourable for the tradable 
sector. The price of tradables is set by international competition, while 
those of non-tradables are determined by domestic cost structure which is 
primarily determined by domestic wages on the supply side and domestic 
macro conditions on the demand side. The imposition of tariffs on 
imported consumer goods would raise to the domestic price of such goods, 
thereby will increase competitiveness of domestic producers of such
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tradable goods in the domestic market. Import quotas on consumer goods 
would not raise the relative prices but domestic producers of such goods 
would be protected from international competition. However, import 
quotas on an imported input or raw materials to the tradable sector would 
reduce the profitability of the tradable sector without any change in the 
relative prices. Likewise, tariffs on imported raw materials would increase 
production costs, and hence lower competitiveness of domestic producers 
of tradable goods. Under such distortions, movements in the relative prices 
due to the exchange rate management may not provide a full effect on the 
increase in non-oil export earnings. Although competitiveness index before 
the devaluation in 1986 shows almost the same value as after the 
devaluation of 1979 (110 versus 111), it does not mean that the August 
1986 exchange rate was not overvalued9). It is of course an empirical 
question how much the additional non-oil export earnings would have been 
in the absence of quantitative restrictions, especially in the comparison to 
the fall in oil export earnings. The rapid growth of industrialization in 
Indonesia was therefore largely supported by domestic consumers’ 
willingness to pay the high costs incurred by domestic producers, implying 
a large transfer of surplus from consumers to producers, i.e. income 
transfer from large numbers of the population to few people. Such a policy 
was clearly not in line with the equity objective stated by the government.
The trade and industrial sector remained rigid until early 1986, 
compared to the financial sector where liberalization has been put into 
effect since 1983. A possible explanation for such a prolonged, restricted 
trade policy is a political one, where decisions on Indonesian economic 
policy were largely influenced by competing groups both inside and 
outside the bureaucracy. Economic policies concerning exchange rate,
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monetary and fiscal policy are designed and conducted by “economic 
agencies” headed and staffed by economists that belong to the so-called 
“technocrats” or “economic team”. Such agencies include the State 
Coordinating Ministry for Economy, Finance and Industry, Ministry of 
Finance, the Central Bank, and the Development Planning Board. This 
“school of thought” favors greater liberalization in all economic sectors 
toward a greater role of the market mechanism and a more outward- 
looking industrial strategy. Meanwhile, policies governing the quantitative 
restrictions on imports and non-tax policies concerning direct foreign 
investment are the responsibility of the so-called sectoral agencies, which 
include the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture, and the Foreign 
Investment Board. The sectoral ministries are headed and staffed by 
’’technicians”, a group consisting of engineers, military officers and other 
non-economists. They generally favor a more inward-looking strategy. The 
view had been conducive to the growing rate of protection and sorts of 
government intervention, and to an increase in the number of rent seekers 
in the industrial sector. In turn, this group appeared to pose strong 
resistance to the industrial and trade reform. However, with pressure from 
international institutions such as World Bank, IMF, and international 
corporate interests, there has been a tendency toward gradual deregulation 
and reform in the Indonesian industrial and trade sector.
The government initiated a series of trade and other regulatory 
reforms to increase the effectiveness of demand management policies in 
reducing macroeconomic imbalances and to enable a recovery of economic 
growth over the medium term. In 1985, the government instituted across- 
the board reduction in tariffs. The tariff ceiling for most products was 
lowered from 225% to 60% and the number of tariff levels was reduced
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from 25 to 11. In response to the sharp drop in oil prices in early 1986, the 
government embarked upon an accelerated and more sweeping program of 
trade and industrial policy reforms designed to improve the international 
competitiveness of the private sector and to reduce the bias against 
exports.
The first step was taken on May 6, 1986, when measures to provide 
internationally-priced inputs to exporters was announced. In addition, a 
duty draw back facility was created to enable indirect exporters to reclaim 
import duties. The second, more fundamental step was taken in October 
1986, when the government introduced the first of a series of trade 
deregulation packages. The primary objective of these trade-reform 
measures was to move away from a trade regime based on import or 
export license protection towards one based on tariffs. Another package of 
trade policy measures was announced in November 1988. The share of 
total domestic production protected by import licensing declined from 52% 
in mid 1986 to 29% by end of 1988.
Along with the trade-related reform measures, the government also 
streamlined the investment approval process and relaxed investment 
licensing and other controls. Steps taken to reduce the red tape to foreign 
investment have significantly reduced the differences in treatment between 
foreign and domestic firms. In May 1986 the government also converted 
the Investment Priority List to a short negative list, thereby increasing the 
transparency of the system and opening up new sectors to domestic and 
foreign investment. The deregulation measures in conjunction with sound 
macroeconomic policies have had a strong positive effect on both domestic 
and foreign private investment. Unlike the 1970s and early 1980s when
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much of private investment was oriented towards import substitution, the 
bulk of the new investment approvals is directed to export industries.
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CHAPTER IV:
INDONESIAN ECONOMY: PERFORMANCE AND ISSUES
4.1. Indonesian Economy in Comparative Perspective
This chapter discusses the results or the performances of the 
financial adjustments reviewed in the preceding chapter, some policy 
drawbacks and issues that emerged thereafter.
Putting Indonesia first in the global perspective will help us identify 
the distinctive features of this country compared to other developing 
countries. To begin with it is worth mentioning the way countries were 
chosen by The Project on Developing Country Debt undertaken by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research1}
"...The choice of countries was dictated by several considerations. 
First, the project aimed to include the countries with the largest 
external debt......
Second the project was designed to investigate both successes and
failures in external debt management We have countries that
succumbed to serious crisis, and have so far not recovered 
(Argentina, Bolivia, etc.) ; a country which succumbed to crisis but 
has recovered in substantial part (Turkey ) ; and two countries that 
did not succumb to an external debt crisis (Indonesia and South 
Korea).
Third, the project aimed to compare countries that varied widely in 
economic structure, particularly in the structure of international 
trade. Thus, as shown in the following Table, our case studies 
include countries heavily dependent on primary commodity exports 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Indonesia ); countries with a mix o f commodity 
and manufactured exports (Brazil, Mexico, etc.); and a country 
almost wholly dependent on manufactured exports (South Korea)
............... Economic growth is strong, and inflation relatively low,
in South Korea, Indonesia, and Turkey. The Latin American 
economies all have low growth (negative in percapita terms), and 
very high inflation. The external debt burden, measured by the debt-
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export ratio, is heaviest in Latin America and the Philippines, and 
relatively light in Indonesia and South Korea. Turkey is ranked in
the middle In the final column of the table, two countries
(Indonesia and South Korea), escaped a debt crisis altogether, 
though Indonesia's debt position remains somewhat precarious. 
Turkey's crisis came in the late 1970s, before the onset of the global 
crisis. The Latin American economies and the Philippines have all 
been engaged in repeated rescheduling since 1982-83.”
Table 4.1.



















Argentina -1.4 342.8 82 576 Yes
Bolivia -4.5 569.1 94 601 Yes
Brazil 1.3 147.7 59 417 Yes
Indonesia 3.5 10.7 89 191 No
Mexico 0.8 62.2 73 445 Yes
Philippines -0.5 19.3 49 563 Yes
South Korea 7.9 6.0 9 156 No
Turkey 4.5 37.1 46 315 Yes
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1987. GDP and 
inflation measures are annual rates of change
Meanwhile John Bunton (1983)2) wrote on Indonesia as follows:
"  With the whole of the world to choose from, why choose
Indonesia? The answer to that unashamedly rhetorical question is 
simply that on current form Indonesia is arguably the best long term 
market in the world for Western Goods and Western expertise.
.............it has a better prospect of sustained growth and (despite
anything its detractors may say) a better prospect of political stability 
- a rare commodity in many developing countries. It is firmly tied to 
the Western free - enterprise ethic and welcomes Western investment 
and participation, often on terms that are extremely favorable, 
largest market in the South East Asia, and in sheer physical size is 
bigger than the United States o f America,...ranks as the third richest 
nation in the world in terms of natural resources, ... the world's
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eighth largest oil producer, and is the world's largest exporter of 
liquid natural gas, the world's third largest producer of tin. It was, 
until a recent change in export policy, the world's major producer of
tropical hardwoods (it is currently in second place) the next
three years or so will almost certainly become the world's largest 
producer of hard-wood-based p ly w o o d It is the world's second 
largest producer oi natural rubber and palm oil, and is set to become 
one of the largest, if not the largest, exporter of cement and urea- 
based fertilizers in Asia. In short: with its large population (note: in 
1992 is around 180 million.) and vast natural resources, Indonesia is 
potentially one of the biggest and most promising markets."
Accordingly, in other words Indonesia fulfills four classic factors 
that are considered good in any market: wealth (or natural resources that 
generate wealth), people, political stability, and free-enterprise ethic. 
Regarding Indonesia's economic development, John Bunton further wrote:
Indonesia has the fastest-expanding economy in South East Asia, 
which itself (according to a recent report by the US Department of 
Commerce) has the most rapidly expanding economy of any region 
in the world. By 1990 the Gross National Product of the five nations 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will have 
doubled - the biggest pro rata increase taking place in 
Indonesia....Overall the ASEAN economy...at least until the end of 
this century, making it (says the Department of Commerce) the new 
centre o f world economic power
The discussion of Indonesia’s achievements in economic 
progress compared to other countries has been broadly elaborated in the 
footnotes of Chapter One.
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4.2. Indonesian Economy In Historical Perspective
To get a better picture of the Indonesian economy, an understanding 
of the economic conditions before the establishment of the New Order 
government in 1966 is important. This is due to fact that the economic 
policies of the 1950-65 period left a very strong mark on the institutional 
memory of the new government. During this period, the Indonesian 
government was preoccupied with domestic political and military 
problems, with the restoration of sovereignty on West Irian (one of the 
biggest islands) and with political recognition in the world forum 
(Indonesia got its independence in 1945). Little effort and resources were 
devoted to economic development. An increasingly difficult budget 
situation made inflation a major problem. Taxes on trade were the major 
source of government revenue, but overvalued multiple exchange rate 
system, unfavorable world market conditions for rubber and other 
commodities and complex trade regulation were reducing the profitability 
of the tradable sector, causing it to shrink. The twin rebellions on the 
islands of Sumatera and Sulawesi in 1958 made the budget situation even 
worse, because both of these islands were important sources of export tax 
revenue. The monetization of the budget deficits (money creation by the 
Central Bank) raised the average 1958-1961 inflation rate to 25 percent 
from the 1950-57 average of 17 percent. The budgetary pressure grew 
steadily worse, resulting in a period of high inflation in 1962-1965. 
Between 1962 and 1964 both money supply and the cost of living index 
roughly doubled every year, and by the end of 1965 they were doubling 
every week. In 1966, inflation culminated at 600 percent. Economic 
growth slowed to 0.8 percent per year in this turbulent period. The 
evolution of the export-to-gross domestic product ratio declined steadily.
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The internal political conflict culminated with the abortive coup by 
military personnel sympathetic to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 
on 30 September 1965. The political chaos aggravated the economic 
instability. The increasing economic difficulties speeded up the transfer of 
authority from President Soekamo to the anti-Communist General Soeharto 
in the following year. Among so many economic policies being 
implemented by the new Government, one policy should get special 
attention, namely "balanced" budget policy3*. The economic chaos of the 
1958-65 period left such a deep impression that the new Government has 
had this policy since 1968.
The development of the Indonesian economy during the new order 
government may be divided into four periods: 1967-73, 1973-80, and
1980-1986 and 1986-1992 (for the purpose of the study). The first period 
was recognized as the years of survival, after political and economic 
disaster and hyper inflation as mentioned above. The remarkable increase 
in economic growth during the subsequent years began with the 
implementation of the First Five Year Development Plan in 1969. During 
the period 1967-73 the real GDP grew at an average of 6.3 percent and the 
annual rate of inflation was 40.7 percent. Although the inflation rate was 
on average still high, its trend performed quite satisfactorily, sharply 
declining from three digits in the earlier period of the new order regime to 
only 27.3 percent in 1973 (Table 4.2).
Over 1973-80, the second period, the Indonesian economy had 
benefited first from the rise in the price of oil exports brought about by the 
action of the oil-exporting countries (OPEC), then from export of LNG 
(Liquefied Natural Gas) since 1977. The real GDP growth rose on average 
at 7.7 percent per-annum and the inflation rate was reduced to 17.6 
percent. The oil boom at the end of 1973 resulted in high pressure on
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domestic inflation. Hence in 1974 the rate of inflation was 33.3 percent, 
the highest ever during the second period and thereafter. With strong 
memories of the miserable hyper inflation during the earlier period, along 
with the strong pressure on domestic rate of inflation from external sources 
due especially to the oil boom during the 1970s, price stability along with 
the sustained high rate of economic growth was the major goal of 
macroeconomic policies set up throughout the period. This goal seemed to 
be maintained during the 1980s.
The third episode, covering the period 1980-1986, was denoted by a 
drastic fall in the country's economic growth rate. The real GDP fell 
considerably to only 4.3 percent, but the rate of inflation also declined on 
average to 8.4 percent per year; in 1985 the inflation rate was as low as 4.3 
percent, the lowest that ever happened in the history of this country. It is 
widely acknowledged that such a slow economic growth during 1980-1986 
was attributable to the world recession in the early 1980s, but it was also 
due to the sharp decline in the world oil price in 1982 following the 
breakdown of the OPEC arrangement.
The last onset of the period, 1986-1992 can be attributed to the period 
of second oil price fall in 1986 which was also a period packed full of 
adjustments, as discussed in Chapter Three. In response to external 
shocks, the government implemented a broad range of adjustment 
measures and structural policy reforms that significantly reduced the 
macroeconomic imbalances while allowing economic growth to remain 
positive in percapita terms. The results were quite promising, the average 
annual growth during this period jumped to 6.3 percent. Indonesia's long­
term growth prospects would undoubtedly have been jeopardized had 
these necessary adjustments not been implemented. Crucial to Indonesia's
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strong economic performance has been a sustained program of market- 
oriented policy reform, which is discussed in the preceding chapter.
Table 4.2.
Annual GDP growth, Inflation Rate and Population Growth
1967-1992
Year
GDP growth rate 
(at 1973 constant 
prices)*
Inflation rate Population 
growth rate
1967-1973 6.3 40.7 2.1
1973 11.3 27.3 2.4
1974 7.6 33.3 2.4
1975 4.9 19.7 2.4
1976 6.9 14.2 2.4
1977 8.8 11.8 2.4
1978 T8 6.7 2.4
1979 6.3 21.8 2.4
1980 9.9 15.9 2.4
1981 7.9 7.1 2.0
1982 2.3 9.7 1.8
1983 4.2 11.5 1.8
1984 6.0 8.8 1.8
1985 2.3 4.3 1.8
1986 5.9 8.8 1.8
1987 4.9 8.9 1.8
1988 5.8 5.5 1.8
1989 7.5 5.9 1.8
1990 7.1 9.5 1.8
1991 6.9 9.9 1.7
1992 6.4 5.0 1.7
Average
1973-1980 7.7 17.6 2.4
1980-1986 4.3 8.4 1.9
1986-1992 6.3 7.7 1.8
Source : Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics
* Since 1987, based on 1983 constant prices
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Table 4.3.A
Indonesia : Gross Domestic Product By Sector
(billion rupiahs : constant prices)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Agriculture 210.4 213.9 220.9 212.7 223.6 225.3 236.1 232.1 255.2 260.1
Mining and quarrying 14.4 14.6 15.4 14.9 15.6 16.0 14.4 16.7 22.8 27.7
Manufacturing 32.6 36.6 37.1 36.4 35.9 35.6 36.3 37.5 40.8 46.6
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.6
Construction 7.9 10.2 8.6 6.5 6.5 7.4 8.4 7.3 ! 9.2 12.1
Trade, hotel and restaurant 55.8 64.7 64.4 66.2 68.1 67.4 64.5 70.8 78.8 88.8
Transportation and Communication 14.5 14.5 14.9 15.3 14.8 15.1 15.2 15.6 15.9 16.5
Bank and Financial services 3.9 4.9 4.2 3.5 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.5 4.0 6.6
Rental 7.7 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.3 8.4 8.7 8.8 9.7 10.4
Government and Defence 17.6 19.2 19.6 19.8 19.9 21.3 24.3 24.7 28.8 29.3
Services 24.3 24.7 25.6 25.9 26.6 27.4 27.9 28.8 29.4 30.1
Gross Domestic Product 390.2 412.5 420.2 410.8 425.3 429.9 441.9 448.0 496.9 530.8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Agriculture 270.7 281.0 287.0 2,710.0 2,811.0 2,811.2 2,943.7 2,981.3 3,134.8 3,255.6
Mining and quarrying 32.2 34.0 41.0 831.0 859.0 828.1 952.3 1,070.0 1,040.3 1,046.9
Manufacturing 51.1 58.0 61.0 650.0 755.0 847.9 930.0 1,057.7 1,176.5 1,395.3
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.0 3.0 4.0 30.4 37.0 41.2 46.3 49.0 53.3 68.6
Construction 15.2 18.0 22.0 262.0 320.0 364.8 384.5 463.8 528.9 562.8
Trade, hotel and restaurant 100.2 108.0 124.0 1,118.0 1,224.0 1,293.8 1,350.7 1,438.2 1,530.3 1,681.1
Transportation and Communication 17.4 22.0 25.0 257.0 288.0 302.7 342.6 427.6 490.1 559.8
Bank and Financial services 8.6 11.0 12.0 83.0 88.0 101.6 117.4 151.2 164.6 179.6
Rental 11.2 12.0 13.0 143.0 174.0 198.4 209.1 252.2 267.6 306.1
Government and Defence 30.4 32.0 33.0 405.0 443.0 564,1 596.5 689.8 767.9 805.1
Services 30.9 32.0 32.0 264.0 270.0 277.0 284.2 290.1 296.9 304.0
Gross Domestic Product 570.9 611.0 654.0 6,753.4 7,269.0 7,630.8 8,156.3 8,870.9 9,471.2 10,164.9
93
Table 4.3.B
Indonesia : Gross Domestic Product By Sector
(billion rupiahs : constant prices)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Agriculture 3,424.90 3,593.50 3,669.80 17,764.70 18,512.60 19,300.00 19,799.10 20,223.50 21,213.70 21,917.80
Mining and quarrying 1,034.60 1,069.10 939.80 16,107.40 17,120.10 15,480.40 16,308.60 16,365.50 15,892.90 16,663.80
Manufacturing 1,704.60 1,877.80 1,900.70 9,896.40 2,078.80 13,430.50 14,678.10 16,235.30 18,182.30 19,855.70
Electricity, gas and water supply 77.90 89.90 105.50 313.90 324.00 360.90 429.80 494.60 548.90 615.60
Construction 639.30 720.20 757.80 4,597.20 4,393.80 4,508.00 4,609.00 4,802.90 5,259.10 5,878.00
Trade, hotel and restaurant 1,851.90 2,042.60 2,158.80 11,418.70 11,811.00 12,398.60 13,398.50 14,356.20 15,656.90 17,338.10
Transportation and Communication 609.40 676.90 716.60 4,098.10 4,443.10 4,487.00 4,668.40 4,938.50 5,211.50 5,811.50
Bank and Financial services 207.80 231.40 258.40 2,358.60 2,829.00 3,020.30 3,483.10 3,659.30 3,752.20 4,290.70
Rental 335.80 358.70 377.40 2,355.50 2,411.50 2,460.90 2,545.10 2,653.90 2,762.20 2,877.70
Government and Defence 971.70 1,075.80 1,114.50 5,711.50 5,996.70 6,455.10 6,862.10 7,366.10 7,932.00 8,396.90
Services 311.30 318.70 326.10 3,000.80 3,116.80 3,180.20 3,298.60 3,422.10 3,569.70 3,790.80
Gross Domestic Product 11,169.2 12,054.6 12,325.4 77,622.8 83, 037.4 85, 081.9 90, 080.4 94, 517.9 99, 981.4 107, 436.6
1990 1991 1992 1993
Agriculture 22,356.9 22,714.8 24,225.5 24,569.30
Mining and quarrying 17,531.7 19,317.0 18,957.7 19,370.30
Manufacturing 22,336.9 24,585.0 26,963.6 29,484.40
Electricity, gas and water supply 725.7 842.8 928.2 1,022.30
Construction 6,672.9 7,423.7 8,223.6 9,222.50
Trade, hotel and restaurant 18,568.6 19,576.2 21,009.1 22,850.10
Transportation and Communication 6,367.9 6,869.4 7,554.9 8,302.20
Bank and Financial services 4,893.8 5,535.1 6,255.7 7,069.60
Rental 2,998.8 3,119.7 3,249.3 3,411.10
Government and Defence 8,783.3 9,052.1 9,320.0 9,506.80
Services 3,980.8 4,189.4 4,497.2 4,896.50
Gross Domestic Product 115,217.3 123,225.2 131,184.8 139,707.1
Notes : 1960-1973 based on 1960 prices; 1973-1983 based on 1973 prices; 1983-1992 based on 1983 prices 
Source : National Income of Indonesia Publication, Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics, various issues
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Table 4.3.C
Indonesia : Gross Domestic Product By Expenditure Sector
(billion rupiahs : constant prices)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Private Consumption 311.4 335.8 359.2 345 347.7 356 350.8 381.8 416.7 441.2
Government consumption 45.1 42 33.8 34 40 29 40.3 35.8 40.6 42.1
Gross domestic fixed capital formation 30.7 44.1 40.1 30.6 34.8 36.2 40.7 33.2 40.6 52.2
Change in stock* - - - - - - - - - -
Export of goods and services 52 56.7 51.8 48.7 54.5 56.2 55.6 55.5 61.3 69.9
less Imports of goods and services 49 66 64.7 47.5 51.7 47.5 45.5 58.3 62.3 74.6
Gross Domestic Product 390.2 412.6 420.2 410.8 425.3 429.9 441.9 448 496.9 530.8
Net factor income from abroad -3.2 -3.4 -3.4 -3.3 -3.5 -3.5 -3.7 -3.7 -4.2 -4.3
Gross National Product 387 409.2 416.8 407.5 421.8 426.4 438.2 444.3 492.7 526.5
less Net indirect taxes 23.8 25.2 25.6 25.1 25.9 26.2 26.9 27.3 30.3 32.4
less Depreciation 23 24.4 24.8 24.2 25.1 25.3 26.2 26.4 29.3 31.3
National Income 340.2 359.6 366.4 358.2 370.8 374.9 385.1 390.6 433.1 462.8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Private Consumption 453.7 474 506 4,790.70 5,453.60 5,678.90 6,031.60 6,433.20 6,955.10 7,865.80
Government consumption 49.2 53 52 716.00 641.00 835.50 896.70 1,044,40 1,156.10 1,345.00
Gross domestic fixed capital formation 69.4 84 100 1,208.00 1,440.00 1,650.20 1,749.20 2,027.50 2,332.90 2,436.00
Change in stock* - - - - - - - - - -
Export of goods and services 82.3 92 113 1,354.30 1,403.40 1,266.80 1,425.20 1,744.00 1,776.30 1,822.00
less Imports of goods and services 83.7 92 117 1,315.60 1,669.00 1,800.60 1,946.40 2,378.20 2,749.20 3,303.90
Gross Domestic Product 570.9 611 654 6, 753.4 7,269 7, 630.8 8, 156.3 8, 870.9 9, 471.2 1, 0164.9
Net factor income from abroad -4.7 -5 -5 - 245.70 - 369.00 - 360.30 - 366.50 - 422.70 - 513.80 - 649.20
Gross National Product 566.2 606 649 6, 507.7 6,900 7, 270.5 7, 789.8 8,448.2 8, 957.4 9,515.70
less Net indirect taxes 34.8 37 40 328.00 351.70 370.60 399.10 430.80 460.00 495.70
less Depreciation 33.7 36 39 439.00 472.50 496.00 530.80 576.60 615.§0 663.50
National Income 497.7 533 570 5, 740.7 6, 075.8 6, 403.9 6, 859.9 7, 440.8 7, 881.8 8,356.50
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Table 4.3.D
Indonesia : Gross Domestic Product By Expenditure Sector
(billion rupiahs : constant prices)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Private Consumption 8,867.70 10, 349.5 10, 697.5 47, 063 48, 942.2 49, 448 50, 530.0 52, 200.4 54, 225.0 56, 475.7
Government Consumption 1,489.60 1,641.0 1,776.10 8, 077.3 8, 353.0 8, 991.2 9, 241.3 9, 225.7 9, 924.3 10,966.30
Gross domestic fixed capital formation 2,896.00 3, 218.5 3,636.70 19, 467.9 18, 296.5 19, 615.8 21,421.7 22, 596.8 25, 200.9 28,568.10
Change in stock* - - - 2, 793.5 4, 452.0 6,641.30 6, 332.7 5, 049.2 1, 119.9 1,417.20
Export of goods and services 1,719.30 1,678.2 1,444.30 19, 847.0 21, 144.9 19, 494.7 22, 460.3 25, 744.8 26, 015.5 28,733.20
less Imports of goods and services 3,803.40 4, 832.6 5,229.20 19, 625.9 18, 151.2 19, 109.1 19, 905.6 20, 299.0 16, 504.2 18,722.90
Gross Domestic Product 11, 169.2 12, 054.6 12, 325.4 77, 622.8 83, 037.4 85, 081.9 90, 080.4 94, 517.9 9if, 981.4 107, 436.6
Net factor income from abroad - 758.70 - 673.70 - 652.70 -3,283.10 -3,821.70 -3,846.10 -3,802.20 -4,247.70 -3,481.70 - 3,710.60
Gross National Product 10, 410.5 11, 380.9 11, 672.7 74, 339.7 79, 215.7 81, 235.8 86, 278.2 90, 270.2 96, 499.7 103, 726
less Net indirect taxes 544.30 587.40 600.60 2, 450.8 2, 515.9 3, 154.7 5, 727.4 5, 399.0 6, 356.1 7, 997.1
less Depreciation 728.50 786.20 803.90 3, 881.1 4, 151.9 4, 254.1 4, 504.0 4, 752.9 4,996.20 5, 362.6
National Income 9, 137.7 10, 007.03 10, 268.2 68, 007.8 72, 547.9 73, 827.0 76, 046.8 80, 145.3 8, 5147.4 90, 366.3
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Table 4.3.D (continued)
Indonesia : Gross Domestic Product By Expenditure Sector
(billion rupiahs: constant prices)
1990 1991 1992 1993
Private Consumption 62, 053.2 66, 584.0 68, 484.5 72,476.20
Government Consumption 11,317.3 12, 112.7 12 819.0 12, 829.7
Gross domestic fixed capital formation 32, 731.5 34, 867.2 36, 589.4 38,671.20
Change in stock* 3,302.80 1,989.60 2,314.20 3,403.70
Export of goods and services 28, 862.8 34,600.80 39,674.80 42,296.80
less Imports of goods and services 23, 050.3 26, 929.1 28,697.00 29,970.50
Gross Domestic Product 115, 217.3 123, 225.2 131, 181.9 139, 707.1
Net factor income from abroad -4,231.00 -4,435.60 -4,955.70 -6,154.10
Gross National Product 110, 986.3 118, 789.6 126, 229.2 133, 553.0
less Net indirect taxes 8,112.50 8,123.60 8,945.60 9,621.00
less Depreciation 5,642.90 6,161.60 6,557.80 6,981.40
National Income 97, 230.9 104, 504.4 110, 725.8 116, 950.6
Notes : 1960-1973 based on 1960 prices; 1973-1983 based on 1973 prices; 1983-1992 based on
1983 prices
Source: National Income of Indonesia Publication, Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics, 
various issues
4.3. Adjustment Performances
4.3.1. Growth and Structure of Production
The effect of the adjustment programs can be seen from some 
main macro economic indicators such as economic growth, balance of 
payments, monetary development, fiscal performance, and inflation.
Although economic growth slowed significantly over the period,
1981-86, averaging 4.4 percent per year, it remained positive in 
percapita terms. Given the severity of external shocks, sustaining a 
reasonable annual expansion of the overall economy and more than 5 
percent annual growth in the non oil economy while at the same time 
reducing financial imbalance is a notable performance. Non-oil exports, 
especially manufactured exports, emerged as a new source of growth, 
while other sectors such as oil earnings and import substituting 
manufacturing - the prime movers of the rapid growth of the 1970s- 
weakened during that period. See Table 4.4, Table 4.9 and Table 4.13.
Table 4.4 
Overall and GDP sectoral performance 
(annual real growth rate)
1973-1992
1973-1981 1981-1986 1986-1992
GDP 7.5 4.4 6.3
Non-oil GDP 8.0 5.4 7.1
Agriculture 3.4 3.7 2.9
Manufacturing 14.1 6.3 10.3
Services 10.0 6.0 7.6
GDP percapita 5.2 2.6 4.5
*. Excludes liquefied natural gas and oil
Source : Calculated from Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics Publications
In the period of 1986-1992, economic growth and non oil GDP 
had revived almost to the level of annual growth of 1973-1981 (See
98
Table 4.4). All sectors, except the agriculture sector, had jumped 
significantly. The lower growth of the agriculture sector reflects the 
transforming process to industrialization.
Table 4.5.
Impact of Adjustment Policies 
1973-1992
Annual growth rate (%) Share of GDP (%)
1973-1981 1981-1986 1986-1992 1973 1986 1992
Terms of trade 1.6 -1 -1 - - -
National income 7.2 3.0 6.5 85 84 84
Consumption 10.2 1 6 5A 56 66 62.6
-Public cons. 10.9 4.1 5.6 8.1 10.3 9.8
-Private cons. 10.1 3.6 5.4 48.1 56.1 53.0
Investment 13.0 6X) 9X) 14.7 21.9 27.8
-Public invest. 17.0 5.0 2.3 3.7 7.3 5.9
-Private invest. 11.4 7.0 11.0 10.9 14.6 21.8
Percapita nat. income 4.8 1.2 4.7 - - -
Percapita private cons. 7.7 1.8 3.2 - - -
Source : Calculated from Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics Publication.
As the terms of trade deteriorated during 1981-86, domestic 
income was also adversely affected. During 1981-86, national income 
grew only 3.0 percent per annum. The lower growth of national income 
had cut consumption significantly, especially in the private sector, 
although it still grew faster than national income. Meanwhile, the rate of 
growth of public investment over the period 1981-1986 and 1986-1992 
kept falling steadily (Table 4.5). This was due to a large reduction in 
budget financed capital spending and in line with the spirit of 
deregulation where private investment should play a more important 
role. Private sector investment declined in the first few years of the 
adjustment period, but since 1986 private investment has been 
recovering and as a proportion of GDP kept increasing significantly,
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resulting from a better climate for investment brought about by 
adjustment programs.
As the economy grew rapidly, the sectoral structure also changed 
considerably. The agriculture sector still contributed dominantly to the 
remarkable Indonesian economic performance, but its share (in real 
term) in composition of GDP declined from 52 percent in 1965 to 22 
percent in 1986 and dropped to 18.5 in 1992 (Table 4.3A and 4.3B). It 
is worth noting that this development cannot be interpreted as reflecting 
an adverse growth of agriculture, but rather the growth rate of 
agriculture was lower than that of the manufacturing and services 
sectors. Indeed, the agricultural sector grew rapidly (in real term) at 4.3 
percent per annum over the period 1965-1980, and continued at a 
slightly lower of 3 percent during 1980-1986 (calculated as an average 
from different base years in Table 4.3A and Table 4.3B). The improved 
government financial position until 1981, mainly due to an increase in 
the output of mining sectors and foreign borrowing, enabled the 
government to allocate considerable resources to the agricultural sector. 
The rapid growth of the agricultural sector, to some extent, was due to 
the intensive use of fertilizers which were subsidized by the 
government, considerable funds for research and development in 
agriculture, and the expansion of the cultivated land through 
rehabilitation of the irrigation system and other infrastructures.
Despite the rapid growth of agricultural output, there has been 
considerable movement in the labor force from the agricultural sector to 
other sectors such as construction and manufacturing. The agricultural 
share of the labor force fell down from 71 percent in 1965 to 57 percent 
in 1980 (World Development Report 1988, Table 31).
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Although the manufacturing sector in real term grew rapidly, at 12 
percent during 1965-1980 and slowed to 7.7 percent during 1980-1986, 
its share in the composition of GDP rose significantly from 8 percent in 
1965 to 16 percent in 1986, ranked third after agricultural and mining 
shares (Table 4.3 A and 4.3.B). The rapid growth of the manufacturing 
sector during 1973-80 was mainly due to increased investment in capital 
equipment and rapid technology, which was made possible by the 
abundant supply of foreign exchange particularly during the oil boom 
period. Also worth mentioning, is the services sector which also 
exhibited a high growth rate, reaching 9.7 percent per annum during
1973-80 and 5.6 percent during 1980-86. The slow growth of all sectors 
during 1980-86 was mostly attributable to the sharp decline in the world 
oil price, limiting the supply of foreign exchange to finance imports of 
capital equipment and intermediate goods; but it was also due to the 
shrinking expenditure especially of the government that dampened the 
growth of demand.
It is generally acknowledged that the remarkable progress of 
Indonesian economic performance during the last two decades was due 
mostly to the fortunate oil boom during 1970s, and partly to the sound 
macroeconomic policies directed toward the utilization of oil/LNG 
revenue to strengthen not only the tradable sector but also the non­
tradable sector. This is connected with the success of Indonesia in 
averting "the Dutch disease ".
Despite the facts, Indonesia like most oil exporting countries, 
suffered much from the sharp decline of oil prices. However, it still 
enjoyed a positive annual real rate of growth at 4.3 percent during 1980- 
86, while other oil exporting countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela
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were having negative rate of growth, and Mexico only increased by 0.4 
percent. As compared to the growth rate of developing countries, the 
latter during the same period, was on average only 1.8 per annum 
(World Development Report 1988, Table 2).
4.3.2. Savings-Investment Balance
As a result of economic growth, Indonesia has also been able to 
increase the level of its consumption over time. Nevertheless, domestic 
capital formation and savings are also growing with faster rates than the 
rate of growth in consumption.
During the 1970s, the savings rate in Indonesia was high and 
rising, being mainly propped up by the increase in oil prices. With the 
decline of oil revenue, the gross domestic savings rate declined sharply. 
The savings rate declined sharply from 22% of GDP in 1981 to around 
18% in 1986, before gradually recovering to about 22% in 1989. On 
average, the rate of savings and rate of investments, as a percentage of 
GDP, during 1981-92 were considerably higher than during 1971-1980 
and compared to most developing countries. Nevertheless, a rate of 
savings of around 24 percent is still considered relatively sufficient 
compared to other developing countries (Table 4.6).
The decline in the savings rate in 1986 can be attributed mostly to 
a decline in savings in the public sector from about 10% of GDP in the 
early 1980s to about 5% in 1986, before recovering to 6.5% in the 
1990s. This was largely a consequence of the decline in government 
revenues following a slump in oil prices, especially in 1986. The private 
national savings rate which declined from about 16% in 1981 to an
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(trillion rupiahs, current prices)
1971-1992
GS GI BD PS PI NPS CA GDP
1971 0.011 0.144 -0.133 0.405 0.451 -0.046 -0.179 3.8
1972 0.077 0.207 -0.13 0.607 0.673 -0.066 -0.196 4.8
1973 0.125 0.313 -0.188 0.405 0.926 -0.521 -0.709 7.1
1974 0.5 0.6 -0.1 1.4 1.2 0.2 0.1 11.3
1975 0.5 1 -0.5 1.7 1.7 0 -0.5 13.3
1976 1.2 1.5 -0.3 1.7 1.8 -0.1 -0.4 16.3
1977 1.4 1.8 -0.4 2.5 2.2 0.3 -0.1 20
1978 1.6 1.9 -0.3 2.6 2.9 -0.3 -0.6 24
1979 2.1 2.4 -0.3 5.4 4.5 0.9 0.6 33.7
1980 4.8 4.3 0.5 6.6 5.4 1.2 1.7 47.9
1981 4.1 4.9 -0.8 10 9.6 0.4 -0.4 61.2
1982 2.5 5.7 -3.2 10.2 10.5 -0.3 -3.5 65.8
1983 3.4 6.4 -3 10.2 13 -2.8 -5.8 77.6
1984 7.6 6.6 1 10.5 13.5 -3 -2 89.9
1985 6.1 7.8 -1.7 14.1 14.5 -0.4 -2.1 97
1986 3.5 7.9 -4.4 16.1 16.9 -0.8 -5.2 102.7
1987 3.1 8.1 -5 24.2 22.9 1.3 -3.7 124.8
1988 4.6 8.1 -3.5 29.6 28.7 0.9 -2.6 142.1
1989 5.7 9.5 -3.8 37.7 36.2 1.5 -2.3 167.2
1990 15.4 12.7 2.7 34.2 42.9 -8.7 -6 195.6
1991 13.5 14.9 -1.4 43.6 50.7 -7.1 -8.5 227.5
1992 15 15.9 -0.9 52.8 58.2 -5.4 -6.3 260.8
% of GDP
GS GI BD PS PI NPS CA
1971 0.29 3.79 -3.50 10.66 11.87 -1.21 -4.71
1972 1.60 4.31 -2.71 12.65 14.02 -1.38 -4.08
1973 1.76 4.41 -2.65 5.70 13.04 -7.34 -9.99
1974 4.42 5.31 -0.88 12.39 10.62 1.77 0.88
1975 3.76 7.52 -3.76 12.78 12.78 0.00 -3.76
1976 7.36 9.20 -1.84 10.43 11.04 -0.61 -2.45
1977 7.00 9.00 -2.00 12.50 11.00 1.50 -0.50
1978 6.67 7.92 -1.25 10.83 12.08 -1.25 -2.50
1979 6.23 7.12 -0.89 16.02 13.35 2.67 1.78
1980 10.02 8.98 1.04 13.78 11.27 2.51 3.55
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1981 6.70 8.01 -1.31 16.34 15.69 0.65 -0.65
1982 3.80 8.66 -4.86 15.50 15.96 -0.46 -5.32
1983 4.38 8.25 -3.87 13.14 16.75 -3.61 -7.47
1984 8.45 7.34 1.11 11.68 15.02 -3.34 -2.22
1985 6.29 8.04 -1.75 14.54 14.95 -0.41 -2.16 '
1986 3.41 7.69 -4.28 15.68 16.46 -0.78 -5.06
1987 2.48 6.49 4.01 19.39 18.35 1.04 -2.96
1988 3.24 5.70 -2.46 20.83 20.20 0.63 -1.83
1989 3.41 5.68 -2.27 22.55 21.65 0.90 -1.38
1990 7.87 6.49 1.38 17.48 21.93 -4.45 -3.07
1991 5.93 6.55 -0.62 19.16 22.29 -3.12 -3.74
1992 5.75 6.10 -0.35 20.25 22.32 -2.07 -2.42
Notes: GS = government savings
GI = government investment
BD = budget deficit
PS = private savings
PI = private investment
NPS = net private savings
CA = current account
GDP = gross domestic product
Source. Calculated from Flow of Funds data, Bank Indonesia.
Figure 4.1.
Budget Deficit Ratio (BDR),
Net Private Savings Ratio (NPSR) and 
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The rate of investment reached an average o f 24% o f GDP per 
annum during 1981 -86 and increased to an average o f 27% during 
1987-1992. In the 1970s until 1980 the investment rate was on average
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20% of GDP. This ratio of investment is actually relatively high for a 
developing country. Throughout 1971-73 there was a rather sizable 
saving-investment gap of about 6 percent per annum due to large 
investment expenditures in both sectors. In the rest of the period except 
in 1982, 1983 and 1986, marking the oil price fall, the savings- 
investment gap reflecting the current account deficit turn to decrease to 
2-3 % of GDP. In contrast, in 1974, and during 1979-80 there was a 
surplus of savings of 1 to 3%. The above mentioned gap reflected the 
shortfall in savings compared to the investment, so that it had to be 
closed by foreign sources of funds - be they loans or grants.
With no longer much hope on oil price increases in the future, 
government savings by and large depend on the success of tax 
mobilization (non-oil and LNG proceeds) and austerity program adopted 
on the government expenditures. And in the face of this, tax reforms 
have become such an unavoidable measure to cope with.
Private savings have been continuously increasing. This can be 
seen from the development of many savings mobilization schemes 
introduced by the banking systems as we will see later. This 
development is tied to the relatively high interest rates offered by the 
banks for deposits. The problem is how these private savings, thus far in 
the hands of financial institutions, can be channeled - directly and 
indirectly - towards productive investments in the real sectors. This 
issue must also be seen in relation to the general policy creating and 
maintaining a conducive atmosphere for investment.
In the saving-investments-income chain, attention should also be 
directed towards the effective use of investment capital. Data showed
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that investment between 1984-1992 hovered on average around 26 
percent of GNP per annum. On the other hand, the rate of production 
growth averaged about 5 percent per annum. This means that the ratio 
between capital investments (26 percent) and the proceeds of those 
investments (5 percent) was about 5-6 percent. In other words, the 
ICOR (Incremental Capital Output Ratio) was very high. It is much 
higher compared to the development in any other ASEAN countries. 
Such a high ICOR rate reflects the low efficiency in the economic 
system.
4.3.3. Public Sector
When the present regime, known as the 'new order' came to 
power in 1966, it inherited a virtually bankrupt nation with a collapsed 
economy and with an external debt mounting to US$2.5 billion. This 
was mainly caused by economic mismanagement: the continuing 
monetary expansion to finance a prolonged budget deficit. The first step 
of the new government's economic stabilization and rehabilitation 
program, therefore, was to eliminate the budget deficit. One major 
landmark in the fiscal sector was the adoption of a balanced budget 
policy
The Indonesian government's presentation of budgetary accounts 
does not provide any measures from which we can work out the impact 
of budget on aggregate demand. The Indonesian budget, running from 
the beginning of April to the end of March in the following year, has 
always been in balance, and the realized budget balance has also been 
close to zero. The explanation for this representation is almost entirely 
definitional (Please read footnote no. 3 of this chapter). The appearance
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of fiscal discipline on the part of government was seen as 
psychologically important to reestablish confidence in economic 
management. These techniques of government accounting, from an 
economic point of view, were accordingly considered inappropriate. 
Thus while the budget deficit as conventionally defined has practically 
fluctuated over the years according to the economic conditions, the 
government has continually adjusted both the revenue and expenditure 
sides of the accounts to produce a nominally balanced budget.
Depending on how revenues and expenditure are classified, 
several different concepts can be derived, each of which may be used as 
an indicator of the impact of budgetary policy depending on the aim of 
the analysis. There are various concepts of the budgetary deficit. Among 
others are the overall budget balance, the 'net worth' concept, the 
domestic deficit4) and the ‘Indonesian monetary deficit’ - a practice 
which constitutes in a sense a ban on the creation of money to finance 




Share of Various Components of Central Government Revenues 
1967 - 1978/9*
Non Oil Domestic Revenue Aid receipts





Non tax Total Programme
aid
Project aid and export 
credits
Total Revenue:
1967 11 50 1 62 9 29 0 29 100
1968 14 51 3 67 14 19 0 19 100
1969 15 44 1 60 18 22 0 22 100
1969/70 13 44 1 58 14 20 8 27 100
1970/71 11 45 3 59 15 17 9 26 100
1971/72 12 39 5 56 20 16 8 24 100
1972/73 14 34 5 52 27 13 8 21 100
1973/74 14 35 4 53 29 8 10 17 100
1974/75 13 23 3 39 49 2 10 12 100
1975/76 12 20 4 36 46 1 17 18 100
1976/77 12 20 3 35 44 - 21 21 100
1977/78 13 20 3 37 45 1 17 18 100
1978/79 15 22 2 39 43 1 17 18 100
1979/80 11 17 3 31 53 - 16 16 100
1980/81 10 15 3 28 60 - 13 13 100
1981/82 11 13 2 26 62 - 12 12 100
1982/83 12 14 3 29 57 - 13 13 100
1983/84 12 13 3 28 52 - 21 21 100
Table (continued)
Share of Various Components of Central Government Revenues 
1985/6 - 1992/3
Year










Project aid and export 
credits
Total
1985/6 11 18 7 36 49 1 15 16 100
1986/7 11 28 5 44 29 9 17 26 100
1987/8 11 21 7 39 37 3 20 23 100
1988/9 13 23 5 41 29 6 24 30 100
1989/90 16 24 5 45 30 3 22 25 100
1990/1 15 25 4 44 36 3 17 20 100
1991/2 20 26 5 51 29 3 17 20 100
1992/3 22 28 5 55 26 - 17 18 100
*)Total may not add due to rounding
Source : Ministry' of Finance, Nota Keuangan dan RAPBN (Financial Notes and Budget Proposal), various years
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The Indonesian government revenue profile as shown in Table 4.7. is 
dominated by the changing relative importance of the three main
f
aggregates, oil and gas revenues, other domestic revenue (non-oil domestic 
revenue-NODR), and foreign borrowing. Non oil domestic revenues since 
1967 until 1973/74 comprised around 50 to 60% of total revenue, oil and 
gas revenue contributed 10 to 20% of the total, with the remaining 20 to 
30% coming from foreign aid/borrowing. Increasing oil prices since 1974 
resulted in significant changes in this proportion. The share of oil revenues 
had increased from 20% in 1971/2 to more than 50% during the period
1974-1985 (not shown). From 1986 onward the share had fallen to about 
30% (See Table 4.7).
Responding to the tax drive in 1983-1984, the central government’s 
non-oil taxes had doubled from 5.66% of GDP in 1983/84 to 11.17% of 
GDP in 1992/93 (Table 4.8). Measures to control expenditure such as 
cutting large capital and import intensive investment were also largely 
successful. Despite the growing burden of external interest payments, 
which was aggravated by yen appreciation, total expenditure declined from 
23.12 percent of GDP in 1983/84 to around 20 percent in 1992/93. As a 
result of revenue mobilization and expenditure control, the overall budget 
deficit narrowed from about 4 percent to 1.50 percent of GDP over the 
same period (Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8.
Summary of Central Government Operation
(in trillion rupiahs)
1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 , 1991/92 1992193
Rev. & Granta 12.49 14.54 16 19.38 16.3 21.08 23.29 29.05 39.97 42 48
oil & gas 8.17 9.52 10.43 11.14 6.33 10.05 9.53 11.25 17.71 15.04 15.33
non-oil & gas 3.81 4.39 4.79 6.62 7.65 8.78 11.91 15.43 19.71 24.06 29.13
Expenditure 15.81 17.94 15.78 22.6 21.69 22.27 27.5 30.58 35.7 43.28 51.9
Current 7.31 8.31 9.62 11.42 12.51 14.02 15.04 18.36 23.15 22.93 25.85
Capitalb 8.5 9.63 6.16 11.18 9.18 8.25 12.46 12.22 12.55 20.35 26.05
Gov’t, savings 5.18 6.23 6.38 7.96 3.79 7.06 8.25 10.69 16.82 19.07 22.15
Overall bal. -3.32 -3.4 0.22 -3.22 -5.39 -1.19 -4.21 -1.53 4.27 -1.28 -3.9
-primary bal.c. -2.7 -2.28 1.71 -1.52 -2.4 2.25 0.19 3.29 9.3 3.28 1.49
(int. payment) (0.62) (112) (1.49) (1.7) (2.99) (3.44) (4.4) (4.82) (5.03) (4.56) (5.39)
% of GDP
Rev. & grant 18.98 18.74 17.80 19.98 15.87 16.89 16.39 17.37 20.43 18.46 18.40
oil & gas 12.42 12.27 11.60 11.48 6.16 8.05 6.71 6.73 9.05 6.61 5.88
non-oil & gas 5.79 5.66 5.33 6.82 7.45 7.04 8.38 9.23 10.08 10.58 11.17
Expenditure 24.03 23.12 17.55 23.30 21.12 17.84 19.35 18.29 18.25 19.02 19.90
Current 11.11 10.71 10.70 11.77 12.18 11.23 10.58 10.98 11.84 10.08 9.91
Capital 12.92 12.41 6.85 11.53 8.94 6.61 8.77 7.31 6.42 8.95 9.99
Gov’t, savings 7.87 8.03 7.10 8.21 3.69 5.66 5.81 6.39 8.60 8.38 8.49
Overall bal. -5.05 -4.38 0.24 -3.32 -5.25 -0.95 -2.96 -0.92 2.18 -0.56 -1.50
-primary bal. -4.10 -2.94 1.90 -1.57 -2.34 1.80 0.13 1.97 4.75 1.44 0.57
Memo item :
Publ. ext. debt 18.2 26 25.4 31.3 50.3 49.5 48 42.2 42.7 38.4 39.5
° Includes external grants
b Derived as the sum of government savings and net financing (external plus domestic) 
'Overall balance net of external interest payments
Source: Calculated from “Financial Note and Budget Proposal", Ministry o f Finance, and IMF 
Publication, various issues.
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The further fall of oil prices in 1986/87 again increased the fiscal 
deficit to about 5% of GDP, necessitating renewed restraint. The required 
adjustment was more stringent than earlier. Both current .and capital 
spending were tightened further, including the freezing of civil service 
salaries for three years.
Some lessons can be drawn from Indonesian fiscal management:
1. When oil revenues were relatively plentiful, although government 
expenditure rose, its fiscal stance was less expansionary than other 
major oil exporters. Large deficits were avoided and external 
borrowing was less compared to the other oil exporters, which 
generally opted for highly expansionary policies 5).
2. The use of oil revenues is judicious, emphasizing agriculture and basic 
physical and social infrastructure and refraining from showy but low- 
productivity projects 6).
3. The government responded promptly to the need to tighten the fiscal 
stance as oil revenues fell; the speed of adjustment was swift. The 
adjustment encompassed both expenditure restraint and revenue 
mobilization.
4. Expenditures critical to growth and poverty reduction, infrastructure 
and human resource development were protected as much as possible.
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4.3.4. External Sector
During the 1970s, in spite of the amount of foreign exchange receipts 
from oil exports, the current account of Indonesia's balance of payments was 
still in deficit, cumulatively amounting to US$1,071 million during 1971/72- 
80/81, though during 1979/1980 and 1980/81 showing surpluses (Table 4.10). 
The inherited feature from the old regime plus the surge in non-oil imports, 
explains why a current account deficit continued to be recorded during the first 
oil boom. The deficit deteriorated even more during the 1980s. The cumulative 
current account deficit over 1981/82-1992/93 reached more than US$35 billion. 
The deficit reached its peak in 1982/83, amounting to US$7,039 million or 7.4% 
of GNP, following the first oil price fall. Some other important explanations for 
this deficit during the period were the Pertamina (the state oil company) crisis in 
1975/76, foreign debt service, world recession during 1974/75 and in the 1980s, 
and the rapid increase in imports, in response to the high domestic demand for 
capital and intermediate goods fostered by a considerable increase in 
government expenditure from year to year.
Due to the lack of management, the state oil company was 
committed to a huge short-term foreign loan used to accelerate its activities as 
its international credit worthiness rose in line with the increase in world oil 
prices. On the other hand, foreign exchange earnings from exports of non-oil 
merchandise declined slightly due to the world recession during 1974-1975. 
Although earnings from oil exports continued to increase considerably, total 
earning from all exports in 1975 only increased slightly, compared to an average 
of US$2 billion 1973-1980 and US$3 billion during 1986-1992.
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Table 4.9 
Balance of Payments, 1972-1992 
(US$ billion)
1972 1974 1982 1983 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Export 1.76 6.76 19.75 18.69 14.40 17.21 19.51 22.97 26.81 29.64 33.80
-Oil & LNG 0.88 4.56 15.87 13.69 7.74 8.57 7.83 8.91 11.93 11.46 10.50
-Non-oil 0.88 2.20 3.88 5.00 6.66 8.64 11.68 14.06 14.88 18.18 23.30
Import -1.45 -4.63 -17.85 -17.73 -11.94 -12.53 -13.83 -16.31 -21.46 -24.83 -26.77
-Oil & LNG -0.17 -1.20 -4.43 -3.83 -2.18 -2.22 -2.10 -2.41 -3.23 -3.37 -3.36
-Non-oil -1.28 -3.43 -13.42 -13.90 -9.76 -10.31 -11.73 -13.90 -18.23 -21.46 -23.41
Services -0.78 -2.10 -7.35 -7.41 -6.56 -6.94 -7.23 -7.99 -8.59 -9.19 -10.14
-Oil & LNG -0.38 -1.18 -3.54 -3.29 -2.50 -2.72 -2.52 -2.91 -3.06 -3.06 -3.29
-Non-oil -0.40 -0.92 -3.81 -4.12 -4.06 -4.22 -4.71 -5.08 -5.53 -6.13 -6.85
Current acc. bal. -0.47 0.03 -5.46 -6.44 -4.10 -2.27 , -1.55 -1.28 -3.24 -4.39 -3.12
-Oil & LNG 0.33 2.18 7.90 6.57 3.06 3.63 3.21 3.59 5.64 5.03 3.85
-Non-oil -0.80 -2,15 -13.35 -13.02 -7.16 -5.89 -4.76 -4.92 -8.88 -9.41 -6.96
Current acc. bal. -0.47 0.03 -5.46 -6.44 -4.10 -2.27 -1.55 -1.28 -3.24 -4.39 -3.12
Olf.cap.infl.(net) 0.40 0.60 4.10 4.80 3.10 2.10 2.00 2.80 0.60 1.40 1.10
Priv.cap.infl.(net) 0.40 0.40 1.60 1.80 1.30 1.50 0.40 0.30 4.10 4.40 5.40
Monet mov. -0.40 -0.70 1.90 -0.70 0.50 -1.20 0.30 -0.40 -2.10 -1.20 -1.70
Error & omission 0.10 -0.30 -2.20 0.50 -0.80 -0.20 -1.10 -1.40 0.60 -0.20 -1.60
Current acct./GNP -4.26 0.00 -5.63 -7.94 -5.38 -3.11 -1.92 -1.45 -3.23 -3.97 -2.54
Non int. curr. acct./GNP -3.36 0.85 -4.04 -5.95 -2.23 0.46 1.75 1.99 -0.10 -0.82 0.31
Debt Service ratio 5.4 2 9.6 10.5 27.4 27.1 28.9 23.7 21.8 20.6 19.4
Official reserve 0.5 1.5 4.2 4.8 5.3 6.5 6.2 6.6 8.7 9.9 11.6
-Eq. of month of non oil/gas imp. 4.3 2.7 2.3 4.3 5.9 6.8 5.7 5.1 5.1 5. . . ...A. 5.3
Source : Calculated from “Balance o f  Payments Statistics Publication ”, Bank Indonesia.
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Table 4.10.
Balance o f Payments, 1971/72-1992/93
Fiscal Current Net factor Trade Service Trade Nominal Cjirrent Net factor
Year account income balance (non. NFI); balance Exchange account income
(NFI); &service (in kind) R ate; (NFI);
mill. US$ mill. US$ mill. US$ mill. US$ milll USS Rp/US$ trill. Rp trill. Rp
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1971/72 -448.00 -228.00 -220.00 -346 126.00 405.75 -0.182 -0.093
1972/73 -557.00 -443.00 -114.00 -402 288.00 415.00 -0.231 -0.184
1973/74 -756.00 -712.00 -44.00 -583 539.00 415.00 -0.314 -0.295
1974/75 -138.00 -1,256.00 1,118.00 -971 2,089.00 415.00 -0.057 -0.521
1975/76 -854.00 -1,268.00 414.00 -1,323 1,737.00 415.00 -0.354 -0.526
1976/77 -802.00 -1,249.00 447.00 -1,593 2,040.00 415.00 -0.333 -0.518
1977/78 -690.00 -1,826.00 1,136.00 -1,858 2,994.00 415.00 -0.286 -0.758
1978/79 -1,155.00 -1,925.00 770.00 -2,140 2,910.00 491.88 -0.568 -0.947
1979/80 2,198.00 -2,678.00 4,876.00 -2,913 7,789.00 626.57 1.377 -1.678
1980/81 2,131.00 -2,943.00 5,074.00 -3,569 8,643.00 626.98 1.336 -1.845
1981/82 -2,790.00 -2,996.00 206.00 -4,877 5,083.00 636.50 -1.776 -1.907
1982/83 -7,039.00 -3,130.00 -3,909.00 -4,085 176.00 674.10 -4.745 -2.110
1983/84 -4,151.00 -3,934.00 -217.00 -3,729 3,512.00 983.38 -4.082 -3.869
1984/85 -1,968.00 -3,698.00 1,730.00 -3,744 5,474.00 1,049.45 -2.065 -3.881
1985/86 -1,832.00 -3,814.00 1,982.00 -4,078 6,060.00 1,146.45 -2.100 -4.373
1986/87 -4,051.00 -3,153.00 -898.00 -3,144 2,246.00 1,410.60 -5.714 -4.448
1987/88 -1,707.00 -3,825.00 2,118.00 -3,273 5,391.00 1,649.00 -2.815 -6.307
1988/89 -1,859.00 -4,198.00 2,339.00 -3,174 5,513.00 1,706.53 -3.172 -7.164
1989/90 -1,599.00 -4,612.00 3,013.00 -3,443 6,456.00 1,707.23 -2.730 -7.874
1990/91 -3,741.00 -5,392.00 1,651.00 -3,464 5,115.00 1,868.95 -6.992 -10.077
1991/92 -4,352.00 -5,579.00 1,227.00 -3,684 4,911.00 1,973.85 -8.590 -11.012
1992/93 -2,561.00 -5,887.00 3,326.00 -4,660 7,986.00 2,046.70 -5.242 -12.049
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Table 4.10. (continued)
Balance o f Payments, 1971/72-1992/93
Fiscal Trade Service Trade Export Import Net Export Net Export Net Export
Year balance (non.NFI) balance Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Non Oil &
& service (excl. serv.) (excl. serv.) (excl. serv) (excl. serv) Gas 
(Excl. serv.)
trill. Rp trill. Rp trilL Rp mill US$ mill. US$ mill.USS trilLRp trilL Rp
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1971/72 -0.089 -0.140 0.051 590 132 458 0.186 -0.135
1972/73 -0.047 -0.167 0.120 965 159 806 0.334 -0.215
1973/74 -0.018 -0.242 0.224 1,708 461 1,247 0.518 -0.294
1974/75 0.464 -0.403 0.867 5,153 1,275 3,878 1.609 -0.742
1975/76 0.172 -0.549 0.721 5,273 930 4,343 1.802 -1.081
1976/77 0.186 -0.661 0.847 6,350 1,753 4,597 1.908 -1.061
1977/78 0.471 -0.771 1.243 7,353 1,490 5,863 2.433 -1.191
1978/79 0.379 -1.053 1.431 7,374 1,711 5,663 2.786 -1.354
1979/80 3.055 -1.825 4.880 12,340 2,672 9,668 6.058 -1.177
1980/81 3.181 -2.238 5.419 17,298 3,681 13,617 8.538 -3.119
1981/82 0.131 -3.104 3.235 18,824 4,916 13,908 8.852 -5.617
1982/83 -2.635 -2.754 0.119 14,744 4,365 10,379 6.996 -6.878
1983/84 -0.213 -3.667 3.454 14,449 3,489 10,960 10.778 -7.324
1984/85 1.816 -3.929 5.745 13,994 2,797 11,197 11.751 -6.006
1985/86 2.272 -4.675 6.947 12,437 2,474 9,963 11.422 -4.475
1986/87 -1.267 -4.435 3.168 6,966 2,095 4,871 6.871 -3.703
1987/88 3.493 -5.397 8.890 8,841 2,355 6,486 10.695 -1.806
1988/89 3.992 -5.417 9.408 7,640 2,072 5,568 9.502 -0.094
1989/90 5.144 -5.878 11.022 9,337 2,529 6,808 11.623 -0.601
1990/91 3.086 -6.474 9.560 12,763 3,580 9,183 17.163 -7.603
1991/92 2.422 -7.272 9.694 10,706 3,143 7,563 14.928 -5.235
1992/93 6.807 -9.538 16.345 10,480 3,566 6,914 14.151 2.194
Source: Calculated from “Indonesian Balance of Payment Statistics” Bank Indonesia
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The sudden increase in oil price in 1979, the devaluation of late 
1978 and fiscal caution in the wake of the Pertamina, all combined to 
produce the regime’s first current account surpluses in 1979 and 1980 
mentioned above. _
An increase in imports from the early 1970s until 1983 was in 
response to the high domestic demand for capital and intermediate goods. 
After 1983, imports of non oil merchandise fell, but payments for services 
continued to rise throughout the following years. An important part of the 
rise in service payments was the payment of interest on external debt.
On the other hand, receipts from all exports already declined after 
1981. Although exports of non-oil merchandise have tended to grow since 
1983, the sharp decline in the oil prices especially in 1986 severely 
reduced total earnings from exports. The overall result was a massive 
increase in the country’s current account deficit during 1986-1987. The 
deficit declined sharply in 1987, but still remained about US$2 billion 
annually, and started to jump again in 1991, reaching almost US$4 billion 
or 4% of GNP. Splitting the current account into oil and non-oil, the non­
oil current account has always been in deficit.
The effect of the adjustment programs on the balance of payments is 
summarized in Table 4.9. and Table 4.10. The current account deficit, 
following a surge to 7.9 percent of GNP in 1983, fell to around 2.4 percent 
in 1984/85 and 1985/86. The collapse of oil prices in 1986 again led to a 
sharp deterioration in the balance of payments, with the current account 
deficit climbing to 5.4 percent of GNP in 1986. Subsequently, the 
adjustment measures succeeded in lowering the deficit to about 3 percent 
of GNP in 1987-92, and in 1989 the current account deficit fell to the 
lowest level of 1.45% of GNP. However the interest payments were on the
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increase, so that non-interest current account showed only little 
improvements.
Given the large loss of foreign exchange earnings caused by external 
shocks, the ability to reduce the current account deficit below the pre­
shock level of 1982 is evidence of the success of the adjustment programs 
in reducing the external imbalance.
In the initial phase of the adjustment period (1983-85), expenditure 
switching policy was primarily focused on a reduction of imports through 
redefining Government priorities, rephasing of large projects, a large 
depreciation of the real exchange rate (1983), the proliferation of non-tariff 
barriers, and an increase in the import-substitution activities brought about 
by strong public investment. The details of the implementation of these 
policies have been discussed in the previous chapter.
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Table 4.11.
Index of Real Growth Rate of Non-oil Export and Total Import of Goods
1974-1992
Year Non Oil 
Exports
% increase Total import 
of goods
% increase
1974 100 - 100 -
1975 97.3 -2.7 114.2 14.2
1976 111.21 14.3 126.31 10.6
1977 118.44 6.5 132.49 4.9
1978 117.14 -1.1 139.78 5.5
1979 123.23 5.2 149.57 7
' 1980 120.02 -2.6 194.44 30
1981 89.42 -25.5 222.43 14.4
1982 79.31 -11.3 281.16 26.4
1983 100.49 26.7 310.12 10.3
1984 116.67 16.1 262.98 -15.2
1985 125.19 7.3 199.86 -24
1986 142.21 13.6 222.45 11.3
1987 183.17 28.8 268.72 20.8
1988 233.35 27.4 284.30 5.8
1989 270.22 15.8 339.74 19.5
1990 304.81 12.8 439.97 29.5
1991 387.11 27 524.00 19.1
1992 492.41 27.2 556.49 6.2
Annual growth rate
1975-83 - 4 - 13
1983-85 - 14 - -20
1986-92 - 23 - 16.5
Source: Calculated from various Indonesia’s Statistical Office Bureau
Publications, various issues.
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Most of the adjustment in the second phase (1986-1992) was derived 
from the rapid growth in non-oil exports: by 23% annually in real terms 
between 1986 and 1992 (Table 4.11), and their share in total merchandise 
exports increased from 20% in 1982 to 50% in 1987 and reached 70% in 
1992 (Table 4.9.). In contrast to the first adjustment period, non-oil imports 
also expanded in real terms.
Looking at the components of the balance of payments, as in most 
other rapidly growing economies, the structure of Indonesia’s international 
trade had changed drastically during the last two decades. In 1967, the 
share of consumer goods in total imports was quite high, 35.8 percent; 
while that of intermediate goods (raw materials and auxiliary goods) and 
capital goods was 36.6 percent and 27.6 percent, respectively (See Table 
4.12). During 1980-1986, this composition changed drastically; the share of 
consumer goods in total imports dropped to 6.3 percent, while the share of 
intermediate goods rose to 76.4 percent, and the share of capital goods 
slightly declined to 17.3 percent. The pattern significantly changed during 
1987-1992, where import of capital goods had increased more than 7 
percentage points over the 1980-1986 level. Meanwhile imports of raw 
materials and consumer good, conversely decreased. The significant decline 
in import of consumer goods and the increase in the intermediate goods was 
due to the rapid growth of import substitution industries especially during 
the 1970s that essentially used imported raw materials. While in the latter 
period the significant rate of growth in capital goods was in line with the 
government’s effort to keep pace with industrialization.
In the meantime, exports had also changed considerably. As can be 
seen in Table 4.13 and 4.14, since 1974 exports have been dominated by 
hydrocarbons, first by oil exclusively and more recently by oil and gas.
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Table 4.12.
Imports by Economic Category (percent) 
1967-1992
Year Capital goods Raw materials Consumers goods
1967 27.6 36.6 35.8
1975 20.0 68.0 12.0
1976 23.7 59.8 16.5
1977 20.1 61.1 18.8
1978 15.5 67.4 17.2
1979 15.7 68.8 15.5
1980 13.7 73.2 13.0
1981 15.2 78.7 6.0
1982 18.0 74.7 7.3
1983 17.7 71.8 10.6
1984 18.5 75.5 6.0
1985 16.8 79.5 2.7
1986 17.4 78.4 4.0
1987 19.7 76.6 3.7
1988 19.3 77.2 3.5
1989 23.0 72.8 4.2
1990 27.8 68.2 4.0
1991 27.8 68.2 4.0
1992 27.0 68.5 4.5
Average
1975-80 18.1 66.4 15.5
1980-86 17.3 76.4 6.3
1987-92 24.1 72.0 3.9
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Indikator Ekonomi, various issues
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During the period of the first "Five Year Development Plan 
(1969/1970-1973/1974)", the share of oil in total earnings from exports was 
only about 30 percent, but from 1974 until 1985 oil/ gas revenues neverf
accounted for less than 50 percent of all export earnings and in 1992 
dropped again to about 30%. The share of net oil/gas in total exports 
fluctuated considerably because of large variations in the price of oil. The 
largest share of net oil/gas was 77 percent in 1981, during which the price 
of oil reached its peak at US $35 US per barrel, and since 1986 the share of 
net oil/gas has declined to below 50 percent, due to the drastic fall in the oil 
price to only about US $10 US per barrel in August 1986. Although the oil 
price rose afterwards, but it was only as high as half the price in 1981.
Meanwhile the impact of non-oil exports on the balance of payments 
adjustment during the initial years is relatively small. This is partly due to 
the small non oil export base at the start of the adjustment program. In 
1983, for example, the share of non-oil exports in total exports of goods 
was only 26%. The expansion of non-oil exports was especially 
encouraging during 1986-92, the second phase of adjustment, when they 
grew by an average of about 23 percent annually in real terms (Table 4.11). 
In 1989 the share of non oil exports in total exports had increased to 61 
percent (Table 4.9). The structure of exports of non-oil merchandise also 
changed drastically, though primary products were still dominant. Table 
4.13. presents major group commodities, accounting for more 50 percent of 
all non-oil exports. Timber (logs, plywood, sawn timber, and others) was 
the leading source of export earnings, followed by rubber, during 1973-80. 
On average during 1973-80, the share of timber was 13.1 percent of total 
exports and 31.6 percent of all non-oil exports; but it declined to 8.1 percent 
of total exports during 1980-87. An important reason for this sharp decline
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was due to the imposition of the export ban on logs since 1981, aiming at 
reducing export of primary goods and encouraging the growth of 
manufacturing industries in wood products that mostly employ domestic 
raw materials. After that year, investments in plywood industries grew 
rapidly; and the result was a more than doubled export of timber products, 
increasing from US $948 million (5 percent of total exports in 1981) to US 
$ 2.2 billion (15 percent of total exports in 1987). Rubber continued to be 
significant in the non-oil exports, though its share in total exports declined 
from 8.2 percent over the period 1973 - 80 to 5.1 percent during 1981-87.
Export of manufacturers was relatively insignificant in the earlier 
period, accounting for only about 3 percent of total exports during 1973- 
80. But in the recent period, there was a substantial increase in 
manufactured exports, from US $865 million in 1981 to US $2.5 billion in 
1987, or 11.3 percent of total exports. Among manufactured commodities, 
textiles have recently become a major non-oil export commodity, 
accounting for 6 percent of total exports or 11 percent of all non-oil exports. 
Despite such substantial increases in manufactured exports during 1980s, on 
a percapita basis Indonesia’s manufactured exports were still low when 
compared with those of neighboring countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and the Philippines7^
In 1992/93 oil and LNG exports had fallen to only 30 percent of total 
exports, and non-oil exports increased to 70 percent (Table 4.14). Values of 




Exports of Major Commodities 




Net oil/gas Major non-oil Exports
Timber Rubber Manufacturing Textiles10
1969 908 279 (30.7) 34 (3.7) 307 (33.8) 20 (2.2) -
1973 2625 1016 (38.7 ) 720 (27.4) 483 (18.4) 77 (2.9) -
1974 5550 3351 (60.4) 615(11.1) 425 (7.7) 114(2.1) -
1975 5999 4182 (69.7) 527 (8.8) 381 (6.4) 144 (2.4) -
1976 7006 4472 (63.8) 885 (12.6) 577 (8.2) 196 (2.8) -
1977 9158 5647 (61.7) 943 (10.3) 608 (6.6) 245 (2.7) -
1978 9418 5759 (61.2) 1003 (10.6) 715 (7.6) 360 (3.8) 24 (0.3)
1979 11479 5900 (51.4) 1912(16.7) 1023 (8.9) 447 (3.9) 59.5 (0.5)
1980 13710 7631 (55.7 ) 1900 (13.9) 1113 (8.1) 540 (3.9) 128 (0.9)
1981 19311 14880 (77.0 ) 948 (4.9) 910 (4.7) 865 (4.5) 87.5 (0.5)
1982 15314 11436 (74.7) 872 (5.7) 606 (4.0) 853 (5.6) 153 (1.0)
1983 14859 9866 (66.4) 1111(7.5) 859 (5.8) 1483 (10.0) 236(1.6)
1984 17817 12042 (66.3) 1173 (6.6) 959 (5.4) 1803 (10.1) 405 (2.3)
1985 15974 9996 (62.6) 1206 (7.6) 719(4.5) 2398(15.0) 451 (2.8)
1986 12215 5559 (45.6) 1408(11.5) 710 (5.8) 2577 (21.1) 746 (6.1)
1987 14994 6345 (42.3 ) 2231 (14.9) 886 (5.9) 2538 (16.9) 913 (6.1)
Average
1973-80 81118 4745 (58.5) 1063 (13.1) 666 (8.2) 265 (3.3)
-
1981-87 15783 10018 (63.5 ) 1278 (8.1) 807 (5.1) 1788(11.3) 427 (2.7)
Note: a) Total exports include total non-oil merchandise and net oil/gas
b) Textiles are also included in manufacturing
c) Numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage share in total exports 
Source: Report o f  Bank Indonesia,. various issues
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Table 4.14
Exports of Non-oil and OIL & LNG, 1984/85-1992/93 
Value (US$ billion)
Year Non-oil Oil & LNG
Agriculture Mineral Manufactured Total (FOB)
1984/85 3.67 0.78 1.47 5.92 14.00
1985/86 3.64 0.80 1.74 6.18 12.43
1986/87 4.50 0.72 1.52 6.74 6.97
1987/88 5.76 1.11 2.63 9.50 8.84
1988/89 6.93 1.56 3.70 12.19 7.64
1989/90 7.03 1.58 5.89 14.50 9.34
1990/91 7.26 1.44 6.68 15.38 12.76
1991/92 7.82 1.69 9.50 19.01 10.70




11.7 13.8 32.2 19.6 -3.5
Source : Bank Indonesia (non-oil export based on PEB Export Declaration Form)
As noted in the previous discussion, one unique feature of the 
deregulation of the Indonesian economy was that it began by opening first 
the capital account in 1970, and was then followed with other reforms. 
This approach does not conform to the postulates of the sequencing 
literature. According to the literature, the international capital account 
should be opened “last”, that is after fiscal and monetary reforms have 
been introduced and the current account opened. Considering that assets 
markets adjust faster than goods markets, the premature deregulation of 
capital flows can lead to speculation and financial instability8). Indonesia’s 
open capital account limits the effectiveness of monetary policy but it has 
several benefits and should be maintained as it stimulates foreign aid and 
domestic investment, provides a barometer of macroeconomic policy (a
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loosening of monetary policy would quickly be reflected in reserve 
outflows), combined with relatively fixed exchange rate places a greater 
role of fiscal policy in affecting aggregate demand. Besides, it is alsof
difficult for a country to close capital account, given the mobility of 
international capital flows nowadays.
Since the balance of payments must be balanced, any deficit 
(surplus) in the current account was always offset by the surplus (deficit) in 
the capital accounts and change in the stock of official foreign reserves. 
During 1982-1989, a total net inflow of long-term capital ranged from 
US$3 billion to US$5 billion per year, with official capital inflow took the 
bigger part. In 1990 net official capital inflow dropped drastically to 
US$0.60 billion from US$2.80 billion in the previous year. On the other 
hand net private capital inflow increased tremendously from an average 
US$ 0.35 billion during 1988-89 to an average not less than US$4 billion 
during 1990-1992 (Table 4.9).
Despite Indonesia's good performance in external adjustment and its 
cautious approach to external borrowing, the debt burden rose sharply in 
the 1980s.
Table 4.15.
External Borrowing and Debt, 1982-1992 (US$ billions)
1982-85 1986-88 1989 1990 1991 1992
Net PLiblic Extbotrowiiig 29 1.9 2 0.6 2 1.6
-Official resources 12 21 29 25 3.2 3
-Neri-cffidal res. 1.7 -0.3 -0.9 -1.9 -1.1 -1.4
Net FhvAlX 0.1 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.9 26
Dirt Stock (year endO
Debt Stock 34.2 50.8 529 66.5 75.9 84.4
FUHicExtdebt 26.8 41.2 41 45 48.6 49.3
nivate MLT Ektdebt 3.8 5.5 6.6 10.3 129 16.9
ftiv Short Term dirt 3.6 4.1 5.3 11.2 14.4 1S2
Notes: MLT is an abbreviation of medium long term debt 
Source. Calculated from World Bank, World Debt Tables. 1993-94
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By the end of 1988 the stock of medium and long-term public and 
private debt outstanding and disbursed had reached US$50.8 billion and 
kept increasing and in 1992 reached $84.4 billion (Table 4.15).' From 1987 
until 1992 total debt as a percentage of GDP had never been lower than 
60%, though the debt service ratio was kept steadily at 30% (Table 4.9). 
Many of Indonesia's debt indicators in the 1980s are above the average for 
all developing countries and in line with those for highly indebted 
countries. However, unlike the highly indebted countries, Indonesia has not 
faced a foreign exchange crisis or a cash-flow constraint on payment of its 
external debt obligations, due to some important factors9):
1. As a result of maintaining sound economic policies and a 
prudent borrowing strategy, it receives strong financial 
support from official sources on concessional termsI0)
2. It has substantial reserves available in the form of foreign 
exchange and undrawn lines of credit.
3. It has retained access to new voluntary lending from 
commercial banks.
4.3.5. Monetary development
The development of Indonesia’s monetary conditions during the new 
order regime may be divided into three periods: 1966-73, 1973-83 and 
1983-present. The first period was recognized as the period of stabilization 
and rehabilitation. This pre-oil boom period marked a fundamental change 
in monetary policy which led to the more market-oriented outlook of the 
order regime. The main objective was first to halt hyper-inflation by tight
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fiscal-monetary control, and to create a banking system as a financial 
intermediary which could play an active role in the task of development.
In the framework of mobilizing and allocating savings to finance part 
of rapid growth of investments, a new interest rate policy was introduced. 
The idea behind this interest rate regulation was to stimulate demand for 
and influence the composition of financial assets through controlling banks’ 
deposits and lending rates. For this purpose, deposit rates must be high 
enough to make them attractive, while lending rates must be low enough to 
control inflation and foster the growth of investment. The positive interest 
rate difference favourable to depositers was made possible by government 
interest subsidies. Change in interest rates had been made frequently in line 
with changes in the rate of inflation and general economic conditions. 
During 1968-74, there had been interest rate adjustments so many times. 
The result of this policy had been a rapid increase in time and saving 
deposits, from only Rp5 billion (in nominal term) in 1968 (not shown) to 
more than half a trillion rupiahs in 1974, and increased to Rp7.1 trillion 
and Rp90.3 trillion in 1983 and 1992 (Table 4.16). In short, monetary 
policy during the pre oil boom era, under circumstances that were 
relatively free from external pressure either from the budget or the balance 
of payments, worked considerably well. The inflation rate fell from about 
600 percent per year during 1965-66 to around 40.7 percent during 1967- 
1973, while GDP grew on average at 6 percent per year (Table 4.2).
As the economy moved toward the oil boom in 1973 and 1974, the 
monetary system that had been developed in preceding years came under 
strain. A huge increase in foreign exchange earnings had led to a rapid 
expansion of bank credit. To limit excessive money supply expansion 
resulting from bank credits, the government then imposed direct control
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over domestic credit. This policy was widely known as credit ceiling and 
lasted until 1983. By credit ceiling, we mean there was a maximum 
percentage of increase in a bank's loan position for a certain period. These
f
measures, anyway, had added to the complexity of the Indonesian financial 
system. Despite such complexity, the Indonesian monetary-fiscal policy 
was considered to be successful in keeping the inflationary effects of the 
1973/1974 oil boom under control.
The financial reform measures, the so called “banking deregulation” 
taken on June 1,1983 represented a dramatic change in the financial 
system. The basic idea underlying this reform was that the tight monetary 
controls were no longer compatible with the present condition of the 
economy. Among other things, there were three important measures under 
the new system.
First, relaxation of interest rate regulation. Commercial banks were 
free to set most deposit and lending rates.
Second, the elaborate scheme of refinancing facilities was simplified 
so as to restrict access only to the highest priority sectors.
Third, was abolition of credit ceilings. Such direct control of bank 
credit expansion was replaced by indirect control through reserve money 
management and more active open market operations. The most striking 
effect of the new monetary measures has been the quick adjustment 
implemented by banking sectors through raising interest rates. For 
example, the interest rate on 6 month deposits jumped from 6 percent in 
1982 to 13 percent per annum in 1983, and from 9 percent to 18 percent 
per annum for 12-month deposits111 As a result there was a considerable 
increase in the total amount of time deposits. Total time deposits were
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doubled within a year after monetary reform, from Rp4 trillion in 1982 (not 
shown) to almost Rp8 trillion in 1983 (Table 4.16).
Table 4.16.
Growth of Money and Credit 
1974-1992
Description
Stock; End of Year 
(trillion rupiahs)







Reserve money 0.8 4.9 14.7 22.3 13
Money-supply (narrow money) 0.9 7.6 28.8 26.8 16
Time & savings deposit (Quasi Money) 0.6 7.1 90.3 31.6 32.7
Broad money ‘ 1.5 14.7 119.1 28.9 26.2
Domestic credit 1.4 10.4 126.6 25 32
- Private sector 1.5 15.7 141.5 30 28
- (Net government deposit) (0.1) (5.3) (14.9) (55) (12)
Quasi Money / GDP 5.31 9.15 34.62 6.2 16
Narrow Money / GDP 7.96 9.79 11.04 2.3 1.3
Broad Money / GDP 13.27 18.94 45.67 4 10.3
Net Government Deposit / GDP 0.88 6.83 5.71 25.6 -2
Money multiplier (ml) 1.13 1.55 1.96 - -
Money multiplier (m2) 1.88 3.00 8.10 - -
Inflation (CPI) 21.29 69.97 135.03 14 7.5
GDP (current prices) 11.3 77.6 260.8 23.9 14.4
Source : Calculated from Indonesian Financial Statistics, Bank Indonesia, various 
issues.
Having two different monetary developments, recent Indonesian 
monetary policy experience can then be classified under two distinct 
financial regimes characterized by contrasting monetary objectives and use 
of different policy instruments. The first regime (1974-1983) can be 
attributed to credit control and extensive central bank intervention in credit 
allocation, associated with high oil revenue growth. The second regime 
(1983-1992) was characterized by a more market based monetary control, 
paralleled by a decline in oil export prices
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A part of the success story of monetary policy is reflected in the 
containment of inflation pressure. The consumer price index, in the period 
1983-92 shows a deceleration of the average rate of inflation (Table 4.16). 
The inflation rate fell from an average 14 percent in 1974-83 to 7.5 percent 
in 1983-92. Despite a large devaluation, cost push pressures on domestic 
inflation during 1983-92 were contained by lower levels of world inflation 
and the government's ability to restrain rice prices.
The low transmission of inflationary pressures through cost-push 
and demand-pull forces was supported by an appropriate monetary policy. 
This was achieved by slowing the rate of growth of reserve money and 
mainly by inducing people to hold large volumes of broad money, by 
deregulating domestic deposit rates. The surge in the growth of quasi­
money (time and saving deposits), contributed to a sharp increase in the 
financial deepening of the economy and promoted financing investment 
through financial intermediaries. Reserve money in 1983-92 grew only 13 
percent, compared to 22.3 percent in 1974-83 (Table 4.16). While the ratio 
of quasi money to GDP annually increased from 6.2 percent in 1974-83 to 
16 percent in 1983-92, altogether the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP 
increased from 4 percent to 10.3 percent over the same period. In line with 
this was the development of broad money multiplier, which increased from 
1.88 in 1974 to 3.00 in 1983 and finally to 8.10 in 1992. The financial 
deepening allowed the expansion of credit to the private sector. The ability 
to bring down inflation even with two major devaluations is a strong 
indication of improved overall monetary management. Yet, the scope of 
monetary policy is restricted in moderating inflation, if not accompanied by 
prudent fiscal policy. This can also be seen from Table 4.16, when 
domestic credit to the private sector increased on average by 30 percent 
per year during 1974-1983, fiscal policy had been very restrained showing
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an increase of net government deposits of 55 percent. But, as credit to the 
private sector slowed down to an average by 28 percent per year during 
1983-1992, net government deposits increased by only 12 percent per year 
(government sector became more expansive or less contractive). This 
policy can be viewed as an “accommodating” fiscal policy to the monetary 
policy. The avoidance of borrowing from the domestic banking system to 
finance budget deficits - a striking feature of Indonesian fiscal policy that is 
uncommon in many other developing countries - has also facilitated the 
task of authorities in controlling inflation and keeping the balance of 
payments manageable. For most of the 1980s, the central government has 
accumulated rather than utilized deposits with the banking system.
4.3.6. Some lessons of experience and problem areas in the future
Although it is not incidental that Indonesia has been praised by many 
observers as a country in the developing world which has successfully 
maintained credit worthiness and non inflationary growth in the global 
scale, there are many problems remaining. Like most other developing 
countries, Indonesia is also still facing problems which are in common with 
other developing countries, such as poverty, a high unemployment rate, 
unequal distribution of income and balance of payment deficits, and 
especially the foreign debt burden.
The attack on poverty depends largely on the success of developing 
the agriculture sector. Past experience, shows that Indonesia had proven to 
be very successful in managing agriculture moving from being the biggest 
rice importing country in the world to rice self sufficiency. And 
extrapolating from developed countries’ experience it is very clear that it is 
in the agriculture sector that the battle for development will be won or lost.
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Attacking poverty also means providing more job opportunities for the 
unemployed.
As a matter of fact, the unemployment rate is still above the normal 
rate by international standards. This is aggravated by so-called 
underemployment and disguised unemployment.
High economic growth and a sustainable balance of payment deficits 
are two objectives which are not easily reconciled, due to the very fact that 
the Indonesian economy is a small open economy subject to world 
economic fluctuation. To some degree, the effects are beyond the control 
of the government. In other words, government is only able to lessen the 
impact of the world’s economic fluctuations but not to totally alleviate it. 
The standard problem is how to maintain an internal and external balance 
in such a way that while the economy is growing it does not give rise to a 
balance of payments problem.
More equal distribution of income is not less important than the 
growth of income itself. Higher economic growth does not necessarily 
mean that more equal distribution of income will follow, as the trickle 
down effects argument suggests. To improve the distribution of income 
many ways can be adopted. Some of them have been proposed by Michael 
P.Todaro 12)
- “getting the prices of factors of production right”. For 
example government should make the use of capital intensive 
technology less attractive than the labor intensive one (by 
imposing higher taxes on capital intensive).
- taxation should be moving to a more and more progressive 
system.
133
- launching land reform, as the most important key in solving 
poverty and skewed distribution of income. This program has 
been successfully implemented in Japan and Taiwan.
- direct aid to the poor.
On the efficiency side, though Incremental Output Ratio (ICOR) 
went down from an average 7.8 in the period 1982-85 to an average 5.2 in 
the next three years, this figure is still quite high, which may represent the 
“high cost” economy.
Last but not least, central to the problem and issues of the 
Indonesian economy in the future is a consistent implementation of policy 
adjustments at an accelerated pace as already formulated and launched by 
the government.
In the realm of policy issues some policy mistakes are inevitable. In 
the monetary field the use of credit ceilings to control money supply was 
ineffective and the use of selective credit allocation (both during 1974- 
1983) biased to indigenous (non-Chinese Indonesian) and State Enterprises 
resulted in many cases of bad loans.
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This chapter discusses the Indonesian budget system, some concepts 
of budget deficit in Indonesia, the concept which is chosen or applied in 
this study, the proposed concepts to be used for oil-exporting countries and 
to a lesser extent some other approaches.
We firstly discuss the budget process and the balance sheet of the 
Indonesian budget to be followed by a discussion on the concept generally 
used by the IMF and the World Bank: the concept which is applied in this 
study.
The next two concepts to follow are the domestic-foreign budget 
balance and the oil-adjusted budget balance which are primarily about the 
budget deficit concepts proposed for oil-exporting countries so that the 
may capture the “real” budget impact of oil revenue on the economy. The 
difference between the domestic-foreign budget balance and the oil- 
adjusted budget balance is that in the former the regrouping is to be made 
between oil and non-oil both for revenues and expenditures, while the 
latter necessitates that the oil component be extracted from total revenues 
compensated by an equal change in the expenditure. The former puts forth 
effort to see the monetary impact of “oil” and “non-oil” budget, while the 
latter attempts to get a real picture of the (non-oil) fiscal stance.
A somewhat different approach comes next in which the budget 
deficit is to be seen as total expenditure minus total domestic revenue. 
Total domestic revenue here covers oil and non-oil revenues.
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Other approaches taken up in the last part of this chapter deal with 
the measurement of budget deficit in a non inflationary context, and of the 
proposed concept for using a comprehensive accounting for the public 
sector.
5.2. The Indonesian Budget Process
The importance of planning for economic and social development 
has long been realized in Indonesia. Since 1969, Five Year Development 
Plans (REPELITA) have been implemented. In fiscal year 1996/97 (fiscal 
year runs from April 1 to end of March), Indonesia is in the third year of 
the Sixth Five Year Development Plan (REPELITA VI), which runs from 
1994/95 through 1998/99. The beginning of April 1994 also marked the 
nation’s Second Long-Term Development Plan covering the 25 fiscal years 
through 2018/19. Each Five Year Development Plan provides coherent 
statements of government policies, programs and projects necessary for 
development during the five subsequent years. The primary objectives of 
almost all the five-year development plan are what is called the Trilogy of 
Development: equitable distribution of development and its fruits, 
reasonable national economic growth and national economic stability. The 
priority is based on the assumed stage of development. In the first few 
five-year development plans the sequence, when the overcoming of 
inflation was still the main concern, was national economic stability, 
followed by national economic growth and equitable distribution of 
development.
The formulation of the Five Year Development Plans is the 
responsibility of the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS)
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in cooperation with different agencies, both those of central and local 
governments, and the business communities. To ensure the conformity of 
the government budget with the Five Year Development Plan, Bappenas, 
in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, has primary responsibility for 
decisions on the development budget allocation, including the estimated 
amount of expenditures. However, the execution which includes control, 
disbursement and revenue collection, rests with the Ministry of Finance. 
As a rule, the expenditure for each fiscal year must be covered by the 
revenue for that fiscal year. Exceptions are carried-over expenses, 
continued expenses and contracts and outlays within the budget of each 
fiscal year that must be made within that fiscal year.
The budget process or budget cycle comprises budget preparation, 
budget formulation and proposal, budget approval, budget execution, 
followed by budget control and budget justification. The process can be 
















-About 18 months after the 
end of fiscal year
In the budget preparation, the Government via the Ministry of 
Finance prepares a draft of the budget. The President, assisted by the 
Minister of Finance and the Chairman of Bappenas, is responsible for its 
final preparation and submission to Parliament (early January), 
approximately three months before the end of the current fiscal year.
The final draft comprises basically six elements:
a. A financial note which details the plans and policies to be 
implemented in the fields of monetary and balance of
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payments policy and the objectives of the proposed 
budgets.
b. Estimates of revenues (taxes, excise, import-duties, etc.).
c. Draft of routine budget.
d. Draft of development budget.
e. Planned project aid and technical assistance projects to be 
financed by various donors in foreign currencies
f. Draft of budget legislation
Parliament holds hearings with the government (Minister of Finance) on 
the draft budget, makes adjustments, and authorizes the expenditure 
contained therein. The draft budget becomes law upon approval and cannot 
be exceeded without parliament’s approval. Whenever it is necessary 
during the course of the fiscal year to change an item in the approved 
budget, a request is addressed to the Budget Committee in Parliament, 
which has the authority to approve minor interim changes. At the end of 
the fiscal year, a formal presentation is made to Parliament for the approval 
of cumulative changes made throughout the fiscal year.
5.3. The Balance Sheet of the Budget
Below is an example of the balance sheet of Indonesia’s official 
budget plan for 1991/92 (in trillion rupiahs):
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Table 5.1.
Balance Sheet of Indonesia’s Official Budget 
(trillion rupiahs)
Revenues Expenditures
A. Domestic revenues 40.184 A. Routine expenditure 30.558
L Oil and gas receipts 15.008 L Personnel expenditure 7.753
1. OIL 12.522 1. Salaries/pensions 6.068
2.LNG 2.486 2. Rice allowances 0.769
11. Non-oil receipts 25.175 3. Food allowances 0.436
1. Income tax 8.021 4. Other personnel dom. exp. 0.267
2. Value added tax 8.224 5. Overseas personnel 0.213
3. Import duties 2.574 IL Material expenditures 2.2
4. Excise tax 2.215 1. Domestic 2.038
5. Export tax 0.121 2. External 0.162
6. Land and property tax 0.839 HL Subsidies to local gov’t 4.66
7. Other taxes 0.351 1. Personnel expenditure 4.346
8. Nontax receipts 2.831 2. Non-personnel expenditure 0.314
IV. Amorti. & int. payments 14.381
1. Domestic debt 0.251
2. Foreign debt 14.13
V. Other routine expenditures 1.564
1. Subsidies on fuel 1.187
2. Others 0.377
B. Development revenues 10.372 B. Development expenditures 19.998
I. Program aids 1.538 I. Rupiah financing 11.164
-Program aid 0.005 II. Project aid 8.834
-Local financing (rupiah) 1.533
II. Project aid 8.834
Grand total 50.556 Grand total 50.556
It is clear from Table 5.1 above, that the budget looks balanced, 
while in fact apart from off-budget activity it is in deficit equal to foreign 
loan amounting to R p l0.372 trillion to be classified as (development) 
revenues instead of means of financing. The realized budget balance has 
also been close to zero. The table also shows that the largest part of 
program aid is local financing or program aid that can be converted to local 
currency (rupiah) and used domestically, which will have a monetary 
impact.
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Routine and development budget allocations are classified in almost 




4. Project (or activity for the routine budget)




Of special importance in the discussion of Indonesia’s budget 
mainly related with the overall budget concept is off-budget activities. 
Regarding off-budget activities, the “location” is mainly in the government 
account at Bank Indonesia (Central Bank). The table below is an example 
of the change of government account with Bank Indonesia which consists 
of demand deposits owned by the State Treasury and other government 
institutions as well as claims on the Central Government in the form of 
Bank Indonesia’s advance payment and other claims, including the off- 
budget account.
The table below reflects net claims of the Central Bank to the 
Central Government (net government indebtedness to Central Bank). Apart 
from government accounts with deposit money banks this means expansion 
or contraction of the money supply. In the example below, the government 
is running a deficit (expansion to money supply) of Rp 1.312 trillion.
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Table 5.2.
Change of Government Account with Bank Indonesia, 1985/86
(trillion rupiahs)
Assets with Bank Indonesia -1.395 Liabilities to Bank Indonesia 0.083
1. State Treasury account — - -0.002 l.Bank Indonesia advances -
a. Receipts(+) 15.808 2. Others 0.083
-Budget 15.222







-Non Budget (“off-budget”) 5.2
♦Cash supply to Treasury 4.72
♦Bank Indonesia advances -
♦Others 0.48
2.Other government accounts -1.397
As seen from the table above, the “off-budget” account applies to 
both revenues and expenditures. This concept is aimed at capturing fiscal 
transactions outside the framework of the annual Budget. For example, on 
the revenues side, this concept captures among others reforestation funds, 
which accrue directly to the Forestry Ministry and are not recorded as a 
revenue in the Budget. On the expenditure side, the concept encompasses 
extra budgetary spending financed out of the Government’s financial 
accounts. The limits of this concept should also be noted. Such 
transactions can only be estimated on a net basis; little is known about the 
size of the underlying gross revenues and expenditures.
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5.5. Some Concepts of Budget Deficit in Indonesia
5.5.1. Overall budget balance : The IMF and World Bank Concept: 
The concept applied in the study
Many concepts of budget deficit have been proposed, for Indonesia 
particularly, as well as for studies of its impact. For Indonesia, the popular 
one is the concept being used by the IMF and the World Bank.
In most of the studies on Indonesia the IMF or the World Bank 
defines budget deficit as being the sum of Total Revenue and Grants minus 
Current expenditure (including interest on external debt) which is equal to 
the Current budget balance minus Development expenditure and Net 
lending. From the financing side it consists of domestic financing and net 
foreign financing. Domestic financing is the change in net government 
deposits with the domestic banking system, while Net foreign borrowing is 
equal to Gross drawings minus Amortization. An example follows :
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Table 5.3.
Indonesia: Summary of Central Government Operations 







Total revenue and grants 29,045
Current expenditure 18,193
Of which: Personnel 6,202
Subsidies 1,290
Interest on external debt 4,496
Current budget balance 10,852
Development expenditure and net lending 2) 12,683
Total expenditure and net lending 30,876
Overall balance - 1,831
Financing, net 1,831





1) The fiscal year begins on April 1
2) Derived as the sum of the current budget balance and net financing. Derived 
residually in this manner, these estimates of capital expenditure include off-budget 
spending.
3) Change in net government deposits with the domestic banking system
4) As derived from the balance of payments accounts.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Indonesia: Recent Economic
Developments, May 21, 1993
The choice of a concept budget deficit definition is constrained by 
the data non-availability and the different theoretical approach. In this 
study, therefore, we follow the concept of budget deficit used by the IMF 
and the World Bank. The concept according to the writer has the following 
preferences :
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1. The concept treats foreign borrowing and domestic 
monetary system as the sources of financing of budget 
deficit, which in fact they are;
2. By incorporating the domestic financing by the 
monetary system it take into account the monetary 
impact of budget deficit with regard to the monetary 
system. From monetary sense it covers, at least, the 
observable monetary impact;
3. The concept captures the net lending and, which may 
be uncommon in other countries, the off-budget 
activities;
4. Last but not the least, compared to other approaches, 
discussed in the following section, the data for this 
approach is relatively readily available.
In assessing the impact of the budget deficit on the current account 
in Indonesia in this study we use the primary budget balance concept 
(overall budget balance minus interest payment) with and without the 
domestic monetary system’s financing, as the latter could be regarded to 
some extent as beyond the control of monetary authorities. Parallel with 
the primary budget balance concept the current account concept to be used 
is the current account without net factor income or simply the trade 
balance without net non-factor services (balance of trade of goods). This is 
discussed in the Appendix on Statistical Issues. We will also only deal 
with the deficit/surplus of the Central Government budget, without local 
government or public enterprises.
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5.5.2. Domestic-Foreign Budget Balance Concept
This concept, though, not necessarily designed and commonly used 
for Indonesia, has a relevance for Indonesia as an oil developing country. 
This concept of budget deficit primarily deals with the issue of the 
monetary impact of budget resulting from oil revenues. For oil exporting 
countries (like Indonesia for example), where a substantial volume of 
external receipts and payments passes directly through the government’s 
budget, it is argued that for such countries the domestic-foreign budget 
balance provides a better first approximation than overall budget balance in 
examining its impact on domestic economy. This concept is suggested by 
David R. Morgan1 \  and the following discussion is extracted from his 
paper.
The separation of government transactions into foreign and domestic 
transactions represent an attempt to estimate the direct impact of the 
budget on domestic, rather than total, demand. Government expenditure 
abroad does not add directly to domestic demand and therefore does not 
increase domestic employment and output. Similarly government receipts 
from abroad do not directly reduce private domestic resources. This 
approach, is said to be more than a straight-forward accounting exercise. 
In die case of government revenue, for example, the central issue is 
whether the revenue represents a withdrawal from the income stream in the 
domestic private sector. The exclusion of government tax revenue from 
domestically based, foreign-owned oil companies from the domestic 
balance implies that this revenue would otherwise have been transferred
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abroad. On the expenditure side, it is also necessary to exclude all 
government expenditure directly incurred abroad.
Morgan further mentioned that the domestic budget balance concept, 
which emphasizes the first-round effects of budgetary operations on the 
generation of income and purchasing power, is closely related to liquidity 
budget balance analysis, which focuses on the liquidity or monetary 
implications of government operations. The liquidity balance differs from 
domestic balance in that it excludes domestic non-bank borrowing by the 
government.
To illuminate the issue a hypothetical example is illustrated below.
Table 5.4.A. A Hypothetical Oil Exporting Country:
Cenfral Government Operation, 1973 and 1974 








Budget surplus/deficit(-) -20 200
Financing*
Domestic banking system 20 -2 0 0
Memorandum item : 
Domestic deficit(-) -7 0 - 115
*. A minus sign represents a reduction in liabilities or an increase in assets
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Table 5.4.B. A Hypothetical Oil Exporting Country: 
Factors Affecting Changes in Domestic Liquidity, 
1973 and 1974
(In millions o f hypothetical dinars)
1973 1974
Change in money and quasi-money 75 120
Change in domestic assets (net) 45 -160
Claims on government sector 20 -200
Claims on non-government sector 25 40
Change in foreign assets (net) 30 280
From Table 5.4.A. the fiscal account shows a drastic change from a 
deficit to a large surplus in 1974 as a result of the sharp jump in oil 
revenues. The surplus is reflected in increased government deposits with 
the domestic banking system.
The conventional presentation of the monetary survey portrays the 
rise in the net foreign assets of the banking system as the primary 
expansionary factor in the growth of liquidity in 1974, and the large 
increase in government deposits as the main offsetting factor (See Table
5.4.B). Fiscal policy and, in particular, its monetary implications, appear 
contractionary. The conventional presentation conceals the fact that the 
government's fiscal operations constitute the primary determinant of 
changes in money and quasi-money. The receipt of oil revenues by 
government (the main factor underlying the rise in foreign assets) has no 
immediate monetary impact, since it is directly offset by a rise in 
government deposits. Only to the extent that government injects this 
revenue into the domestic income stream, through its domestic 
expenditure, is the inflow of foreign exchange translated into domestic 
liquidity. Hence, an analytically more meaningful presentation of the 
factors affecting changes in liquidity is presented in Table 5.4.C below.
150
Table 5.4.C. A Hypothetical Oil Exporting Country:
Alternative Presentation of Factors Affecting 
Changes in Domestic Liquidity, 1973 and 1974 
(In millions o f  hypothetical dinars)
1973 1974
Change in money and quasi-money 75 120
Owing t o :
Domestic budget deficit 70 115
Non-government sector operation 5 5
External transactions -20 -35
Change in claims by domestic banks 25 40
Note: All entries in this table are taken from Tables 1 and 2 except for non­
government sector external transactions, which enter as a residual.
The table above portrays government sector activity as the major 
expansionary factor in the growth of liquidity.
One important policy implication highlighted by this alternative 
presentation is that the exogenous nature of oil revenues to any one oil 
exporting country does not give rise to the monetary stabilization problems 
that would confront, say, commodity products where the sale proceeds 
were in the hands of the private sector. Under existing institutional 
arrangements in almost all major oil exporting countries, oil revenues are 
automatically sterilized. The relevant transmission mechanism is not the 
balance of payments, but rather the government budget.
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5.5.3. Oil-Ad justed Overall Budget Balance Concept
Still in the light of oil-related issues, another approach to budget 
balance which is quite similar to the domestic-foreign budget balance 
(currency balance) illustrated above is oil-adjusted overall budget balance. 
This concept is proposed by Lazaros E. Molho2). He argues the problem of 
the concept of the domestic-foreign budget balance above is that in 
practice it is not always easy to identify the import content of government 
spending. In addition, by excluding foreign-financed government imports, 
the domestic currency balance misses the important effects of fiscal 
imbalances on the buildup of external debt.
Another problem which the domestic-foreign budget balance 
concept may encounter, according to the writer, especially in the case of 
Indonesia, lies in the difficulty in breaking down the balance of payments 
into private and public sector components.
While the domestic-budget balance concept wants to expose the 
liquidity or monetary impact of the budget stemming from oil revenue, the 
oil-adjusted budget balance concept is designed to get the real picture of 
fiscal stance, which accounts for some special features of oil revenue. But, 
like die domestic currency balance, the oil-adjusted balance reflects die 
true effects of oil-related budgetary developments on domestic demand, as 
it captures changes in oil revenue that are compensated by equal changes 
in expenditure, while disregarding uncompensated changes in oil revenue.
As such, this approach is regarded a more reliable measure of 
discretionary fiscal policy than the unadjusted balance, which is subject to 
oil revenue instability tiiat is most often unrelated to policy factors. This
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approach eliminates much of the year-to-year variability in the fiscal 
balance, making it easier to asses long-run policy trends.
This approach argues further, from a longer-run perspective, serves 
to account for the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource. If Government is 
assumed to be the sole owner of the oil wealth (as in the case of 
Indonesia), then oil-related receipts could be viewed as revenues from the 
sale of an asset. The conventional measure of the fiscal balance would, 
accordingly, overstate government saving until all oil wealth is depleted, 
and therefore provide a misleading picture of the sustainability of fiscal 
policy, as exposed by Buiter3). Buiter’s approach will be briefly touched on 
in the section of Other Approaches.
Oil-adjusted balance, according to the writer, as far as the (non-oil) 
fiscal stance is concerned, addresses the problem well. But as the monetary 
impact of oil revenue become the main issue, it loses its relevance.
5.5.4. Budget deficit as total expenditure minus total domestic revenue
Besides budget deficit followed by the IMF’s concept, and budget 
deficit seen as the monetary impact of banking systems loans to Central 
government (and state enterprises), Hal Hill, without using any empirical 
studies, lists the third possible approach that is the deficit as total 

















1969 -76 -91 4 -22
1970 -101 -113 19 -5
1971 -91 -117 -16 -29
1972 -117 -146 20 -23
1973 -163 -197 24 -9
1974 -168 -224 -25 -334
1975 -468 -488 410 -518
1976 -693 -778 387 -37
1977 -393 -770 293 230
1978 -754 -1,033 291 -683
1979 -764 -1,379 1,140 890
1980 -1,102 -1,489 1,876 1,336
1981 -1,172 -1,705 131 -552
1982 -1,191 -1,938 -581 -963
1983 -1,862 -3,878 2,220 1,942
1984 -1,219 -3,475 2,878 2,740
1985 -948 -3,572 -1,199 -1,376
1986 -3,621 -5,751 1,503 863
1987 -1,028 -6,156 -1.822 -2,355
1988 -4,179 -9,985 102 -1,113
1989 -3,362 -9,426 62 -1,046
1990 -798 -9,903 4,819 6,323
1991 - -10,407 2,407 895
1992 - -10,714 62 9
- -10,714 62 9
a. Refers to total expenditure less total domestic revenue
b. Refers to expansion in the money supply due to (i) advances to the 
government, and (ii) advances to the government plus bank credit to state 
enterprises and public entities.
Note : Minus sign indicates a deficit or borrowings.
Sources: IMF, Government Finance Statistics, various issues; and Nota 
Keuangan, various issues.
Source: Hal Hill “ The Indonesian Economy Since 1966 : South East Asia’s
Emerging Giant”, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p 61.
The approach discussed in this section refers to column 3 of Table
5.5. above. All Hal HilFs analysis are simply based on the development of 
data series of the three approaches. As regards the development of the 
concerned approach /.e. Budget deficit as total expenditure minus total
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domestic revenue (non-oil and oil), refers to col. 3, he mentions that the 
government has consistently run a deficit, and an increasingly large one in 
the late 1980s. Yet such a measure does not capture accurately the 
domestic economic impact of the budget, since there are large 
“leakages”(abroad) on both sides of the ledger. These include debt service 
payments and payments of the import-intensive oil sector payable abroad, 
though probably declining, proportion of the development budget, 
consisting of material and capital imports are substantial.
In his analysis on the monetary impact approach (col. 4 and col. 5) 
he commented that government has adopted a conservative fiscal strategy 
reflected by budget surplus with the monetary system as far as the Central 
Government deficit stance is concerned. However, as the coverage is 
extended to include bank credit to public enterprises and entities, reflecting 
off-budget activities a deficit is recorded in most years.
Referring to IMF approach (col. 2) which the example of detailed 
presentation is shown on Table 5.3., the analysis suggests that, except for 
1990 and 1991, the government has run a deficit in every year since 1969, 
though on a significantly smaller scale than that suggested by a simple 
comparison of total expenditure and domestic revenue. As a proportion of 
GDP, according to this definition, the deficit has been with in the 2 to 3 
percent range. This series suggests the government has not attempted to 
run a countercyclical fiscal policy, since small and large deficits have both 
been recorded in years of boom and recession.
However, Hal Hill points out the difficulty in analyzing the budget 
impact by simply saying “the budget’s economic impact is far less clear”5\
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As regards the relationship between “domestic - foreign budget 
balance” and other concepts of budget deficits in Indonesia according to 
Mukul G. Asher and Anne Booth, however, is not yet clear :
“ Several commentators have pointed out the difficulties inherent in 
trying to reconcile the monetary figures with the other concepts of the 
budget deficit in common use in Indonesia”6).
The authors refer to the previous study done by herself (Anne 
Booth) and Peter McCawley7). This observation also seems to be 
supported by Iwan Jaya Azis. He simply says that it is too naive to 
disregard the relationship between monetary impact and real impact of 
budget deficit, even though it is important to differentiate the two 
impacts8). In his study on the impact of Indonesia’s budget on the economy 
Iwan is using a model developed by Bent Hansen.9)
It is not exaggeration as N. Gregory Mankiw says, that in looking at 
budget deficit figure, (on top of the limited reliability of Indonesia’s data) 
we should be cautious :
“No economic statistic is perfect. Whenever we see a number reported 
in the media, we need to know what it is measuring an what it is
leaving out. This is especially true for the government budget deficit”
10)
5.6. Other approaches
Vito Tanzi, Mario I. Blejer, and Mario O. Teijeiro in general 
suggested a certain measurement of fiscal deficit in a non inflationary 
context111 According to them the measurement of the fiscal deficit in a 
non-inflationary context is supposed to provide policymakers with an 
indication of the net impact of the government budgetary activity on
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aggregate demand and on financial markets. It is intended to indicate the 
magnitude of additional resources over the ordinary government revenue 
that the government must attract from the private sector, or from external 
sources, to finance its own operations. The conventional definition is thus 
designed to be a measure of the government contribution to aggregate 
demand and, through this, to the external current account disequilibrium. 
Alternatively, it may measure the crowding out of the private sector in 
financial markets12).
Under this definition, amortization payments are not added to other 
government outlays in the computation of the deficit, because of the 
implicit assumption that those amortization payments will not be regarded 
as income by those who receive them. Thus, one basic assumption is that 
the behavior of the bondholder as consumers will not be changed by the 
amortization payments. Furthermore, and this is another important 
assumption, bondholders are expected to willingly reinvest those receipts 
in new government bonds issued at current market conditions. In other 
words, their behavior as financial investors will also not be affected. 
Amortization services are, therefore, not expected to create additional 
pressures on financial or goods markets. In a noninflationary context, 
however, government interest payments should be treated differently from 
amortization payments. Interest payments are assumed to be regarded, by 
those who receive them, as just any other type of income to be consumed 
or saved depending on their propensity to consume. The payments are a 
return on wealth rather than a return of wealth. Thus they can be consumed 
without reducing the bondholder’s accumulated net wealth. Therefore, 
interest payments would be similar in their macreconomic effects to any 
other type of expenditure.
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Buiter and other economists have criticised the conventional 
measure of the deficit and fiscal stance indicators constructed by the IMF 
and the OECD, among others. Instead, Buiter advocates the use of 
comprehensive accounting for the public sector, which measures all 
changes in net worth of the public sector from whatever source. He 
criticised the conventional measure of the deficit, even though that measure 
is expressed in real terms, because it excludes changes to the net worth of 
the public sector stemming from changes in the real values of the 
outstanding stocks of public assets13).
Another approach that can be mentioned is the concept proposed by 
Wing Thye Woo, who defines the budget deficit as being total government 
expenditure minus total domestic revenue and total debt service payments 
and expressing the result as a percentage of GDP14). By so doing can be 
derived the so called fisca l stimulus concept, to be used for evaluating the 
posture of fiscal policy in relation with the objective of exchange rate 
devaluation in Indonesia. In his analysis it is found that the posture of fiscal 
policy in Indonesia seems consistent with the objective of exchange rate 
devaluation.
5.7. Conclusion
As a conclusion we may say each concept of budget deficit has its 
own merits, and thereby has its own advantage and disadvantages. It all 
depends on the purpose of the study. The concept proposed by Buiter is 
probably the most ideal one as it covers almost all the activity of the public 
sector, but is also difficult to apply in developing countries where such 
comprehensive data are hardly available.
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Those oil-related budget deficit approaches though theoretically 
appealing, those concepts, especially domestic-foreign budget balance, are 
difficult to apply in the real world because no government separates its 
budget into domestic and foreign transactions. It also fails to capture the 
effect of the public sector on the external balance. In addition to that it is 
not an easy task either for this approach to work by splitting balance of 
payments into private and public sector.
As far as the (non-oil) fiscal stance is concerned, the oil-adjusted 
balance approach seems very appropriate. But as the monetary impact of 
oil revenue should be taken into account, it loses its relevance.
The choice falls on the IMF-World Bank concept based on all of the 
considerations mentioned above.
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CHAPTER VI:
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION PROCESS
6.1. Variables and models explained 
6.1.1 Current account concepts :
Before discussing variables and models for the empirical analysis we 
begin with refreshing the definitions of current account. The current 
account of a country can be formulated in four different ways :
I. Current account surplus = (X-M) + NFI
II. Current account surplus = GNP - A
III. Current account surplus = I-S




NFI = net factor income 
GNP = gross national product 
A = Absorption
= consumption + investment + government expenditure 
I = Investment
S = Savings
ANFA = change of net foreign assets of monetary authorities
= net official capital inflow + net private capital inflow + 
monetary movements + error and omission.
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In the case of Indonesia, the data corresponding to the first two 
concepts above are different from those of the last two. The source of the 
former data are Indonesian Statistical Office (BPS) that derived them from 
national income account, while the latter ones are from the central bank i.e. 
Bank Indonesia (BI). As regard the third definition, which is derived from 
flow of funds account, BPS data cover all levels of governments i.e. 
central, provincial, and local, whereas BI ones cover only the central 
government and other levels of governments are lumped into net private 
savings.
The examples of calculating current account surplus, using 
Indonesian data for 1990, are as follows:
I. Current account surplus = (X-M) + NFI
-8 . 6  = (51.9-50.9) + (-9.6)
II. Current account surplus = GNP - Absorption
-8 . 6  = 185.98 - 194.58
III. Current account surplus = I-S
-6.0 = Budget surplus + net private
savings surplus 
-  2.7 + (-8.7)
IV. Current account surplus = ANFA of monetary authorities
-6.0 = 1.1 + 7 .6 -3 .8 +  1.1 **)
As can be seen from Table 4.6, Chapter IV.
**) As can be seen from Table 4.9, Chapter IV, with average exchange rate US $1 = 
Rp 1,843. Note that the right hand side of concept IV are the financing items indicated 
by opposite sign.
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The differences in data are mainly due to the recording system 
discussed broadly in the statistical issues in Appendix I paragraph 1.4. 
Based on the information from BI and BPS authorities, the differences 
between BFs data and BPS’s data on current account merely involve the 
intercept, while the changes or the first differences (the slope) are the 
same. From the analytical point of view, this should not be a problem. 
However, BI’s current account concept is more preferable, due to its 
prompt availability for daily policy making. For this reason the data which 
are going to be used in this study are the BFs ones. In the process of 
estimation we will only deal with the balance of goods (merchandise 
balance), without taking into account non-factor services i.e. insurance, 
tourism, etc. This exclusion is simply made due to the unreliability of the 
data of non-factor services. Non-factor services (and factor services) are 
quite often calculated by estimation1} and are more or less 1 0  percent of 
export or import values2 1
6.1.2. Model specifications :
In the spirit of the Mundell-Fleming framework which is assumed to 
be suitable for Indonesian case, discussed in Chapter II, we would have a 
model as follows:
I. M7Pd = Md (Y ,id) (1)
II. Y = AD = A (id, Y, G, T) + NX (EP'/P4, Y) (2)
III. BP = NX (EP’/P4, Y) + K (id, i*) = 0 (3)
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By interpolating equation 1, we will g e t:
M$/Pd = Md (Y, id) = 1Y - gid 
id = 1/g [1Y - M'VP'1] gives LM curve 
Linearizing and solving equation 2 gives :
Y = k ( A - d i d+ b  EP*/Pd) which represents IS curve. 
Equation 3 represents BB curve (balance of payments equilibrium) 
where:
Ms = nominal money
Md =r demand for money
M° — a given level of money supply
Y = domestic income
pci =r domestic prices
P* world prices
AD = aggregate demand
A = domestic absorption
G — government expenditure
T - taxes
NX = 7 net exports
K = net capital flows
E = nominal exchange rate
id — domestic interest rate
. *l = world interest rate
k = open economy multiplier
Under assumption of perfect capital mobility and static exchange 
rate expectation id = i*.
As our main concern is to look at factors affecting balance of trade, 
or net export (NX) especially budget deficit impact through the models
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above within Indonesian context, we therefore modify the net export 
function, NX, by adding up some other variables rather than only the real 
exchange rate, EP*/Pd, and the domestic income, Y.
In formulating the balance of trade equation in Indonesia, one can 
not ignore the role of export and import of oil. Unfortunately, due to data 
non-availability of the explanatory variables, we cannot make separate 
estimation on the functions of trade balance broken down into oil and non­
oil. These variables, export and import of oil, therefore, should be taken 
into account in the export and import functions, so that the export and 
import function would be as follows:
1. Export function:
XNOIL + XOIL = f  (factors affecting non-oil exports) + XOIL
2. Import function:
MNOIL + MOIL = f  (factors affecting non-oil import) + MOIL
where :
XNOIL = real non-oil exports
XOIL = real export of oil
MNOIL = real non-oil imports
MOIL = real import of oil
With regard to factors affecting non-oil export, XNOIL we can 
specify:
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a. Real effective exchange rate. A real depreciation of exchange rate 
improves an exporter’s competitive position, so that it will increase 
export.
b. World’s real income. As a small open economy, Indonesia is assumed to 
be a price taker in both exports and imports, so that an increase in 
foreign income raises demand for exports.
c. Indonesia’s real domestic income. We include this variable as domestic 
income determines the potential domestic demand for exportables. If 
domestic income rises, there will be an increase in domestic demand for 
exportables, hence exports will go down.
Meanwhile, factors affecting non-oil imports, MNOIL are:
a. Budget surplus. This is the variable that we want to examine its effects 
on the balance of trade, in this case through import. Budget surplus has a 
direct impact on import. The direct effect is the impact of lower 
expenditure on imports financed directly by government borrowings. 
The indirect effect comes from the impact of a fiscal surplus on lower 
inflation that leads to a depreciation of the exchange rate. This in turn 
will lead to lower imports and higher exports, bringing about a higher 
trade balance surplus. In this study we will apply two concepts of 
budget surplus. One is net resource inflow budget surplus (NRIBS) and 
the other is primary balance budget surplus (PBBS). For short, primary 
balance budget surplus (PBBS) is net resource inflow budget surplus 
(NRIBS), plus net position of central government budget with the 
domestic banking system. More details on the differences of the two 
concepts are discussed in Appendix I, paragraph II.
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b. Indonesia’s real domestic income. An increase in the domestic income 
will increase demand for domestic goods as well as imported goods, 
which means imports will also increase.
c. Real effective exchange rate. This is like the other side of the coin of the 
effects of real exchange rate on export. A real depreciation (a decrease 
in the real exchange rate index) may reduce demand for imports. The 
more expensive is the domestic price of the foreign goods, the lower the 
demand for the imported goods.
d. Real domestic credits of monetary authorities. Like the budget surplus, 
domestic credits also has indirect and direct impacts on balance of 
trade3). The indirect effect is contrary to the route that came to pass to 
that budget surplus effect. Higher flow of net domestic credit leads to 
inflation, which leads to an appreciation in the exchange rate. This in 
turn will have a dampening effect on exports and increase in imports. 
While, its direct effect works through higher imports financed by 
domestic credits.
Inserting all the variables into equation 1 and 2 gives :
(3). Export function:
XNOIL + XOIL = ao + ai reer + a2 gdpwi + Yn+ XOIL
(4). Import function:
MNOIL + MOIL = bo + bi busur + b2 reer + b3 Yn +b4  ndcma + MOIL 
where:
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reer = real effective exchange rate index
gdpwi = world’s income growth index
Yn = Indonesia’s real national income
busur = real budget surplus (NRIBS/PBBS)
ndcma = real flow of net domestic credit of monetary authorities
Subtracting (4) from (3) gives:
(5). X - M = (ao - bo) + (ai - b2 ) reer + a2 gdpwi + bi busur
+ (a3 -b3 )Yn +b4  ndcma + (XOIL - MOIL)
All variables are in real terms with GDP deflator as the deflator^.
By adding net factor income (NFI) to both sides and incorporating 
income terms of trade effect,^ the equation can be transformed into:
(6) (X-M) - X (Px/Pm-1) +NFI = (ao-bo) + (ai-b2) reer + a2 gdpwi
+ (bi) busur + (a3 -b3 )Yn + b4  ndcma 
+ (X-M)0ll + NFI
where
• X(Px/Pm“l) = income terms of trade effect
• (X-M)oii is the same term as (XOIL-MOIL)
• NFI = net factor income
In Indonesia, terms of trade effect is important for two reasons6):
1. The movement of export price and import prices are significantly 
different;
2. The role of external sector (exports and imports) in the Indonesian 
economy is quite important.
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Equation (6 ) can be simplified into:
(7) CA = (ao-bo) + (ai-b2 ) reer + a2  gdpwi + (bi) busur +
(a3 -b3 ) gdprl + b4  ndcma + (X-M)0ii + toty + NFI
where
• CA = current account surplus
•  toty = income terms of trade index.
• gdprl = real gross domestic product
Taking out NFIn7) from both side gives :
(8 ) (X-M) = C0  + Ci busur + C2  reer + C3 gdpwi+Gt gdprl
+ C5 ndcma + Ce ( X - M ) 0a + toty
For simplicity we can write Equation (8 ) as:
(9) (NX) = Co + Ci busur + C2 reer + C3 gdpwi+C4  gdprl
+ C 5 ndcma + C6  ( N X ) 0i i +C7 toty>
where NX is real balance of trade surplus.
Two variables reer (real effective exchange rate) and totyi (index of 
income terms of trade) need to be addressed. These two variables are quite 
different concept and will theoretically, have independent effect on balance 
of trade. There are two things that make terms of trade and real effective 
exchange rate differ. Firstly, in the terms of trade concept, there are no 
domestic prices whatsoever involved, as in the real exchange rate. 
Secondly, the real exchange rate may be affected by changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, given domestic and foreign prices. The 
mathematical definitions can be represented as follows :
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1.TOTy = (Px/Pm) * X
2. REER = E * (Pd/Pf)
where
• TOTy = income terms of trade
• P* = export prices in foreign currencies
• P111 = import prices in foreign currencies
• X = volume of export
• REER = real effective exchange rate
• E = nominal exchange rate (a weighted basket of foreign
currencies per rupiah)
• Pd = domestic prices measured by GDP deflator or any
other domestic inflation index.
• Pf = world’s prices
Simply say, income terms of trade {toty) may change with or without 
real exchange rate {reer) change. Both concepts are the same only in the 
economy where there are no tradable and non-tradable sectors. However, 
this is not always noted in the literature where the reciprocal of terms of 
trade is also often called “real exchange rate”8).
The expected sign of the explanatory variables would be as follow :
(In this study budget surpluses or trade balance surpluses are denoted 
with positive sign and deficits with negative sign)
(1) The expected sign of real budget surplus (busur) in the import equation 
(Equation 4) is expected to be negative, due to direct impact of lower 
expenditure on imports directly financed by foreign and domestic
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government borrowing (bi<0). As budget surplus decreases imports, it 
will then raise the balance of trade surpluses (Ci>0; Equation 9). 
Coefficient in the budget surplus will not include the indirect effect of 
budget surplus, because it will be picked-up by real exchange rate.
(2) The real exchange rate in this study uses the following concept:
REER = E * (Pd/Pf)9)
w here:
• REER = real effective exchange rate index
• E = nominal exchange rate (a basket of foreign
currencies per rupiah)
• Pd = domestic prices index
• Pf = foreign prices index
A decrease in the real exchange rate index represents a depreciation of 
the real exchange rate. This occurs when the nominal exchange rate (a 
basket of foreign currencies per rupiah) decreases (See Table 3.2 
Chapter III), or when the Indonesian trading partner inflation increases 
higher than that of the Indonesian. This will affect the incentive for 
both exports and imports. A real depreciation of exchange rate 
increases the incentive to export, because the foreign currencies price 
paid for exports is decreasing faster than exporters’ production costs 
(domestic inflation). Alternatively, a real depreciation may suggest that 
competitors’ costs (foreign inflation) are increasing by more than that 
of Indonesian production. Either way, a real depreciation improves an 
exporter’s competitive position (aj<0; Eq.3). On the import side, a real 
depreciation (a decrease in the real exchange rate index) indicates that
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prices of domestic goods (in foreign currencies term) given by the 
combination of the nominal exchange rate and the domestic inflation 
are decreasing faster than those of foreign goods. This decrease in 
domestic prices, relative to import prices, slows imports (b2 >0 ; Eq.4). 
All in all, a decrease in the real exchange rate index increases the 
balance of trade surplus (C2 <0 ; Eq.9).
(3) World’s real income growth index’s coefficient will unambiguously be 
positive, because higher world real income will increase export, so that 
it raises balance of trade surplus (C3>0 ; Eq.9).
(4) The expected sign of real gross domestic product (gdprl), will be 
negative, if the elasticity of imports is greater than that of exports, with 
respect to income (C4  <0; Eq.9).
(5) Net domestic credit of monetary authorities will have an adverse effect 
on balance of trade surplus. In Indonesia, there is always a tendency to 
use this credit for import, either directly extended by the central bank 
(BI) or indirectly through liquidity credits given to the commercial 
banks, which will also increase import. The indirect effect, like budget 
surplus, will be picked up by real exchange rate mentioned above. The 
sign of real flow of net domestic credit is, therefore, expected to be 
negative (C5 O ; Eq.9).
( 6 )  Net export of oil, ( X - M ) 0ii will unambiguously have positive impact on 
balance of trade surpluses. An increase in net-oil export will increase 
total balance of trade. Therefore the expected sign of ( X - M ) 0ii is 
expected to be positive, as Indonesia has been a net oil-exporter (C6 >0; 
Eq.9).
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(7) The sign of the income terms of trade variable (toty) is unambiguously 
positive. A rise in the terms of trade means that Px (export price) has 
relatively gone up to Pm (import price), so that it will raise the balance 
of trade surplus (C7 >0 ; Eq.9).
6* 2, Estimation process
Recent econometric theory and practice have undergone dramatic
change and had a far reaching effect which focus more attention on the
time series properties of the data typically used in the regression analysis.
As it is mentioned as follows:
“ M ethodological revolutions in economics are not new. 
Economics has gone through the Keynesian, monetarist, neoclassical 
and new classical evolutions in the post war period. The major impact 
o f  each one o f  these revolutions is that they call for a fundamental 
change in our way o f  thinking about modelling economic phenomena.
Such revolutions in economics are invariably controversial partly 
because they often imply that existing policy measures are 
inappropriate and should be abandoned in favour o f  a new set o f
policies. Herein lies a major source o f  controversy....................
At the moment, both economics and econometrics are going 
through a new type o f  revolution : the unit root test and co-integration 
revolution. This new revolution calls for a fundamental change in 
thinking about methods o f  estimation o f  economic relationships as well 
as modelling fluctuations in econom ic activity. However, there is a 
major difference between the new and the old revolutions. Debates 
about the significance o f  the new revolution can be conducted within a 
positive framework and without the need for its appeal to one’s sense 
economic justice. Consequently the new revolution has attracted not 
only the attention o f  specialist econometricians but also a large number 
o f  policy oriented applied economists. M ethodological predilections are 
less important forjudging the significance o f  the new revolution!”10 .^
A large number of time series used in econometric analysis that are 
non-stationary (variables which contain stochastic, i.e. random trends)
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imply a number of restrictions on their use in regression analysis. 
Specifically, a regression of one non-stationary series on another can give 
rise to the so-called spurious regression problem and lead to incorrect 
statistical inferences ll). The non-stationarity problem can usually be 
removed by first differencing the data, but in doing so, the potentially 
interesting information about long-run equilibrium relationship between 
economic variables is lost.
The works by Granger and others have, however, found a way to 
advantageously exploit the spurious regression problem12). The basic result 
of their analysis centers on the notion of co-integration: linear combination 
of two or more non-stationary time series can, in some circumstances, turn 
out to be stationary. According to “superconsistency” property if say, 
variable yt and xt in a linear function y=a +p (x)+ et , are both non- 
stationary 7(1) variables, and £t~f(0 ), then as sample size becomes larger 
the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator of P  converges to its true value 
at a much faster rate than the usual OLS estimator with stationary 1(0) 
variables 13).
The existence of co-integrating relationships turn out to be 
synonymous with the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between the economic variables. The proof of this result also establishes a 
correspondence between co-integration and the error-correction model, 
which has developed in tandem with the new results on the properties of 
time series: “if a co-integrating relationship exists, then it can be 
legitimately used in an error-correction model”14).
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Empirical attempts to capture the sluggish adjustment of dependent 
variable towards its desired equilibrium have often employed the 
assumption of partial adjustment in which a fixed proportion of the 
difference between desired and actual results diminishes each period. 
Recently this approach has been criticized as overly restrictive because it 
assumes that adjustment costs and expectations can be captured in a very 
specific, simple-fashioned way. An approach regarded as having more 
advantages is error-correction model (ECM)15). In this study an error- 
correction dynamic specification is used. Shortly, ECM can be thought of 
as a more general, intertemporal version of partial adjustment in which 
expectations are based on the available information.
In the context of this analysis here, if the linear combination of trade 
balance, budget surplus, trade balance on oil, real exchange rate, world’s 
income growth, and other variables in Equation (9) formed a co-integrating 
relationship, then it would also represent the long-run relationship between 
these variables. Furthermore, the residuals formed by subtracting actual 
trade balance from the fitted values of the long-run relationship described 
by Equation (9) would be stationary and would form a legitimate error- 
correction to include in Equation (10). The error-correction of trade 
balance function can then be written in the form:
(10) A(NX) = do + j r  ( dii Abusur + d2 i Areer + d3i Agdpwi
0
+ cLuAgdprl + dsi Andcma + c i^ (ANX)0ii 
+ d7 i Atoty + dg[(NX)-A^j.i)
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where the symbol A represents a first difference of a variable and Aix 
stands for the fitted values from Equation (9), or the term with dg 
coefficient represents the lag residual of Equation (9). This term represents 
deviations from long-run equilibrium and gives the equation its correcting 
properties: it ties the short-run behaviour of trade balance (NX) to its long- 
run value. It is quite common in the econometric literature for the lagged 
difference of the explanatory variables to be introduced in the equation. 
This approach however is regarded suitable only for analysing monthly or 
quarterly data. As we are here dealing with yearly data and, to some 
extent, need to save the degree of freedom, we therefore do not introduce 
lagged difference of the explanatory variables. In this model we suppose 
not to expect to have a dynamic effect over a year. It is also sensible for 
one to see (say Granger or Sims) causality effect on monthly or quarterly 
data basis which happen within one year. For annual data analysis the 
effect of one year lag or more is too long to have much economic meaning. 
For this reason we do not apply causality test. The static long-run 
equilibrium properties of the trade balance function represented by 
Equation (10) are identical to Equation (9)16).
The method adopted here follows that of Engle and Granger17) and 
after preliminary analysis to establish the order of integration of the data 
series, employs a two-stage estimation process. In the first stage, Equation
(9) is estimated directly by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and the 
residuals of this regression are then tested for stationarity to determine 
whether the regression equation might represent a co-integrating 
relationship between variables investigated. Engle and Granger shows that 
(as has been touched on “superconsistency” property above) if this is the
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case, the OLS estimates of the coefficients are consistent and converge 
rapidly to the long-run behavioral parameters. If stationarity is rejected, the 
data do not support the existence of a stable long-run relationship between 
variables.
In the second stage, error-correction model (Equation 10) is 
estimated for co-integration relationship to be found. Again, Engle and 
Granger show that OLS provides consistent estimates of the parameters in 
this equation, even where all regressors are not strictly exogenous. 
Equation (10) is specified first as first difference in the dependent and 
independent variables, plus the lagged residuals from Equation (9) - the 
error correction term. This general specification is reduced to a more 
compact form by eliminating insignificant variables. This process, 
pioneered by D.F. Hendry, is known as a “top-down” or a “general to 
specific” approach. RL Thomas gives his comment on this as follows:
“However, regardless o f  the attractions o f  the Learner and 
Sims approaches, the fact remains that studies adopting the Hendry 
approach are far more common, particularly in the UK, than research 
work using either o f  the other methodologies” 18^
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REFERENCE AND FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI
1} Bank Indonesia, “Financial Report. 1992/93”. p .77.
2) Discussion with Bank Indonesia’s (Central Bank) authorities.
Recall Chapter II on the discussion about monetary approach to balance o f  
payments. The money market is in equlibrium when the real money supply equals real 
money demand, that is when:
MS/P = *Y
if  NFA denote the central bank’s foreign assets and NDC its net domestic credits, and 
m  is the money multiplier, then:
Ms=  /w (NFA+NDC).
W e consequently can derive as follows :
N F A =  (1/w ) Vk (Y)-N DC  
The change in central-bank foreign assets over any time period, ANFA, equals the 
balance o f  payments (Please see paragraph 6.1.1 o f  this Chapter). I f  w e assume that m  
is constant, the balance o f  payments or current account surplus is 
ANFA = (l//w)A[P*(Y)] -ANDC
The first term on its the right-hand side o f  the equation reflects changes 
in nominal money demand, ceteris paribus, an increase in money demand will bring 
about a balance o f  payments surplus and an accompanying increase in the money 
supply which maintains money-market equilibrium. The second term on its right-hand 
side in the equation o f  balance o f  payments above represents supply factors in the 
money market. An increase in net domestic credit (NDC ) raises money supply relative 
to money demand, ceteris paribus, the balance o f  payments will run into deficit to  
reduce the money supply and restore money-market in equilibrium. B y plugging this 
variable as an explanatory variable, it can be viewed to a little extent as a partial 
attempt to apply monetary approach to balance o f  payments, as w e are here dealing 
only with trade balance, instead o f  net foreign assets (net foreign reserves).
Dividing all variables with GDP deflator, instead o f  its respective prices e.g. export 
or import prices, is made deliberately. Dividing by a common price index is required to 
maintain the equality o f  the Equation (9) and the choice o f  GDP deflator will allow us 
to see the policy effects o f  any variables on the balance o f  trade, measured in the same 
unit as national income. In a way this specification and estimation techniques-level o f  
variables in real term-is the same as studies for Ghana, M arocco, and Pakistan in 
“Public Sector Deficits and M acroeconomic Performance.” edited by Easterly, William, 
Carlos Alfredo Rodriguez and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Published for the World Bank, 
Oxford University Press, 1994, pp 61. While studies on seven other developing 
countries use the dependent variable (current account or trade balance) either as a ratio 
to GDP or log ratio to GDP.
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income terms o f  trade and single factoral terms o f  trade. See Gillis, M alcolm and others 
in “Economics o f  Development”. Fourth Edition, W. W. Norton&Company, 1996, pp. 
468-471. While the first measurement tell little about income effect, o f  a trading 
country, the second concept to which the approach in this study is to  be applied gives 
better measurement for that purpose. The last concept linked with the productivity o f  
the export sector. The income terms o f  trade (TOTy) measures the purchasing power 
o f  exports or the export capacity, which is comparing the index o f  export revenues to  
an index o f  import prices. This is equivalent to the net barter terms o f  trade, (Px/Pm), 
multiplied by the volume o f  exports (X).
John P. Powelson describes terms o f  trade effect as follow  : “Thus changes in 
the international terms o f  trade are similar to gains through increased productivity, and 
they contribute to a sort o f  social dividend. Unlike the case o f  increased productivity, 
however, this dividend is not part o f  the nation’s product and therefore should not 
debited to the producing account. It is more like a “gift” from foreigners. Conversely, 
losses through adverse changes in the terms o f  trade contribute to  a negative “social 
dividend” in that residents are required to pay “premium” in their trade with foreigners, 
as compared to the earlier bargaining position”. See "‘National Income And Flow o f  
Funds Analysis.” by John P. Powelson, McGraw-Hill B ook  Company, Inc., 1960, 
pp.462-463.
6') Based on data observation, Indonesia’s gross domestic income (G D Y) which is gross 
domestic product plus terms o f  trade effect, with 1973 constant prices particularly 
since the middle o f  1970s, had always been larger than GDP, being propped up by 
terms o f  trade effects mainly due to oil price increases. Since in this study all real term 
variables are obtained by deflating all nominal variable with GDP deflator with 1983 
constant prices, the reverse situation occurs; the GDP with 1983 prices has always 
been larger than GDY. In other words using 1983 constant prices Indonesia has been 
suffering terms o f  trade losses instead o f  gains.
7-) Net factor income from abroad (NFI) in Indonesia mainly consist o f  government 
foreign debt interest payments and outflow o f  profits o f  foreign companies in the 
energy sector. As factors affecting NFI are quite different from that balance o f  trade 
and non-factor services, NFI variable is taken out from the equation, so that w e will 
get real primary balance o f  current account (trade balance and non-factor services). To 
analyze factors affecting NFI is also beyond the scope o f  the study. In the Indonesian 
history GNP has always been smaller than GDP due to negative effect o f  net factor 
income (NFI).
8') Referring to semantical confusion involved in those tw o different concepts see 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Felipe Larrain B. in “M acroeconomics In The Global Economy. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, p.662. W e may also find “Global Monetary Economics” 
by Emil-Maria Claassen, Oxford University Press, 1996, the textbook which discuss 
extensively about real exchange rate and terms o f  trade.
N otice w e can also express real exchange rate in this form :
REER=1/E *(Pf/Pd)
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15  ^ Full discussions can be found in R.I.D Harris, “Using Cointegration Analysis in 
Econometric Modelling”. Prentice Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995, p.24 or Anindya 
Baneijee, Juan J.Dolado, John W. Galbraith, and David F. Hendry in “Co-integration. 
Error Correction. And The Econometric Analysis o f  N on Stationary Data”. Oxford 
University Press, 1993, pp.50-53
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and other econometricians, it should not be thought that it is the only m odem  approach
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to applied work. For example, tw o methodologies o f  E.E. Learner and o f  C. Sims can 
be cited. E.E. Learner is on the contrary criticizing about the unrecognised influence o f  
prior belief o f  investigator on much applied econometric work. Learner’s m ethodology 
suggests that a researcher identify in advance the parameters o f  interest in his study. 
Meanwhile C Sims advocating the all-important o f  data and that can be allowed to  
determine causality, sometimes in the face o f  recognised theory^
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CHAPTER VII:
EMPIRICAL RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
7.1. Introduction
In Chapter II, the impacts of fiscal deficit on balance of payments 
and various approaches or theories to balance of payment have been 
highlighted. In Chapter V, budget deficit concepts were discussed and in 
Chapter III how fiscal policy and other policies were conducted within 
the frame work of government policies in maintaining stability and 
promoting growth has been presented. In the previous chapter (Chapter 
VI) empirical model and estimation process on factors affecting balance 
of trade including budget deficit and domestic credit were formulated. In 
this chapter, these specific models or equations were estimated with 
equation or model in the previous chapter as references and the results 
as well as policy implication are analysed. The discussion is classified 
into five subjects: test on the stationarity of the variables to be 
estimated, long-run equilibrium relationship, short-run relationship or 
error-correction mechanism, the illustration of the application of 
Mundell-Fleming model and policy implications. The elaboration of the 
discussion on estimation process and results of the long-run and short- 
run relationship can be found in Appendix II.
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7.2. Test on the stationarity of the variables to be estimated
Before making estimations, we check firstly the stationarity of the 









NX -2.611 4.428 -
NRIBS -0.828 -6.301 -
PBBS -0.562 -6.627 -
TBOILR -2.459 -3.392 -
GDPWI 1.659 -2 . 6 8 8 -
TOTY -1.615 -3.058 -
NDCMA -3.840 - -
REER -0.987 -3.495 -
GDPRL 2.518 1.214 -3.675
N ote: The sample period was 1971-1993. The MacKinnon critical values
were -3.786, -3.011, and -2.646 for 1%, 5% and 10% levels o f  
significance respectively. This is based on the augmented Dickey- 
Fuller test with a time trend and one lagged dependent variable.
These results suggest that all variables are I (1) with the possible 
exceptions of NDCMA and GDPRL, which on the face of them would
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appear to be I (0) and I (2) respectively. However, as regard GDPRL it 
is possible that GDPRL of order (2) is affected by:
(i) the relatively small data based, twenty observations
(ii) a structural break which can lead to erroneous conclusion 
with respect to stationarity1 1
We later present evidence of such a structural break. The 
hypothesis GDP is 1(1) receives some support when we subsequently 
find it to be part of a cointegrating set with other 1(1) variables. Having 
established a case that all our variables can be considered 1 ( 1 ), we now 
proceed to examine their cointegrating properties by looking at the long- 
run equilibrium relationship within an error correction framework.
7.3. Long-run equilibrium relationship.
Running the regression of trade balance on the factors affecting it 
for the period under study, 1971-1993 does not give satisfactory result. 
The next step to do is to apply non-a priori informal tests to detect a 
structural break using recursive method such as recursive residuals, 
cusum test, etc. The results give an indication that structural break might 
have happened in 1991. Although the estimation gives “fabulous” result 
in terms of all the variables having expected signs and are highly 
significant, it fails against cointegration test. Finally, applying a-priori 
test, using Chow’s forecast test, based on the assumption that the big 
fall of oil price in 1986 and its decelerated effect that might take place in 
the next immediate years would have a big impact on trade balance, it is 
then proved that there was structural break in 1988. Other causes of the 
structural break than the fall of oil price will be discussed later.
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By applying “general to specific approach” through the whittling 
down process of the insignificant explanatory variables we finally obtain 
the result as follows (more elaboration on the process of estimation and 
diagnostic tests can be found in the Appendix II):
Table 7.2
Long-run equilibrium of trade balance
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1988 
Included observations: 18
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -26.02201 6.976967 -3.729703 0.0025
TBOILR 0.841626 0.090349 9.315303 0 .0 0 0 0
GDPWI 0.685576 0.129294 5.302462 0 . 0 0 0 1
REER -0.060823 0.014922 -4.075994 0.0013
GDPRL -0.525000 0.092290 -5.688604 0 . 0 0 0 1
R-squared 0.924230 Mean dependent var. 3.613854
Adj. R-squared 0.900916 S.D. dependent var 2.337264
S.E. of regression 0.735716 Akaike info criterion -0.383689
Sum squared resid 7.036612 Schwarz criterion -0.136364
Log likelihood -17.08769 F-statistic 39.64278
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.048027 Prob (F-statistic) 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0
Norm.(2df); X2(2 )= l-9 0 p=0.385
Reset(p,n-p); F ( 3j io) =  0.14
Het.(n*R2) ; X(O=0.865 ; X (5)=4.182
Theil’s coeff; = 0.07
Table 7.3
Engle-Granger Cointegration Test: UROOT(C,l)
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Table 7.2 above is the regression result of long-run equilibrium 
trade balance, and Figure 7.1 shows the actual and fitted value. All the 
variables have the expected signs and are highly significant. The 
regression is cointegrated at 10% level of significance (Table 7.3). 
Budget surplus whatever concept is used, domestic credit and terms of 
trade do not seem to have any influence on trade balance. While trade 
balance on oil is understood to have positive effect on balance of trade 
surplus, the other variables such as world’s income, real exchange rate 
and Indonesia’s gross domestic product follow as predicted by the 
theory very well. The coefficient of determination of 90% is quite high.
The coefficient of trade balance on oil (TBOILR) of 0.84 means 
that any increase in trade balance on oil by Rpl trillion will increase
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(total) surplus balance of trade by Rp0.84 trillion. An increase of 
world’s income index (GDPWI) by 1% will increase trade balance 
surplus by Rp0.68 trillion. Negative sign on the coefficient of gross 
domestic product (GDPRL) indicating that import elasticity is greater 
than the elasticity of export in respect to income meaning that Rpl 
trillion increase in domestic income will reduce the trade balance surplus 
by Rp0.52 trillion. The real effective exchange rate index variable 
(REER) shows that any depreciation of real exchange rate by 1% will 
increase the balance of trade surplus by Rp0.06 trillion.
The regression does not seem to suffer from serial correlation as 
indicated by value of Durbin Watson = 2.0. Testing on higher order 
serial correlation is assumed to be unnecessary as we are dealing with 
annual data.
The results of other tests such as normality test (Norm.), Ramsey 
Reset specification test (Reset), Heteroscedasticity test (Het.), and 
TheiTs prediction test (Theil’s coeff.) are as follows.
Test on normality of the residual using Jarque-Bera test allows us 
to accept the hypothesis of residual normality. Above all, estimating 
regression with single equation approach on the level with the variables 
on the right hand side of the equation which are not stationary, although 
cointegrated, they produce underestimates of the standard errors. This 
means that the /‘-tests are not reliable, even if the errors were normal2). 
The important of normality is greater in the dynamic model, reported 
below, because there is no problem of non-stationary, and the /-tests are 
therefore more reliable.
Specification or functional form test result shows no 
mispecification error exists as shown by value of Ramsey’s reset test of
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0.14 which is smaller than its critical value with 5% and 1% level of 
confidence being 3.71 and 6.55 respectively.
Test on heteroscedasticity shows that no indication of 
heteroscedasticity exist. This is shown by either the first order of ARCH 
(autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) or the fifth order which 
respectively gives values of Obs*R-squared : 0.8647 smaller than its 
critical value x2 (i, o.o5 )= 3.841 and Obs*R-squared : 4.182 smaller than 
its critical value x2 (s, o.os)= 11.07.
Lastly the regression also have a quite good historical predictive 
power as indicated by low Theirs value of 0.07 and supported by Figure
7.1 above. More on other test results of predictive power can be seen at 
Appendix II.
7.4. Error Correction Model (ECM)
Having obtained the cointegrating regression produced in Table
7.2 above, it is legitimate for us to construct an error correction model. 
ECM, which represents a dynamic short-term equilibrium of the model, 
just like the long-run equilibrium, is estimated by applying ‘general to 
specific’ approach with one lagged residual of corresponding long-term 
equilibrium of balance of trade or cointegrating regression as the error 





LS // Dependent Variable is DNX
Sample(adjusted): 1972 1988
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints
-  -
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.717569 0.467854 -1.533748 0.1533
DTBOILR 0.884280 0.082012 10.78238 0.0000
DGDPWI 0.772730 0.121042 6.383986 0 . 0 0 0 1
DREER -0.022897 0.011623 -1.970043 0.0745
DGDPRL -0.410938 0.122100 -3.365584 0.0063
R ESl(-l) -0.976082 0.272282 -3.584826 0.0043
R-squared 0.965422 Mean dependent var 0.325710
Adj. R-squared 0.949704 S.D. dependent var 2.403516
S.E. of regression 0.539030 Akaike info criterion -0.965406
Sum squared resid 3.196081 Schwarz criterion -0.671330
Log likelihood -9.916007 F-statistic 61.42372
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.569249 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Norm.(2df); X2 (2)=0.55 p=0.75
Reset(p,n-p); F (3>9)= 0.85.
Het.(n*R2) ; X2( ,>=0.7956 ; 5C2(5)=3.625
Theil’s coeff; = 0.09
The result appears to produce the same explanatory variables as 
that of the long run relationship, of the first difference, plus the lagged 
residuals of the cointegrating regression. The adjusted R-squared is 
larger than that of the long-run relationship, but the change in the real 
exchange rate is now significant only at 1 0 % significance level, with 
Durbin Watson value in the indecisive area. The lagged residual variable 
is also highly significant.
The plot of the actual and fitted values of the estimation is shown 
on Figure 7.2 below and supported by low Theirs coefficient of 0.09. It 
shows that the estimation tracks quite well.
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Figure 7.2
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Test on the normality also gives relatively good result as shown 
on Figure 7.3 below with low Jarque-Bera value o f 0.55 and its 
probability relatively high: 75%.
Test on specification test yields that F-statistics o f 0.85, lower 
than its critical value F().o5(3,9) = 3.86, indicating no functional or 
specification error.
Test on heteroscedasticity at 5% level of significance, represented 
by value o f Obs*R-squared : 0.7956< x2(i, o . o 5 ) = 3 . 8 4 1  for the first order 
and Obs*R-squared : 3.625 < x2(s, 0 .05) =  11.07 for the fifth order, show 














Jarque-Bera 0.552395  
Probability 0.758663
What we can infer from error-correction model above is that the 
coefficient o f the lagged residual of 0.97 tells the proportion of the 
disequilibrium in balance of trade in one period is corrected in the next 
period. In other words about 0.97 (almost one) of the discrepancy 
between the actual and the long-run or equilibrium value of trade 
balance, is eliminated or corrected in one year.
7.5. Mundell-Fleming Model: An Application in Indonesia
Chapter II discusses various theoretical approaches to balance of 
payment, and it is suggested that Mundell-Fleming approach is regarded 
to be relevant or suitable for analyzing Indonesian economy considering 
that Indonesia is a small open economy, adopting fixed real exchange 
rate and open capital account system.
Referring to estimation results, it is shown that during the period 
1971-1988, monetary expansion represented by net domestic credit
l l l l l l l l  |1|
.C?;Ixx.iSSS:;:
-0 .5  0 .0 0.5 1.0
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variable of the monetary authorities has no impact on trade balance. 
However, after 1988, from a simple empirical illustration which will be 
presented here, we will see how Mundell-Fleming approach can be used 
or applied to analyze Indonesia’s short-run macro economic 
development. The differences between the illustration presented in this 
section and the regression estimation in the previous section, are that the 
first is using concept of net foreign assets of the monetary system 
instead of balance of trade and net domestic credit of monetary system 
instead of net domestic credit of the monetary authorities.
By definition, the change in net foreign assets of monetary system 
is equal to the change in net foreign assets of deposit money banks plus 
the change in net foreign assets of monetary authorities, the latter being 
the sum of trade balance and net factor income (NFI) (See Chapter VI. 
Section 6.1.1). Meanwhile, (the change in) net domestic credit of 
monetary system is equal to (the change in) net domestic credit of 
monetary authorities plus (the change in) net domestic credit of deposit 
money banks. The ratio of the last two variables is known as credit 
multiplier.
To begin with, it is assumed now that economy is initially 




















March 35.66 29.886 19.005 na
June 37.901 33.122 18.029 - - 3.236 -0.976 na
Sept. 40.07 38.348 17.196 - - 5.226 -0.833 na
December 42.073 40.835 17.892 - - 2.487 0.696 18.17
1989
March 47.567 41.7 18.608 33.4 39.53 0.865 0.716 18.47
June 47.6 43.174 16.601 25.59 30.35 1.474 -2.007 18.13
Sept. 55.411 53.453 17.355 38.29 39.39 10.279 0.754 17.70
December 58.526 60.564 18.279 39.11 48.31 7.111 0.924 17.21
1990
March 64.367 69.677 12.405 35.03 67.09 9.113 -5.874 16.32
June 78.477 82.526 8.726 64.86 91.15 12.849 -3.679 15.54
Sept. 76.907 91.099 6.425 38.79 70.4 8.573 -2.301 16.95
December 84.63 95.896 10.659 44.6 58.4 4.797 4.234 19.41
Note :
col . (1): broad money in trillion rupiahs, end of period
col. (2): net domestic credit of monetary system in trillion rupiahs, end of period
col. (3): net foreign assets of monetary system in trillion rupiahs, end of period
col. (4): annual growth rate of broad money
col. (5): annual growth rate of net domestic credit
col. (6): change in net domestic credit
col. (7): change in net foreign assets
col. (8): 6-month time deposit rate
Source : International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF.
In the mid-1990, to stimulate economy, the government had been 
conducting expansionary monetary policy, shown by annual growth rate 
of domestic credit that increased by 67.09% in the first quarter and by 
91.15 % in the second quarter (col. 5), compared to the previous annual 
growth rate averaging below 50.0%. Money supply also increased by 
35% and 65% in the first and second quarter (col. 4). In term of Figure 
2.4. in Chapter II, LM curve shifts to the right, pushing down interest
rate to 16.3% and 15.54% percent from an average of 17%-18% (col.
9). As the interest rate went down, there were huge net capital outflows
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amounting Rp5.9 trillion in the first quarter and Rp3.7 billion in the 
second quarter (col.7), and real exchange rate tend to depreciate. As the 
government did not let real exchange rate depreciate further, it slowed 
down the annual rate of growth o f domestic credit and money supply in 
the second half o f 1990; diagramatically, LM curve moves back to the 
initial position. Interest rate went up, capital flowed in, and real 
exchange rate tend to appreciate.
Figure 7.4 below depicts the movement o f changes in domestic 
credit vis-a-vis changes in net foreign assets. The figure implies a close 
(negative) relationship between the two, though not in an exact way. 
This seems to conform to the value o f the offset coefficient o f less than 
one, around 0.48 and 0.60, discussed in Chapter II section 2.9.
Figure 7.4
Change of net foreign assets and net domestic credits o f monetary
systems
December December Jun-90 Dece mber
— (- — dNDC —A— dNFA
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This observation suggests that under fixed exchange rate system 
and open capital account as proposed by Mundell-Fleming approach, as 
well as monetary approach to balance of payments, monetary policy is 
not effective and money supply is endogenously determined.
7.6. Policy implications
The estimation results substantiate the fact that Indonesian 
economy is an oil economy. Although the role of oil is now decreasing, 
the economy had been very buoyant on the oil glut. The regressions 
results for the period 1971-1988, both in the long-run and the short-run 
confirm this, shown by high coefficient of trade balance surplus of oil in 
the long-run of 0.84 and in the short-run of 0.88. It is, therefore, not 
surprising, that under the period of the study, the regression shows that 
there was a structural-break mainly due to the oil-price fall and the 
government responses to facing a new environment of global macro­
economy. In adjusting to the sharp drop of oil prices in 1986, the 
government launched immediate and intensified trade reforms (See 
Chapter III, section 3.2. and 3.6.). It can be re-emphasized again that 
under trade liberalization in October 1986, 544 items were exempted 
from the import license requirement. Restrictions on certain exports 
were lifted. By the end 1987 the proportion of CCCN items covered by 
import licensing had fallen to 22 percent from 32 percent in mid-1986. 
In November 1988, the license on many “big-ticket” import items were 
revoked and the result was that at the end of 1988 the proportion of 
CCCN items covered was reduced to 16 percent. In January 1989, there 
were revisions of the tariff schedule to reduce the dispersion of tariff
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rates and to leave the average tariff unchanged so that rendering more 
uniform protections^.
The overall effects of these policies were:
• the share of total production subject to non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) fell from 41 percent at the end of 1986 to 38 percent at 
the end of 1987 and to 22 percent in June 1991;
• the production-weighted tariff fell from 19 percent in 1989 to 
15 percent in June 1991;
• the effective tariff ceiling was lowered progressively from 
about 60 percent in 1985 to 30 percent in June 1991.
One important implication of these liberalization measures, in 
addition to improving the competitiveness of the economy, is that import 
got a big boost by the reduction in the landed cost of imports. So that 
apart from the expansion of aggregate demand, imports would therefore 
have been expected to respond positively to the reduction in the relative 
price. In the meantime, exports responded even more, so that trade 
balance surplus improved significantly. Had there been no trade reforms, 
others remain the same, the trade balance surplus since 1987-1988 
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Oil price fall and mitigated by major trade liberalization measures 
taking place around 1986-1988, have undoubtedly become the 
underlying factors o f the structural break in the estimation.
The expected variables, in which the government might have 
exercised its influence on balance o f trade: budget surplus and domestic 
credit, at least through their direct effects, under the period o f the study 
have no impacts on balance of trade. The findings do not lend support to 
fiscal approach to balance of payments and seem parallel with the 
general conclusion of studies conducted by the World Bank on the effect 
o f public sector deficit on macro-economic performance within eight 
developing countries. The empirical evidences of the studies find fiscal
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adjustment and its consequences are complex. In some countries deficits 
result in high and variable inflation, in others, result in a debt crisis. In 
still others, moderately high deficits seem not to generate any macro 
imbalance whatsoever. The ways of financing affect the correlation of 
fiscal deficits with macro-economic performance4^
And in the case of Indonesia, fiscal policy through “balanced” 
budget has proven to be successful in maintaining price stability and 
promoting development. In Chapter IV section 4.3.5. we saw how 
government had been skillfully adjusting its budget in conjunction with 
the development of domestic credit or monetary sector. And a striking 
feature of Indonesian fiscal policy - avoiding domestic monetary 
financing to finance the deficit - has been contributing to sustainable 
balance of payment deficit and moderate inflation.
However, it would be misleading to assume that incautious and 
imprudent fiscal policy, i.e. foreign borrowing and monetary policy will 
have no negative effects on balance of trade or balance of payments. 
The following discussion underlines the importance of those policies.
As regards with fiscal or budget policy, particularly related with 
official foreign borrowing, in the last few years there have been 
precarious sizable net official resource outflow in the government sector 
during 1987-1992 (Table 7.6 below), in contrast to what had been 
happening before. In other words, net official resource inflows since 
1987 have been negative. In 1990, for example government interest 
payment was US$(-)2.88 billion which was greater than net official 
capital inflow (foreign borrowing) amounting US$0.60 billion, so that 
net official resource outflow was US$2.28 billion.
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Table 7.6 
Indonesia’s Balance of Payments: 
Non-interest current account and interest payments 
(billion US $)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Non int.curr.acc (NICA) -1.62 0.53 1.67 1.98 0.11 -0.64 0.84
Interest payments -2.48 -2.80 -3.22 -3.26 -3.35 -3.75 -3.96
-Govt -2.18 -2.47 -2.86 -2.81 -2.88 -2.90 -3.06
-Private -0.30 -0.33 -0.36 -0.45 -0.47 -0.85 -0.90
Current acc -4.10 -2.27 -1.55 -1.28 -3.24 -4.39 -3.12
Current acc 4.10 2.27 1.55 1.28 3.24 4.39 3.12
Net off. cap.infl. 3.10 2.10 2.00 2.80 0.60 1.40 1.10
Net private cap.infl. 1.30 1.50 0.40 0.30 4.10 4.40 5.40
Monetary movement 0.50 -1.20 0.3 -0.4 -2.1 -1.2 -1.7
Error &Ommission -0.80 -0.20 -1.1 -1.4 0.64 -0.2 -1.6
Addendum
Net off. Resource inflow 0.92 -0.37 -0.86 -0.01 -2.28 -1.50 -1.96
(Net off.cap.infl.-Govt.int.pay).
Source : Calculated from Bank Indonesia’s “Balance o f Payments Statistics”.
From the table above we can get an equation as follows:
NICA + Interest payments = Net capital inflows
NICA is non interest current account (that is total current account 
minus all interest payments), which is balance of trade of goods and 
services (out of interest payment). Net capital inflows consist of three 
broad categories: reserve decumulation (represented by monetary 
movement and error & omission), net private capital inflows (including 
direct foreign investment inflows) and net official capital inflows. 
Official and private capital inflows also include short term and medium 
term borrowing which is often called “new money”. While net official 
(private) capital itself is gross official (private) foreign borrowing minus 
principal payments. For example, in 1990 total interest payments was 
US$(-)$3.35 billion and NICA was US$0.11 billion and their sum, 
which is current account deficit, was equal to US$(-)3.24. This current
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account deficit was financed by net official capital inflow, US$0.60 
billion, plus net private capital inflow US$4.10 billion, plus monetary 
movement US$(-)2.1 billion and plus error and omission US$0.64 
billion.
Taking out net official capital inflow (foreign borrowing) from the 
right side and putting it on the left side of the equation, and inserting 
their corresponding values for 1990, we get:
Net official govem- Net
capital inflow ment private private
(foreign- interest capital interest reserve
borrowing) - payments = NICA+ inflow ■ payments + decumulation
(0.60) (2 .8 8 ) (0.11) (4.10) (0.47) (-1.46)
The left side of the equation is net resource inflow in the 
government sector, which is nothing but net resource inflow budget 
surplus (NRIBS) in our regression estimation. Here we can see there are 
three sources of financing for the deficit (net resource outflow in the 
government sector) which are NICA, net private resource inflows (net 
private capital inflows-interest payments) and reserve decumulation. 
From 1987 until 1989, net resource outflow in the government sector 
had been sufficiently financed by non interest current account surplus 
(NICA). But in 1990 and in 1992, only a small part of net resource 
outflow in the government sector had been financed by NICA. In 1991 
the situation was even worse, NICA was negative.
From the equation above, we can see that given the current 
account, the larger the net outflow of resources in the government sector 
(indicated by negative number in the left side of the equation above), the 
larger the NICA, or net private resources inflow, or reserve
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decumulation, or their sum will be needed. Considering that net private 
resource inflows can not be unlimited and reserve decumulation should 
not be below the safe limit, so that the stock has to be kept enough for, 
more or less, three months of imports, the only safety valve left is 
therefore NICA, that is trade balance and services (out of interest 
payments). Realizing that trade balance on services (out of interest 
payments), in the Indonesian history has always been deficit (negative), 
and oil export can not be relied upon any more, the most plausible 
solution seems to be maintaining non oil export and controlling import at 
a sustainable level. The bad news is, that based on our regression 
estimation, trade balance either in the long run and the short run are very 
much affected by trade balance on oil and world’s income growth. Both 
are beyond the control of the government. In addition, domestic income 
had a negative impact on balance of trade surplus.
The only policy variables left to the government, a policy which 
can be assigned to control this balance of trade, based on our findings, is 
the real exchange rate coupled with favourable trade climates. 
Meanwhile, of course, to check foreign borrowing itself under control: 
be it the amount, the effectiveness, and the efficiency of the uses, is 
unavoidable. The central massage is then government should be more 
cautious and more efficient in using foreign borrowing.
In the mean time as regard to monetary policy, the illustration 
through data observation on the applicability of Mundell-Fleming 
approach on later period, suggests that monetary policy has to be 
conducted in such a way that will not encourage capital outflow. 
Although based on the estimation results, the findings show that net 
domestic credit (monetary authorities) does not have any impact on
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trade balance (merchandise balance), the observation on the relationship 
between the expansion of net domestic credit (monetary system) and the 
contraction of foreign reserve/assets in later period seem to prove the 
endogeneity of the money supply or monetary policy: a piece of 
evidence supporting the applicability of monetary approach to the 
balance of payment as well as Mundell-Fleming model in Indonesia.
Finally, the most important thing is to control the real exchange 
rate, that is how the policy is directed to keep the real exchange rate 
level at a competitive rate. The task of achieving the proper real 
exchange rate falls on the domestic price level and the nominal exchange 
rate. Either one will become unavoidable target. If the nominal exchange 
rate is not allowed to move, because the government wants to control it 
at a predetermined level, the burden of adjustment falls entirely on 
domestic prices. Conversely, if domestic inflation are let free to move, 
incompatible with the required real exchange rate, the nominal exchange 
rate will have to adjust. Checking inflation under control, as always, is 
not as easy as depreciating the nominal exchange rate - just by a strike 
of a pen. High inflation is always harmful to the economy: it discourages 
investment and encourages capital outflow. Here he the challenges.
7.7. Conclusion
The estimation results show that neither budget surplus nor 
domestic credit has any impact on balance of trade surplus. The 
empirical results also show that trade balance on oil, world’s income 
growth, domestic income and real exchange rate both in the long-run 
and in the short-run have significant effects on balance of trade surplus.
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The results confirm the importance of oil in the Indonesian economy, at 
least during the period of estimation. World’s income growth as well as 
domestic income have significant impacts on balance of trade. The 
former gives positive impact on balance of trade, while the latter gives 
negative impact, meaning the import elasticity is greater than export 
elasticity. The effects of domestic income and real exchange rate on 
balance of trade surplus follow the theory very well.
While we can be confident that the findings do not support the 
fiscal approach on balance of payments, monetary approach to balance 
of payments and Mundell-Fleming model seem to find their applicability 
in Indonesia, basing on theoretical justification and empirical grounds.
The estimation results also imply that the policy variable left to 
the government to affect balance of trade surplus, is the real exchange 
rate. However, the existence of structural break, affirming the changes in 
the parameters in the equations to be estimated, also verify that oil 
prices, ceteris paribus, have played an important role in imparting on 
trade balance surplus. It is also probable this effect has been mitigated 





















Balance Surplus on 
Oil
(5)
1971/72 0.051000 -0.065000 -0.081000 0.186000
1972/73 0.120000 -0.122000 -0.102000 0.334000
1973/74 0.224000 -0.167000 -0.143000 0.518000
1974/75 0.867000 -0.118000 -0.143000 1.609000
1975/76 0.721000 -0.839000 -0.429000 1.802000
1976/77 0.847000 -0.990000 -0.603000 1.908000
1977/78 1.243000 -0.563000 -0.270000 2.433000
1978/79 1.431000 -0.808000 -0.517000 2.786000
1979/80 4.880000 -1.487000 -0.347000 6.058000
1980/81 5.419000 -2.578000 -0.702000 8.538000
1981/82 3.235000 -0.839000 -0.708000 8.852000
1982/83 0.119000 0.070000 -0.511000 6.996000
1983/84 3.454000 -2.887000 -0.667000 10.77800
1984/85 5.745000 -0.167000 2.711000 11.75100
1985/86 6.947000 1.870000 0.671000 11.42200
1986/87 3.168000 -2.599000 -1.096000 6.871000
1987/88 8.890000 4.222000 2.398000 10.69500
1988/89 9.408000 -0.086000 0.015000 9.502000
1989/90 11.02200 1.397000 1.457000 11.62300
1990/91 9.560000 1.010000 5.830000 17.16300
1991/92 9.694000 3.137000 5.544000 14.92800
1992/93 16.34500 4.290000 4.290000 14.15100
1993/94 15.51000 6.808000 8.362000 11.60200
Note:
1) Columns 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 are in trillion rupiahs at market prices.
2) Column 6 is Rp per US$1, end of period.
3) Columns 7 and 9 are calculated based on the quarterly method interpolation discussed in Appendix I
Sources:
- Bank Indonesia’s Indonesia Balance of Paytnent Statistics.
- Bank Indonesia’s Indonesia Financial Statistics.
- Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics Publications.
205
Table 7.7
Some Selected Data Of Indonesia’s Economy 











Change of Nominal 
Net Domestic Credit of 
Monetary Authorities 
to the Domestic Sector 
(8)
, GDP Deflator 
1983=100
(9)
1971/72 405.7500 4.045984 0.179906 0.118359
1972/73 415.0000 5.220013 -0.180206 0.138620
1973/74 415.0000 8.124992 0.070243 0.195120
1974/75 415.0000 11.87299 0.539766 0.267211
1975/76 415.0000 13.95799 0.659592 0.298458
1976/77 415.0000 17.16302 0.351617 0.341376
1977/78 415.0000 20.74702 -0.189782 0.379565
1978/79 491.8800 25.91801 1.021561 0.442234
1979/80 626.5700 37.01100 -0.300490 0.589197
1980/81 626.9800 51.57701 -0.478430 0.747547
1981/82 636.5000 62.50501 1.389019 0.852159
1982/83 674.1000 68.29101 2.348804 0.910389
1983/84 983.3800 80.41802 -1.284617 1.019537
1984/85 1049.450 94.17201 -0.867011 1.125988
1985/86 1146.450 108.2340 1.811792 1.249512
1986/87 1410.600 118.9850 2.424244 1.296387
1987/88 1649.000 142.8990 3.227241 1.473626
1988/89 1706.530 164.1240 3.783403 1.576418
1989/90 1707.230 191.4080 8.983735 1.701465
1990/91 1868.950 220.0330 -10.13557 1.784432
1991/92 1973.850 257.7110 -8.653451 1.927272
1992/93 2046.700 293.1549 -0.695781 2.046414
1993/94 2102.500 358.5291 1.250171 2.232449
Note:
1) Columns 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 are in trillion rupiahs at market prices.
2) Column 6 is Rp per US$1, end of period.
3) Columns 7 and 9 are calculated based on the quarterly method interpolation discussed in Appendix I
Sources:
- Bank Indonesia’s Indonesia Balance of Payment Statistics.
- Bank Indonesia’s Indonesia Financial Statistics.
- Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics Publications.
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Table 7.8






















. Balance Surplus 
on Oil 
(6)
NX NRIBS PBBS TOTY TBOILR
1971/72 0.430892 -0.549177 -0.684359 15.64300 1.571490
1972/73 0.865676 -0.880104 -0.735825 20.74300 2.409465
1973/74 1.148011 -0.855884 -0.732882 33.10800 2.654777
1974/75 3.244627 -0.441599 -0.535158 47.77300 6.021459
1975/76 2.415750 -2.811116 -1.437388 41.76700 6.037700
1976/77 2.481135 -2.900028 -1.766381 48.87800 5.589145
1977/78 3.274801 -1.483277 -0.711341 57.62900 6.409969
1978/79 3.235843 -1.827087 -1.169064 63.46200 6.299832
1979/80 8.282459 -2.523774 -0.588937 88.09600 10.28179
1980/81 7.249043 -3.448613 -0.939071 108.7430 11.42136
1981/82 3.796240 -0.984558 -0.830831 102.0180 10.38773
1982/83 0.130713 0.076890 -0.561299 94.34200 7.684627
1983/84 3.387812 -2.831678 -0.654219 98.82800 10.57147
1984/85 5.102186 -0.148314 2.407663 80.16100 10.43617
1985/86 5.559771 1.496584 0.537010 52.07800 9.141169
1986/87 2.443715 -2.004803 -0.845427 58.61000 5.300115
1987/88 6.032738 2.865042 1.627279 84.60800 7.257608
1988/89 5.967960 -0.054554 0.009515 92.24800 6.027589
1989/90 6.477947 0.821057 0.856321 117.3990 6.831172
1990/91 5.357447 0.566006 3.267146 147.7040 9.618187
1991/92 5.029908 1.627689 2.876605 163.7310 7.745663
1992/93 7.987142 2.096350 2.096350 161.4240 6.915023
1993/94 6.947527 3.049566 3.745662 152.6440 5.196983
Note:
1) Data above are all the variables used in the regression estimations
2) All data are based on 1983 ’s constant price.
3) Columns 5 is calculated based on the quarterly method interpolation discussed in Appendix I
Sources:
- Bank Indonesia’s Indonesia Balance of Payment Statistics.
- Bank Indonesia’s Indonesia Financial Statistics.
- Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics Publications.
- J. P. Morgan Co.
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Table 7.8
Some Selected Data Of Indonesia’s Economy 

















Change of Real Net 
Domestic Credit of 
Monetary' Authorities to the 
Domestic Sector 
(10)
GDPWI REER GDPRL NDCMA
1971/72 70.23300 93.63000 34.18400 1.520000
1972/73 74.16600 92.71000 37.65700 -1.300000
1973/74 77.58300 105.9300 41.64100 0.360000
1974/75 78.16400 104.5500 44.43300 2.020000
1975/76 79.37900 113.8300 46.76700 2.210000
1976/77 83.68600 124.0400 50.27600 1.030000
1977/78 87.44100 124.2700 54.66000 -0.500000
1978/79 91.11000 103.4500 58.60700 2.310000
1979/80 93.92300 96.01000 62.81600 -0.510000
1980/81 95.87100 100.9000 68.99500 -0.640000
1981/82 97.10300 114.8900 73.34900 1.630000
1982/83 97.90300 125.7600 75.01300 2.580000
1983/84 100.9550 101.9200 78.87700 -1.260000
1984/85 105.3420 107.6200 83.63500 -0.770000
1985/86 109.1570 100.6800 86.62100 1.450000
1986/87 113.1250 74.27000 91.78200 1.870000
1987/88 117.9140 63.62000 96.97100 2.190000
1988/89 123.1820 62.47000 104.1120 2.400000
1989/90 126.9720 63.35000 112.4960 5.280000
1990/91 129.4050 60.95000 123.3070 -5.680000
1991/92 131.2000 62.60000 133.7180 -4.490000
1992/93 133.9600 61.50000 143.2530 -0.340000
1993/94 143.4270 62.51000 160.5990 0.560000
Note:
1) Data above are all the variables used in the regression estimations
2) All data are based on 1983’s constant price.
3) Columns 7 and 9 are calculated based on the quarterly method interpolation discussed in 
Appendix I
Sources:
- Bank Indonesia’s Indonesia Balance o f Payment Statistics.
- Bank Indonesia’s Indonesia Financial Statistics.
- Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics Publications.
- J. P. Morgan Co.
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This chapter provides the summary and conclusion of the research. 
In Chapter I we start with the aims, scope and limitation of the study. 
Chapter II discusses theoretical approaches to balance of payments and 
impact of budget deficit on balance of payments. In this Chapter it is also 
suggested that Mundell-Fleming based policy approach - fiscal policy 
assigned to promote income and employment and monetary approach to 
maintain external balance, considering Indonesian economy’s 
characteristics, suitable for Indonesia. This is due to given the fact that 
Indonesia is a small open economy, adopting fixed exchange rate system 
and open capital account. By inferring this, it should not be necessarily 
interpreted that monetary policy is not important. On the contrary, it 
supports balance of payments by protecting foreign reserves through 
prudent monetary and credit policy, and maintaining price stability. The 
challenge being to ensure that money supply expands in line with demand.
The Indonesia’s uniqueness in applying in a reverse sequence of the 
deregulations to that suggested by the theories, that is by opening capital 
account in advance, have attracted foreign capital and widen economic 
opportunities for domestic economy. Although Indonesia’s open capital 
account limits the effectiveness of monetary policy, it should be maintained 
as it has several benefits. Not only it stimulates foreign investments, but 
also will always necessitate that the government be committed to a prudent 
macroeconomic management. It is, therefore, a barometer of 
macroeconomic policy, in which a loosening of monetary policy would
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quickly be reflected in capital outflows. Nevertheless, it is also difficult for 
a country to close capital account, given the high mobility of international 
capital flows nowadays.
In the mean time, the flexibility of budget policy in Indonesia in the 
form of assets built up or drawndown to smooth out government 
expenditure, especially in the era of oil buoyancy, has proven to be 
facilitating the efforts to checking inflation and managing sustainability of 
balance of payments.
In Chapter III and IV, we discuss how Indonesia’s economy has 
been subject to episodes of overheating and subsequent policy adjustments 
that have been implemented due to the rises and falls of oil price, world’s 
economy recession, and US dollar depreciation. After economic setback in 
the mid-1980, the result of financial and other policy adjustments in almost 
all sectors, indicating impressive achievements, characterised by strong 
economic expansion in the late 1980s, especially non-oil output and 
export, rising and high levels of savings and investments, strong growth in 
manufacturing and substantial build-up in international reserves. 
Nevertheless, economic development in Indonesia - which by far has the 
largest population - remains lag behinds its neighbouring countries, in 
terms of per-capita income; its external debt and inflation are relatively 
high and has always been in fiscal deficit.
With regard to the fiscal deficit which is the main topic of Chapter 
V, it is found that many concepts of budget or fiscal deficit proposed. Each 
concept has advantages and disadvantages which to a large extent depend 
on the purpose of the study and the availability of the data. Considering the 
aims of the study, characteristics and availability of the data the IMF and 
the World Bank’s concept of budget deficit seems to be the most suitable
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and appropriate for this purpose. Yet some tests and derivation on the data 
are unavoidable and painstaking.
Our statistical findings in Chapter VII, after being preceded with the 
discussion on empirical model in Chapter VI, suggest that the Indonesia’s 
state “balanced” budget, has no impact on the trade balance both in the 
long run and the short run. The findings do not lend support to fiscal 
approach to the balance of payment. In the mean time through practical 
empirical observation in a short later period, the result finds the relevance 
of the monetary approach to the balance of payments as well as Mundell- 
Fleming policy approach in Indonesia.
Surplus of trade balance on oil in the 1970s and until mid-1980s, no 
doubt had played very significant role in the Indonesian economy and 
exports. In the mean time world’s income growth, real exchange rate and 
domestic income, all as expected by the theories have impacts on trade 
balance in the long run and in the short run. World’s oil prices which will 
definitely affect Indonesia’s balance of trade surplus on oil, as well as 
world’s income growth, are beyond the control of government.
Although the findings show that budget deficit has no detrimental 
direct effect on trade balance, verifying that “twin deficits” do not exist in 
Indonesia by no means government should not do sensible policy on 
foreign borrowing. The sizeable net resource transfer outflow for debts and 
interest payments in the last few years seem to have persistently continued 
until present and draws close supervisions. The clear message of the 
findings is that government has to be consistently more cautious and 
efficient in the implementations of foreign borrowing. It is indeed 
therefore, becomes very demanding exercise to monitor and scrutinise the 
external debt sustainability. Although budget deficit has no impact on trade
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balance, some studies revealed that public investment often crowds out 
private investment; typically, when public enterprises compete with private 
firms.
The policy variables left to the government to affect balance of trade 
in the period of the study and in the period to come is to keep the real 
exchange rate at a competitive rate and to create always favourable trade 
climates. The task of achieving the proper real exchange rate falls on the 
domestic price level and the nominal exchange rate, in which controlling 
the former is not as easy as adjusting the later.
The main policy implications being the pressure to the government 
to promote non oil-exports, restrain imports, mobilise domestic savings and 
consistently maintain competitive exchange rate would have become 
inevitably more compelling and daunting tasks in the future.
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APPENDIX I 
STATISTICAL ISSUES AND DATA DERIVATION
This section discusses the availability, characteristics, sources and 
derivation of data which are used in this study. The resources are mainly 
taken from the Annex V of Indonesia - Staff Report for the 1995 Article 
IV Consultation, IMF, June 23, 1995, Indonesia’s official publications, and 
discussion with the authorities.
Below are some excerpts from the IMF staff report which give us 
good background and understanding, related to this study on Indonesia’s 
statistical (data) issues.
I. Data characteristics and sources
I. 1. Real sector data :
- BPS (Indonesia’s Statistical Office) believes that household 
consumption and imports o f non-factor services may be underestimated.
- Investment data are available only in aggregate form, with no division 
between the private and public sectors. Stock changes are calculated as 
a residuals (which in recent years has been large).
- National savings data are not available.




- The public sector in Indonesia consists of the central government, 27 
seven provincial governments, 368 municipal and local governments, 
and about 180 public enterprises (of which 23 are financial institutions). 
Comprehensive data on the consolidated public sector are not available.
- There is a lack of transparency in the classification of central 
government expenditure that take place through non budgetary 
accounts.
- Data on tax revenues are generally reliable, but data on non-tax 
revenues, expenditures, and net lending related to non-budget accounts 
held with the domestic banking system—primarily with Bank Indonesia 
are difficult to asses. The IMF staffs estimates of net foreign financing 
of the central government is derived from the balance o f payments data 
provided by Bank Indonesia, which often differs from the budget 
estimate. The resulting expenditure and/or repayments are classified as 
capital expenditure and net lending. To move towards preparing 
consolidated data for public sector accounts, owing to differences in 
coverage, there is not always a direct correspondence between bank 
financing o f  the central government in the fiscal accounts and 
changes in credit to the Government (net) in the monetary accounts.
I. 3. Monetary data
The central bank balance sheet and the monetary survey are 
provided with a relatively short lag. These data are later published in 
weekly and monthly statistical bulletins. Monetary data are reported on a 
fairly regular basis. However, numerous data inconsistencies have 
prevented their publications. In resolving these inconsistencies, Bank
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Indonesia is requested to submit its balance sheet as well as consolidated 
balance sheet for the deposit money banks (DMJBs). Bank Indonesia has 
recently submitted its revised monetary data along with those of DMBs for 
1994, which are generally consistent, although they do not resolve all of 
the identified data problems.
I. 4. Balance of Payments
- Foreign trade data are prepared by BPS on a monthly basis and by 
Bank Indonesia on a quarterly basis. There are some weaknesses in the 
estimation of trade prices. Although BPS prepares export and import 
unit value data, Bank Indonesia also constructs an export price index 
for internal use, based on some broad prices indices. There is a lag of 
more than one year in the reporting of data on total exports, unit value 
o f exports, and value, volume, and unit value ofpetroleum exports.
- The recording of export and import transaction in Indonesia’s balance of 
payments (prepared by Bank Indonesia) are mainly based on customs 
documents, namely PEB (Notification of Exports of Goods) and PPUD 
(Notification of Incoming Goods to be Utilized). Since April 1990, the 
PPUD has been changed to PIUD (Notification of Import to be 
Utilized). In addition to these documents, the records of Indonesia’s 
balance of payments also incorporate data from reports prepared by 
certain companies/institutions. In international trade statistics (prepared 
by BPS), export means trade where goods are sent out of the Indonesian 
custom territory under legal conditions, while import is trade where 
foreign goods are admitted into the Indonesian custom territory under 
legal conditions. Unlike the recording in the balance of payments, data 
processing in international trade statistics are entirely based on export
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and import documents (PEB and PPUD/PIUD) sent by foreign exchange 
banks to Bank Indonesia. Data on imports under US$5 thousand are 
available from customs offices; consequently, export and import data in 
the balance of payments are different from those in the international 
trade statistics {Source : Indonesian Financial Statistics, Bank Indonesia, 
Vol.XXV No.5, May, 1992, page 119-120).
- A better and reliability data of terms o f  trade index should be 
constructed.
- In the capital account (prepared on the basis of the fourth edition of the 
Balance o f Payments Manual) there are several important gaps in data 
estimates. There are no data on long-and short-term investment of the 
banking sector and on short-term investment of the official sector. Also 
there is no data on outward portfolio investment and direct investment 
abroad. Error and omissions were relatively large and positive in 
1992/1993, while they were relatively large and negative in 1993/94- 
1994/95.
- Detail of capital account of the balance of payments and of related 
stocks and maturity of external private debt need to be improved.
There are, at present, considerable variations in private sector debts 
estimates compiled by different organizations. The World Bank staffs 
estimate is the highest, while that of the authorities is the lowest, and the 
Fund staffs estimate falling in between. Although the staff estimate, 
which is based on data provided by BIS, the World Bank, and the 
authorities, is considered acceptable given the circumstance and is used 
in staff reports double counting of some items is possible.
It is suggested that the data on debtor based be improved by widening 
the coverage of the reporting. The link between the external debt stock,
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debt service, and the balance o f  payments should also be improved. 
Estimates of the maturity o f  private debt, in particular of short-term 
debt, are very approximate.
- Data on the gross and net official reserve position of the central bank 
are regularly reported to the staff on a weekly basis with a short lag. 
There is a difference between the data officially reported for publication 
in International Financial Statistics and those used by the staff. 
“Contingent” reserves were assigned in the past by Bank Indonesia as 
an accounting counterpart to the domestic liability arising from the 
rediscounting o f export drafts. In the staff’s view, these reserves (which 
are gradually being reduced) should be treated as part o f  international 
reserves as they have the same liquidity and monetary implications as 
the other foreign exchange reserves.
II. Indonesia’s budget deficit concepts used in this study: primary 
budget deficit and net resources inflows budget deficit.
Before going further, it should be noted that in this study we denote 
budget surplus with positive sign and budget deficit with negative sign. In 
most of the studies on Indonesia, the IMF or the World Bank defines 
budget deficit as being the sum of Total Revenue and Grants minus 
Current expenditure (of which interest on external debt) which is equal to 
Current budget balance minus Development expenditure and Net lending. 
From the financing side it consists of domestic financing and net foreign 
financing. Domestic financing is the change in net government deposits 
with the domestic banking system, while net foreign borrowing is equal to 
Gross drawings minus Amortization. An example follows :
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Table 1.1
Indonesia: Summary of Central Government Operations 












Interest on external debt 4,496
Current budget balance 10,852
Development expenditure and net lending2) 12,683







1) The fiscal year begins on April 1
2) Derived as the sum of the current budget balance and net financing. Derived residually in 
this manner, these estimates of capital expenditure include off-budget spending.
3) Change in net government deposits with the domestic banking system
4) As derived from the balance of payments accounts.
Source: International Monetary Funds, Indonesia: Recent Economic Developments,
May 21, 1993
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Contrary to common practice in calculating budget deficit, in 
Indonesia, due to non-availability of the data (i.e., net lending and off- 
budget expenditure), the deficit as shown on the table above is derived 
from the financing side. Budget deficit concept which will be used in this 
study does not include interest payment and is known as primary budget 
balance.
As budget deficit being financed by domestic monetary system, or 
“budget balance with respect to monetary system ”, is assumed to some 
extent “beyond” the control of government (Monetary Authorities), but its 
net monetary impact is readily observable, then budget deficit concepts 
will consist of two kinds namely primary budget deficit and net resources 
inflow budget deficit.
1. “Primary budget deficit ”. This is overall budget balance netted 
out interest payments. Under this concept, budget deficit 
includes budget deficit financed by the domestic monetary 
system. In the estimation, this variable is denoted as PBBS 
(primary balance budget surplus).
2. “Net resources inflow budget deficit”. This is derived as primary 
budget deficit deducted by “budget deficit financed by domestic 
monetary system ”. So, the difference from the first concept is 
simply the exclusion of budget deficit that is financed by 
domestic monetary/banking system. In other words, “net 
resources inflow budget deficit” is budget deficit which is purely 
financed by net foreign borrowing net of interest payment. In the 
regression estimation this variable is denoted as net resource 
inflow budget surplus (NRIBS).
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Table 1.2.













































1971/72 -0.091 0.091 0.016 0.075 0.01 -0.065 -0.081
1972/73 -0.117 0.117 -0.02 0.137 0.015 -0.122 -0.102
1973/74 -0.163 0.163 -0.024 0.187 0.02 -0.167 -0.143
1974/75 -0.167 0.167 0.025 0.142 0.024 -0.118 -0.143
1975/76 -0.468 0.463 -0.41 0.878 0.039 -0.839 -0.429
1976/77 -0.693 0.693 -0.387 1.08 0.09 -0.99 -0.603
1977/78 -0.393 0.393 -0.293 0.686 0.123 -0.563 -0.27
1978/79 -0.754 0.754 -0.291 1.045 0.237 -0.808 -0.517
1979/80 -0.764 0.764 -1.14 1.904 0.417 -1.487 -0.347
1980/81 -1.102 1.102 -1.876 2.978 0.4 -2.578 -0.702
1981/82 -1.172 1.172 -0.131 1.303 0.464 -0.839 -0.708
1982/83 -1.191 1.191 0.581 0.61 0.68 0.07 -0.511
1983/84 -1.862 1.862 -2.22 4.082 1.195 -2.887 -0.667
1984/85 1.219 -1.219 -2.878 1.659 1.492 -0.167 2.711
1985/86 -0.948 0.948 1.199 -0.251 1.619 1.87 0.671
1986/87 -3.621 3.621 -1.503 5.124 2.525 -2.599 -1.096
1987/88 -1.037 1.037 1.824 -0.787 3.435 4.222 2.398
1988/89 -4.388 4.388 -0.101 4.489 4.403 -0.086 0.015
1989/90 -3.362 3.362 -0.06 3.422 4.819 1.397 1.457
1990/91 0.798 -0.798 -4.82 4.022 5.032 1.01 5.83
1991/92 0.982 -0.982 -2.407 1.425 4.562 3.137 5.544
1992/93 -1.096 1.096 0 1.096 5.386 4.29 4.29
1993/94 2.018 -2.018 -1.554 -0.464 6.344 6.808 8.362
Notes: Col. 1. Self explanatory
Col. 2. Minus means deficit.
Col. 3. Self explanatory
Col. 4. Plus means banks net claims on government (net government deposit) increase 
(decrease) represents budget deficit financed by banks.
Col. 5. Residual. Plus represents budget deficit financed by net foreign borrowing.
Shown in the state budget as the development revenues minus foreign debt 
amortization. Minus means Government is net creditor abroad (debt repayment).
Col. 6. Self explanatory
Col. 7. Net foreign borrowing net of interest payment (net resources inflow). Minus means 
budget deficit purely financed by net foreign borrowing net of interest payments.
Col. 8. Minus means (over all) budget deficit netted of interest payments 
Source: Government Finance Statistics Year Book, IMF (GFS), except Col. 4 from Bank Indonesia’s
Indonesian Financial Statistics.
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The distinction is deliberately made, so that in the estimation we will 
see the effects of budget deficit on balance of trade, with and without 
budget deficit financed by domestic monetary system.
By definition net resource inflows is gross official foreign borrowing 
(gross drawings) minus interest payments. And net foreign borrowing is 
gross foreign borrowing minus debt amortization. To clarify the process of 
derivations, we refer to Table 1.2 above.
The overall budget balance and overall financing (col. 2 and 3) in 
Table 1.2 above, are taken from Government Finance Statistics Year Book 
(GFS), IMF. This two sets of data are the same, except for their signs. And 
these data are found to be the same as those in the International Finance 
Statistics (IFS), IMF. The data on official interest payment (col. 6) are also 
taken from the GFS.
Data on net foreign borrowing (col. 5) is a residual o f overall 
budget balance/financing (col. 3) over the change in net claims o f Bank 
Indonesia and deposit money banks on government (deficit which is 
financed by domestic monetary/ banking system) (col.4). The latter data is 
taken from the monetary surveys of Bank Indonesia’s Indonesian 
Financial Statistics. Deriving this way the net foreign borrowing is the 
same as development revenues minus foreign debt amortization reported 
in the State Budget (as reported in Table 3.1 Government Finance 
Operation, in the “Bank Indonesia, Report fo r  The Financial Year, 
1994/95”, p.37). Deficit financed by net resource inflow or net resource 
inflow budget deficit (col.7) is derived as net foreign borrowing (col.5) 
minus official interest payments (col.6). Column 8, primary budget 
balance, is simply overall budget balance (col.2) plus official interest
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payments (col.6) or the same as deficit financed by net resource inflow 
(col.7) minus deficit financed by domestic monetary system (col.4).
III. Net domestic credit of monetary authorities to domestic sector 
(NDCMA).
Like net domestic credit of monetary system to the government to 
finance the deficit (col. 4), net domestic credit of monetary authorities to 
domestic sector (NDCMA) used in the regression, is also taken from Bank 
Indonesia’s Indonesian Financial Statistics.
III. Trade balance concept (NX)
In order to be in line with the budget deficit concept above in which 
(foreign) interest rate payment is not included, the trade balance concept to 
be used is current account less net factor income/services or trade balance 
and services (out of interest payments). However, data on balance of 
services (out of interest payments) such as tourisms, insurance is not 
reliable and is calculated by estimation^, which is more or less 10 percent 
of export or import values2). For this reason, in the trade balance concept 
we only refer to the balance of trade of goods without taking into account 
balance on services.
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IV. Quarterly data derivations
Realizing the complexity of statistical issues of the data and non­
availability of the quarterly data, some data have to be self-derived. Data 
on world’s growth rate index, terms of trade index (on goods), and 
Indonesia’s gross domestic product, on quarterly basis are not available, 
therefore these data have to be derived by using quarterly interpolation 
technique proposed by Goldstein and Khan (1976) (the source is not 
known). It involves interpolating by fitting a quadratic curve to three 
successive annual observations.
If xt.Itx t and xt+1 are three successive annual observations of a flow 
variable x(t), the quadratic function passing through the three points 
satisfies the following equations:
J1 (as2+bs+c) ds = xu\
J2 (as2+bs+c) ds = x{
J3 (as2+bs+c) ds = x t+1
Integrating and solving for a, b and c gives:
a = .5xt_j-xt+.5xt+i 
b = -2xt-i+3xrx tti 
c = L8333xt_i-I.1666xt+ ,333xt^ 1
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The quarterly data observations Ql, Q2, Q3, and 04  are interpolated as:
Q l = \™ (as?+bs+c) ds = .0548xt_j+.2343xr .0390xt+i 
Q2 = j^  (as*+b£-+c).ds = .0079xt.i+.02655xt - .024xt+1 
Q3 = J^75 (as2+bs+c).ds = .0233xt.j+ .2652xt+.008xt+1 
Q4 = f2 (as2+bs+c).ds = .0392xt.i+ .2347xt+ . 0545xt+1
J1.75
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FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES TO APPENDIX I
1} Bank Indonesia, “Financial Report, 1992/93”, p. 77.
2) Discussion with Bank Indonesia’s (Central Bank) authorities.
APPENDIX II 
ESTIMATION PROCESS
Below are the variables and symbols used in the regression to be 
estimated. All variables are in real terms and deflated by Indonesia’s GDP 









real trade balance surplus
real net resource inflow budget surplus/real primary
budget balance surplus
income terms of trade index
trade balance surplus on oil
world’s real income growth index (1983=100)
real effective exchange rate index
real gross domestic product
real flow of net domestic credit of monetary authorities 
to the domestic sector
The general function of the regression equation would be as follows:
NX = f  (NRIBS/PBBS, TOTY, TBOILR, GDPWI, REER, GDPRL, NDCMA)
The step by step estimation process of balance of trade surplus (NX) 
as a function of the explanatory variables above, using ordinary least 
square (OLS) are as follows.
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II. 1. First version: Trade balance surplus (NX) as a function of net
resources inflow budget surplus (NRIBS) and other variables
Table 1
LS // Dependent Variable is NX
Sample: 1971 1993 - -
Included observations: 23
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 12.20531 9.836564 1.240810 0.2337
NRIBS -0.025604 0.293904 -0.087117 0.9317
TOTY -0.003085 0.026094 -0.118242 0.9074
TBOILR 0.654524 0.248761 2.631138 0.0189
GDPWI -0.109990 0.146994 -0.748264 0.4659
REER -0.072247 0.032225 -2.241939 0.0405 -
GDPRL 0.067795 0.096848 0.700013 0.4946
NDCMA 0.211195 0.178209 1.185096 0.2544
R-squared 0.703997 Mean dependent var 4.210841
Adj.R-squared 0.565862 S.D. dependent var 2.413579
S.E. of regression 1.590287 Akaike info criterion 1.196037
Sum squared resid 37.93518 Schwarz criterion 1.590991
Log likelihood -38.39001 F-statistic 5.096445
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.263561 Prob(F-statistic) 0.003967
It is found that net resource inflow budget surplus (NRIBS) is the 
least significant variable. By dropping this variable gives:
Table 2
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1993 
Included observations: 23
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 12.16523 9.516196 1.278371 0.2194
TOTY -0.002521 0.024480 -0.102980 0.9193
TBOILR 0.656405 0.240014 2.734863 0.0147
GDPWI -0.108229 0.141010 -0.767530 0.4539
REER -0.072027 0.031114 -2.314934 0.0342
GDPRL 0.065222 0.089330 0.730127 0.4759
NDCMA 0.209808 0.171903 1.220497 0.2400
R-squared 0.703847 Mean dependent var 4.210841
Adj.R squared 0.592790 S.D. dependent var 2.413579
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S.E. of regression 1.540178 Akaike info criterion 1.109586
Sum squared resid 37.95438 Schwarz criterion 1.455171
Log likelihood -38.39583 F-statistic 6.337686
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.238122 Prob(F-statistic) 0.001448
From the result “above among the insignificant variables income 
terms of trade (TOTY) is the least significant one. Dropping this variable 
yields:
Table 3
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971-1993 
Included observations: 23
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 11.83194 8.684636 1.362399 0.1909
TBOILR 0.641017 0.182280 3.516669 0.0026
GDPWI -0.101805 0.122724 -0.829544 0.4183
REER -0.071455 0.029710 -2.405079 0.0278
GDPRL 0.059257 0.065997 0.897874 0.3818
NDCMA 0.211495 0.166066 1.273561 0.2200
R-squared 0.703651 Mean dependent var 4.210841
Adj. R-squared 0.616489 S.D. dependent var 2.413579
S.E. of regression 1.494687 Akaike info criterion 1.023292
Sum squared resid 37.97953 Schwarz criterion 1.319508
Log likelihood -38.40345 F-statistic 8.072946
Durbin-Watson stat . 1.249110 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000467
Followed by dropping world’s income growth index (GDPWI) the 
result follows:
Table 4
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1993 
Included observations: 23
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 5.097822 3.059139 1.666424 0.1129
TBOILR 0.547784 0.142258 3.850638 0.0012
REER -0.057696 0.024435 -2.361243 0.0297
GDPRL 0.006264 0.016431 0.381249 0.7075
229
NDCMA 0.141476 0.141771 0.997917 0.3315
R-squared 0.691655 
Adj.R-squared 0.623134 
S.E. of regression 1.481683 
Sum squared resid 39.51691 
Log likelihood -38.85978 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.217524
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 










The next variable to be dropped is real gross domestic product
(GDPRL) which then give:
Table 5
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971-1993 
Included observations: 23



















S.E. of regression 1.447975 
Sum squared resid 39.83601 
Log likelihood -38.95227 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.187945
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 










Finally variable net domestic credit of monetary authorities
(NDCMA) has to be dropped and yields:
Table 6
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1993 
Included observations: 23










REER -0.062500 0.013460 -4.643419 0.0002
R-squared 0.672192 
Adj .R-squared 0.639411 
S.E. of regression 1.449331 
Sum squared resid 42.01122 
Log likelihood -39.56367 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.273018
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 










The end result shows that the remaining variables are significant and
give expected signs, but they suffer from serial correlation shown by low
value of D.W. Testing for cointegration, they are not cointegrated, as
shown below:
Table 7






MacKinnon critical values: 1 % -5.0599
5% -4.1710
10% -3.7553
It is quite unreasonable to expect that there had been no structural 
change in the Indonesia’s economy during such a long period, in which 
there were ups and downs in the export and import prices, mainly oil, and 
changes in the economic policy. There could possibly be three ways to 
detect structural change. First, by using dummy variables from which we 
will be able to see whether the change happens in the intercept and/or the 
slope. Unfortunately we can not apply this option as we will lose many 
degrees of freedom. So, we leave out this choice. Second, by using
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recursive methods and third by applying Chow’s test. As regard recursive 
method they may comprise^ :
a. recursive residuals test,
b. one-step forecast test,
c. cusum test,
d. recursive coefficient estimates.
From die plots, all these approaches (selections) can detect the
stability o f the parameters, assuming that break point is not known 4 a
p r i o r i The plots of these approaches are only valid for equation estimated
by ordinary least square (OLS). The nature o f the tests and their
corresponding results are discussed sequentially.
a. Recursive residuals, in which the data period is increased 
successively, the test shows a plot of the recursive residuals about the 
zero line. Each recursive residual is the error in a one-step ahead 
forecast. Residuals that move out from the standard error bands 
suggest instability in the parameter of the equation. The result of the 
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b. The one -step forecast test is recursive residuals, where the error is 
compared with its standard deviation under the null hypothesis to test 
whether the value of the dependent variable at time t might have come 
from the model fitted to all the data, up to that point. While the upper 
portion of the plot show the recursive residuals and its standard errors, the 
lower portion shows the probability values for those sample points where 
the hypotheses of parameter constancy would be rejected at less than 15 
percent level. The result of the test is shown below :
Figure 2 
(iOne-step forecast test)
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a One-Step Probability ----------  Recursive Residuals
c. Cusum  test looks at the cumulative sum of the residuals plotted against 
the time. This test simply the sum of the recursive residuals normalised by the 
standard error of the residuals. Parameter instability is shown when the 
cumulative sum goes outside the area between the two critical lines. The result 












79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
CUSUM ---------  5% Significance
All the tests above give indications that there might have been 
structural break in 1992. However, there seem to be similar parameter 
shifts as well in 1984, 1988 and 1989 as shown by Figure 1 and Figure 2.
d. Recursive coefficient estimates enable us to trace the evolution of each 
coefficient as more and more of the data are used in the estimation 
for all feasible recursive estimation. If the coefficient displays 
significant variation as more data is added to the estimating equation 
it is a strong indication of instability. The dramatic jumps of the 
coefficient plots will some times show the postulated equation tries 
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The numbering o f the coefficients follows the sequence of the 
variables to be estimated in the equation where :
c(l): constant
c(2): nribs (net resources inflow budget surplus)
c(3): toty (income terms o f trade effect)
c(4): tboilr (real trade balance surplus on oil)
c(5): gdpwi (world’s real income growth index)
c(6): reer (real effective exchange rate index)
c(7): gdprl (real gross domestic product)
c(8): ndcma (real flow in net domestic credit o f monetary 
authorities to the domestic private sector
The plots o f the recursive coefficient estimates in general, show that 
structural changes happened along 1984-1987 and 1992, as also indicated 
by the three previous figures.
Following the indications revealed by recursive residuals, one-step 
forecast test and cusum test the estimation of the regression will be run for
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the period 1971 until 1991, and in case if it does not give good results, it 
will be followed by applying Chow’s test.
Table 8
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1991 
Included observations: 21
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -7.942723 9.418944 -0.843271 0.4143
NRIBS 0.134272 0.229685 0.584591 0.5688
TOTY 0.018576 0.021193 0.876527 0.3967
TBOILR 0.616570 0.190748 3.232373 0.0065
GDPWI 0.320176 0.165023 1.940186 0.0744
REER -0.067433 0.024983 -2.699162 0.0182
GDPRL -0.258626 0.118258 -2.186960 0.0476
NDCMA -0.043321 0.153837 -u.281603 0.7827
R-squared 0.816010 Mean dependent var 3.900699
Adj R-squared 0.716939 S.D. dependent var 2.284602
S.E. of regression 1.215487 Akaike info criterion 0.672622
Sum squared resid 19.20632 Schwarz criterion 1.070535
Log likelihood -28.86024 F-statistic 8.236601
Durbin-Watson stat . 1.646223 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000630
By dropping net domestic credit of monetary authorities (NDCMA), 
being the least significant variable gives:
Table 9
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1991 
Included observations: 21
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -6.437167 7.495208 -0.858838 0.4049
NRIBS 0.123443 0.218870 0.564001 0.5817
TOTY 0.018139 0.020429 0.887901 0.3896
TBOILR 0.632311 0.176275 3.587068 0.0030
GDPWI 0.292660 0.128537 2.276850 0.0390
REER -0.069727 0.022827 -3.054585 0.0086
GDPRL -0.240694 0.096317 -2.498973 0.0255
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R-squared 0.814888 
Adj. R-squared 0.735555 
S .E. of regression 1.174840 
Sum squared resid 19.32348 
Log likelihood -28.92409 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.583141
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 










The next variable to be dropped is net resource inflow budget deficit
(NRIBS) and gives:
Table 10
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1991 
Included observations: 21




















Adj .R-squared 0.747576 
S.E. of regression 1.147825 
Sum squared resid 19.76253 
Log likelihood -29.15999 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.749200
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 










Finally variable income terms of trade (TOTY) has to be dropped
and gives results as follows:
Table 11
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1991 
Included observations: 21
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.528903 6.395386 -0.551789 0.5887
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TBOILR 0.701509 0.131576 5.331594 0.0001
GDPWI 0.226477 0.101183 2.238296 0.0398
REER -0.072595 0.021767 -3.335111 0.0042
GDPRL -0.176884 0.064863 -2.727035 0.0149
R-squared 0.803109 Mean dependent var 3.900699
Adj .R-squared 0.753887 S.D. dependent var 2.i84602
S.E. of regression 1.133387 Akaike info criterion 0.454677
Sum squared resid 20.55304 Schwarz criterion 0.703373
Log likelihood -29.57182 F-statistic 16.31585
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.633615 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000017
All variables are significant and give expected signs. Testing for 
cointegration test yields:
Table 12








MacKinnon critical values: 1% -6.2273
5% -5.1951
10% -4.7078
The result shows that the regression is not cointegrated. All the plot 
tests above, however, may offer only informal evidence of parameter 
instability. The last option to detect structural break is using Chow’s test. 
Based on a-priori judgment, it is quite possible that the structural break 
may happen in 1986 marking the big fall in world oil prices, and its 
possible decelerated effect in 1987 and 1988 and of the development in 
world’s income growth around that year. The fall in oil price affects terms
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of trade (TOTy\  budget surplus (NRIBS), and government responses 
through devaluation in 1986, monetary policy and other trade reforms. We, 
therefore, apply Chow’s forecast test instead of break point test as it would 
not possible to implement die later due to insufficient number of 
observations compared widi the number of the explanatory variables. The 
results follow:
Table 13
Chow Forecast Test: Forecast from 1985 to 1993
Chow Forecast Test: Forecast from 1986 to 1993
Chow Forecast Test: Forecast from 1987 to 1993
Chow Forecast Test: Forecast from 1988 to 1993































The range of critical value of the F distribution for V/=n2=9 ; V2= n r 
k(=8)=6 and for V7=ii2=5 ; V2=ni-k(=8)=10 degree of freedom with 5% 
significant level are ; Fo.s(9,6) = 4.10 and F05(5,10) = 3.33. All the F 
values above show that they are all greater than critical value, indicating 
that there were five possible break points (years). The problem here is to 
choose die appropriate or relevant break point among the four. To 
overcome this, die regression results of diose five periods are examined 
one by one. In other words we compare directly the result of the regression
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covering the period, 1971-1984 with that of 1971-1985, 1971-1986, 1971- 
1987, and 1971-1988, and choose the best result based on diagnostic tests. 
Running the regression from 1971-1984 gives :
Table 14
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1984 
Included observations: 14
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -20.79421 6.401722 -3.248222 0.0175
NREBS 0.229519 0.203467 1.128037 0.3024
TOTY -0.021651 0.020548 -1.053685 0.3326
TBOILR 1.277451 0.198310 6.441703 0.0007
GDPWI 0.559628 0.126650 4.418678 0.0045
REER -0.034181 0.018458 -1.851803 0.1135
GDPRL -0.495448 0.088908 -5.572578 0.0014
NDCMA -0.098118 0.150799 -0.650653 0.5394
R-squared 0.969403 Mean dependent var 3.217514
Adj.R-squared .0.933707 S.D. dependent var 2.387786
S.E. of regression 0.614793 Akaike info criterion -0.677379
Sum squared resid 2.267825 Schwarz criterion -0.312203
Log likelihood -7.123485 F-statistic 27.15705
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.643920 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000390
Following the whittling down process of the insignificant variables 
one by one finally give us:
Table 15
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1984 
Included observations: 14
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -19.98176 6.340587 -3.151406 0.0117
TBOILR 1.026802 0.127353 8.062620 0.0000
GDPWI 0.552143 0.121983 4.526374 0.0014
REER -0.044120 0.016482 -2.676827 0.0253
GDPRL -0.480600 0.080020 -6.005958 0.0002
R-squared 0.952707 Mean dependent var 3.217514
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Adj.R-squared 0.931688 S.D. dependent var 2.387786
S.E. of regression 0.624085 Akaike info criterion -0.670484
Sum squared resid 3.505341 Schwarz criterion -0.442249
Log likelihood -10.17175 F-statistic 45.32585
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.314347 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000006
As the regression result above give good result in term of 
significances and expected signs of the variables, we now test their 
cointegration. The result show that they are not cointegrated as shown 
below:
Table 16
Engle-Granger Cointegration Test UROOT(C,l)






MacKinnon critical values: 1 % -7.0627
5% -5.7022
1 0 % -5.0573
Running the regression from 1971-1985 gives :
Table 17
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1985 
Included observations: 15
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -21.91538 5.384628 -4.069989 0.0047
NR1BS 0.124004 0.188806 0.656781 0.5323
TOTY -0.033140 0.013805 -2.400497 0.0474
TBOILR 1.312419 0.169275 7.753179 0 . 0 0 0 1
GDPWI 0.574245 0.106797 5.376983 0 . 0 0 1 0
REER -0.036105 0.015000 -2.406988 0.0470
GDPRL -0.488307 0.079495 -6.142643 0.0005
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NDCMA -0.145004 0.124469 -1.164980 0.2822
R-squared 0.973605 
Adj .R-squared 0.947209 
S.E. of regression 0.546624 
Sum squared resid 2.091582 
Log likelihood -6.508105 
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.556490
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 










Following the same process by dropping one by one the insignificant
variables give us:
Table 18
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1985 
Included observations: 15
















R-squared 0.933336 Mean dependent var 3.373664
Adj. R-squared 0.906670 
S.E. of regression 0.726807 
Sum squared resid 5.282483 
Log likelihood -13.45667 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.822856
S.D. dependent var 









All the variables have the expected signs and are significant. Test
for cointegration test, they are not cointegrated as shown below:
Table 19










MacKinnon critical values: 1% -6.8824
5% --5 .5 9 3 0
1 0 % -4.9834
As we expand the time period to 1971-1986, and dropping one by 
one the insignificant variables gives us :
Table 20
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1986 
Included observations: 16

























0 . 0 0 0 1
R-squared 0.933823 
Adj R-squared 0.909759 
S.E. of regression 0.693969 
Sum squared resid 5.297521 
Log likelihood -13.86022 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.979159
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 









0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2
Testing for cointegration test they are not cointegrated (shown 
below), although it has got better diagnostic tests result than that of the 
period 1971-1985.
Table 21
Engle-Granger Cointegration T es t: UROOT(C,l)







MacKinnon critical values: 1 % -6.7304
5% -5.5008
1 0 % -4.9205
The following tables those are from Table 22 until Table 25 give the 
regression results running from period 1971-1987 and 1971-1988, and 
their cointegration tests. Dropping one by one the insignificant variables, 
the results always end up that only those four variables (TBOILR, 
GDPWI, REER, GDPRL) dominating the equation, so that we just show 
the end results.
Table 22
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1987 
Included observations: 17






















0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 1
0.0013
0 . 0 0 0 1
R-squared 0.935668 
Adj.R-squared 0.914224 
S.E. of regression 0.682940 
Sum squared resid 5.596882 
Log likelihood -14.67842 
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.133741
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 









0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0
Test for cointegration test give the following result:
Table 23
___________Engle-Granger Cointegration T est: UROOT(C,l)







MacKinnon critical values : 1% -6.6004
5% -5.4219
1 0 % -4.8663
Meanwhile the regression results for the period 1971-1988 and its 
cointegrating tests are shown below:
Table 24
LS // Dependent Variable is NX
Sample: 1971 1988
Included observations: 18
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -26.02201 6.976967 -3.729703 0.0025
TBOILR 0.841626 0.090349 9.315303 0.0000
GDPWI 0.685576 0.129294 5.302462 0 . 0 0 0 1
REER -0.060823 0.014922 -4.075994 0.0013
GDPRL -0.525000 0.092290 -5.688604 0 . 0 0 0 1
R-squared 0.924230 Mean dependent var 3.613854
Adj. R-squared 0.900916 S.D. dependent var 2.337264
S.E. of regression 0.735716 Akaike info criterion -0.383689
Sum squared resid 7.036612 Schwarz criterion -0.136364
Log likelihood -17.08769 F-statistic 39.64278
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.048027 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 25
Engle-Granger Cointegration T es t: UROOT(C,l)







MacKinnon critical values: 1 % -6.4881
5% -5.3537
1 0 % -4.8190
All the above results show that only regression for the period 1971- 
1988 is cointegrated, though only at 10% level of significance. The 
regression result is only slightly worse than that of period 1971-1987 
(Table 22), (e.g., in terms of t statistics, standard error, Adjusted R- 
squared, Akaike and Schwarz criterion but Durbin-Watson value).
To make sure that the estimation resulting from regression for the 
period 1971-1988 is the optimal one, if not the “best” one, we then 
compare it with that of the following period, 1971-1989. The regression 
result of period 1971-1989 is as follows:
Table 26
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1989 
Included observations: 19
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -22.23055 8.442756 -2.633091 0.0197
TBOILR 0.782589 0.108423 7.217942 0.0000
GDPWI 0.607562 0.155780 3.900116 0.0016
REER -0.065510 0.018279 -3.583954 0.0030
GDPRL -0.456376 0.109858 -4.154222 0 . 0 0 1 0
R-squared 0.885652 Mean dependent var 3.764596
Adj R-squared 0.852981 S.D. dependent var 2.364541
S.E. of regression 0.906636 Akaike info criterion 0.024905
Sum squared resid 11.50784 Schwarz criterion 0.273442
Log likelihood -22.19643 F-statistic 27.10838
Durbin-W atson stat. 1.617876 Prob(F-statistic) 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2
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Table 27
Engle-Granger Cointegration Test UROOT(C,l)






MacKinnon critical values : 1% -6.3901
5% -5.2941
1 0 % -4.7774
The results are all worse than those of period 1971-1988, in terms of 
diagnostic tests and cointegration test. It raises question now as in which 
year the structural break takes place. For this we can only be sure that the 
structural break may happen either in 1987 or 1988, but we choose period 
1971-1988 as the representing cointegrating regression for further analysis. 
As the degree of freedom dwindles (less than 20 observation) we also have 
to treat the result cautiously.
The reason underlying this structural break which happened either in 
1987 or 1988, is very much likely to have been related with the oil price 
fall and the development in the Indonesian major trade liberalization 
measures took place around that year, reducing both quantitative 
restrictions and tariff rates, discussed in Chapter III. The overall effect of 
these policies has been :
• the share of total production subject to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) fell 
from 38 percent in end of 1987 to 22 percent in June 1991;
• the production-weighted tariff fell from 19 percent in 1989 to 15 percent 
in June 1991;
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• the effective tariff ceiling was lowered progressively from about 60 
percent in 1985 to 30 percent in June 1991.
One important implication o f these liberalization measures, in 
addition to improving the competitiveness o f the economy, is that import 
has increased significantly from the reduction in the landed cost o f imports. 
So that apart from the expansion o f aggregate demand, imports would 
therefore be expected to respond positively to the reduction in the relative 
price.
The fitted, actual and the residual of the estimation o f the regression 
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The next tests to follow are :
1. Normality test o f the residual
2. RAMSEY Reset specification/functional form test
3. Heteroscedasticity test
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We do not apply higher order serial correlation test considering we 
are dealing with annual data analysis, which is sufficiently assessed by 
obtaining a good result o f first order serial correlation.
To test the normality of the residuals o f the regression we use 














The figure of the residual shown above, although somewhat skewed 
is judged to be normal from the Jarque-Bera statistic. Furthermore, 
estimating regression with single equation approach on level with the 
variables on the right hand side o f the equation which are not stationary, 
although they are cointegrated, produces underestimates of the standard 
errors. This means that the /-tests are not reliable, had the errors been 
normal2). The importance o f normality is greater in the dynamic model, 
when there is no problem of non-stationarity, and the /-tests are therefore 
more reliable.
Ramsey RESET test to detect mispecification error or functional 
form, indicates no functional form problem exist, as shown by the value of
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F= 0.14, which is less than its critical value: F (3 , 1 0)= with 5% and 1% 
level of confidence being 3.71 and 6.55 as shown on Table 28 below.
Table 28
Ramsey RESET Test:
F-statistic 0.142644 Probability 0.932057
Log likelihood ratio 0.754252 Probability 0.860375
LS // Dependent Variable is NX
Sample: 1971 1988
Included observations: 18
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -17.43149 27.36056 -0.637103 0.5384
TBOILR 0.510269 0.919952 0.554669 0.5913
GDPWI 0.446103 0.716209 0.622867 0.5473
REER -0.032932 0.072416 -0.454759 0.6590
GDPRL -0.337108 0.549723 -0.613232 0.5534
FittedA2 0.095297 0.580922 0.164043 0.8730
FittedA3 -0.006785 0.112763 -0.060172 0.9532
FittedA4 6.70E-05 0.007089 0.009457 0.9926
R-squared 0.927339 Mean dependent var 3.613854
Adj.R-squared 0.876476 S.D. dependent var 2.337264
S.E. of regression 0.821453 Akaike info criterion -0.092259
Sum squared resid 6.747850 Schwarz criterion 0.303462
Log likelihood -16.71056 F-statistic 18.23222
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.842509 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000061
The result of the test on heteroscedasticity of first order3) and fifth 




F-statistic 0.803890 Probability 0.384097
Obs*R-squared 0.864732 Probability 0.352418
LS // Dependent Variable is RESIDA2
Sample(adjusted): 1972 1988 —  *
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.475159 0.164660 2.885704 0.0113
RESIDA2(-1) -0.230948 0.257582 -0.896599 0.3841
R-squared 0.050867 Mean dependent var 0.391184
Adj .R-squared -0.012409 S.D. dependent var 0.554950
S.E. of regression 0.558383 Akaike info criterion -1.055291
Sum squared resid 4.676866 Schwarz criterion -0.957266
Log likelihood -13.15198 F-statistic 0.803890
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.037836 Prob(F-statistic) 0.384097
Table 30
ARCH Test:
F-statistic 0.663919 Probability 0.663027
Obs*R-squared 4.181825 Probability 0.523546
LS // Dependent Variable is RESIDA2
Sample(adjusted): 1976 1988
Included observations: 13 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.018947 0.508232 2.004884 0.0850
RESIDA2(-1) -0.445444 0.367843 -1.210963 0.2652
RESIDA2(-2) -0.350751 0.361674 -0.969799 0.3645
RESIDA2(-3) -0.291100 0.356552 -0.816430 0.4411
RESIDA2(-4) -0.390577 0.352597 -1.107716 0.3046
RESEDA2(-5) 0.063656 0.361714 0.175984 0.8653
R-squared 0.321679 Mean dependent var 0.465781
Adj .R-squared -0.162836 S.D. dependent var 0.616468
S.E. of regression 0.664767 Akaike info criterion -0.512598
Sum squared resid 3.093410 Schwarz criterion -0.251852
Log likelihood -9.114312 F-statistic 0.663919
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.071481 Prob(F-statistic) 0.663027
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From the results above, either first order or fifth order ARCH 
(autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) test, shows there is no 
indication of heteroscedasticity at 5% level of significance, represented by 
value of Obs*R-squared : 0.8647< x2(i, 0 .0 5 )= 3.841 for the first order, and 
Obs*R-squared : 4.182 < x2(5 ,o.o5)= 11.07, for the fifth order.
Considering that an equation may have a very good statistical fit, but 
has a very poor simulation fit, the forecasting power is also worth 
evaluating. The result shows that the regression has also good (historical) 
forecasting power, suggested among others, by small value of Theil’s 
inequality coefficient of 0.07= 0, as shown on Table 31 below and Figure 5 
above.
Table 31
Actual: NX Forecast: NXF 
Sample: 1971 1988 
Include observations: 18
Root Mean Squared Error 0.625238
Mean Absolute Error 0.497691
Mean Absolute Percentage Error 40.48597




The suggested structural break that happen in 1988, can also be 
verified from the poor expost forecast result for 1971-1993 as shown 
below:
Table 32
Actual: NX Forecast: NXF 
Sample: 1971 1993 
Include observations: 23
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Root Mean Squared Error 
Mean Absolute Error 












Comparing the expost forecast evaluation (Table 32) with the 
historical forecast (Table 31), it shows that all error measurements of the 
former increase significantly. The bias proportion which is zero in the 
historical forecast tends to rise in the expost forecast, meaning the 
systematic error is increasing. Systematic error measures the extent to 
which the average value of the simulated and actual series deviate from 
each other. For any value of Theil’s inequality coefficient greater than 
zero, the ideal distribution of inequality over the three sources is bias 
proportion = variance proportion = 0 and covariance proportion = 14). 
These properties seem come close and applicable to the estimation 
equation for the period 1971-1988, but not for the whole period 1971- 
1993. The systematic bias is also captured by the increasing value of the 
mean (absolute) percentage error.
The corresponding figure below (Figure 7) also support this 
evidence, shown by fitted and actual values which have been moving in 
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II. 2. Second version : Trade balance surplus (NX) as a function of 
primary budget surplus (PBBS) and other variables
The only difference between this version and the previous version is 
simply to change net resource inflow budget surplus (NRIBS) with primary 
budget surplus (PBBS), the latter being NRIBS plus net position o f central 
government budget with domestic banking system; central bank and 
domestic deposit money banks. The reason we make such a distinction has 
been elaborated in Appendix I paragraph II.
The regression gives the result as follows :
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Table 33
LS // Dependent Variable is NX 
Sample: 1971 1993 
Included observations: 23
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 6.317918 10.02102 0.630467 0.5379
PBBS -0.135786 0.437826 -0.310136 0.7607
TOTY -0.006617 0.026658 -0.248222 0.8073
TBOILR 0.581151 0.251183 2.313654 0.0353
GDPWI -0.014287 0.158409 -0.090188 0.9293
REER -0.062188 0.032591 -1.908119 0.0757
GDPRL 0.020357 0.110409 0.184377 0.8562
NDCMA -0.121993 0.172300 -0.708027 0.4898
R-squared 0.688606 Mean dependent var 4.210841
Adj .R-squared 0.543289 S.D. dependent var .2.413579
S.E. of regression 1.631106 Akaike info criterion 1.246725
Sum squared resid 39.90760 Schwarz criterion 1.641679
Log likelihood -38.97292 F-statistic 4.738645
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.306919 Prob(F-statistic) 0.005542
After dropping one by one the least significant variables we again 
come up with similar result as shown in Table 6.
Up to this point, what we can conclude is that neither net resource 
inflow budget surplus, nor primary budget balance surplus and net 
domestic credit of monetary authorities credits to domestic private sector 
through their direct effects, in the period studied, have any influence on 
trade balance surplus.
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II.3. Error Correction Model
Having obtained the cointegrating regression shown on Table 24, it 
is legitimate to derive an error correction mechanism/model (ECM) which 
represent the short-run ‘disequilibrium5 relationship. While the 
cointegrating regression shows a long-run relationship among variables, 
ECM represents the short-run or dynamic model. The model is estimated 
by adopting the ‘general to specific5 approach, thereby incorporating all 
the variables and inserting one lagged residual of corresponding long-term 
equihbrium relationship as the error correction term. The result is as 
follows:
Table 34
LS // Dependent Variable is DNX
Sample(adjusted): 1972 1988
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.968591 0.524010 -1.848421 0.1017
DNRTBS -0.040644 0.084168 -0.482889 0.6421
DTOTY -0.017312 0.013700 -1.263723 0.2419
DTBOILR 0.980888 0.113248 8.661405 0.0000
DGDPWI 0.784456 0.146048 5.371214 0.0007
DREER -0.022490 0.013292 -1.691979 0.1291
DGDPRL -0.346155 0.151632 -2.282867 0.0518
DNDCMA 0.053677 0.101518 0.528746 0.6113
R E Sl(-l) -0.973503 0.292741 -3.325479 0.0105
R-squared 0.972338 Mean dependent var 0.325710
Adj .R-squared 0.944676 S.D. dependent var 2.403516
S.E. of regression 0.565335 Akaike info criterion -0.835623
Sum squared resid 2.556826 Schwarz criterion -0.394510
Log likelihood -8.019156 F-statistic 35.15039
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.814070 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000019
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After dropping one by one the insignificant variables, we finally 
obtain:
Table 35
LS // Dependent Variable is DNX
Sample(adjusted): 1972 1988
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.717569 0.467854 -1.533748 0.1533
DTBOILR 0.884280 0.082012 10.78238 0.0000
DGDPWI 0.772730 0.121042 6.383986 0.0001
DREER -0.022897 0.011623 -1.970043 0.0745
DGDPRL -0.410938 0.122100 -3.365584 0.0063
R E Sl(-l) -0.976082 0.272282 -3.584826 0.0043
R-squared 0.965422 Mean dependent var 0.325710
Adj .R-squared 0.949704 S.D. dependent var 2.403516
S.E. of regression 0.539030 Akaike info criterion -0.965406
Sum squared resid 3.196081 Schwarz criterion -0.671330
Log likelihood -9.916007 F-statistic 61.42372
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.569249 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
The result to be produced has the same explanatory variables as that 
of long run relationship, of the first difference, plus the lagged residuals of 
the cointegrating regression. The R-squared is larger than that the long-run 
relationship, except the change in the real exchange rate is now significant 
at 10% significance level, and with Durbin-Watson value in the indecisive 
area. The lagged residual is also highly significant.
The plot of the actual and fitted values of the estimation is shown on 
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Test on the normality also gives relatively good result as shown 














Test on specification test yields F-statistics of 0.85, as shown on 
Table 36 below, lower than its critical value F0.o5(3,9) = 3.86, meaning 
there is no problem of specification or functional form.
;




F-statistic 0.858099 Probability 0.500874
Log likelihood ratio 4.742742 Probability 0.191634
LS // Dependent Variable is DNX
Sample: 1972 1988
Included observations: 17
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.047883 0.728787 0.065702 0.9492
DTBOILR 0.569235 0.229020 2.485528 0.0378
DGDPWI 0.517430 0.208097 2.486484 0.0377
DREER -0.022749 0.015600 -1.458233 0.1829
DGDPRL -0.363868 0.129239 -2.815477 0.0227
R ESl(-l) -0.892973 0.398040 -2.243422 0.0551
FittedA2 0.001297 0.090052 0.014401 0.9889
FittedA3 0.029849 0.022809 1.308659 0.2270
FittedA4 -0.003846 0.006268 -0.613511 0.5566
R-squared 0.973840 Mean dependent var 0.325710
Adj .R-squared 0.947679 S.D. dependent var 2.403516
S.E. of regression 0.549773 Akaike info criterion -0.891449
Sum squared resid 2.418000 Schwarz criterion -0.450336
Log likelihood -7.544636 F-statistic 37.22592
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.084288 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000015
Tests on heteroscedasticity at 5% level of significance, represented 
by value of Obs*R-squared : 0.7956< %2(i, 0.05)=3.841 for the first order 
and Obs*R-squared : 3.625 < %\s, o.os)= 11.07, for the fifth order (see 
Table 37 and 38 below) show no heteroscedasticity problems existed.
Table 37
ARCH Test:
F-statistic 0.732662 Probability 0.406434
Obs*R-squared 0.795687 Probability 0.372386
LS // Dependent Variable is RESIDA2
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Sample(adjusted): 1973 1988
Included observations: 16 after adjusting endpoints










Adj .R-squared -0.018146 
S.E. of regression 0.263041 
Sum squared resid 0.968671 
Log likelihood -0.267667 
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.161768
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 












F-statistic 0.519543 Probability 0.755362
Obs*R-squared 3.625681 Probability 0.604462
LS // Dependent Variable is RESIDA2
Sample(adjusted): 1977 1988
Included observations: 12 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.515854 0.301200 1.712662 0.1376
RESIDA2(-1) -0.439851 0.387841 -1.134101 0.3000
RESIDA2(-2) -0.503658 0.423612 -1.188959 0.2794
RESIDA2(-3) -0.325453 0.436271 -0.745989 0.4839
RESIDA2(-4) -0.168918 0.766346 -0.220419 0.8329
RESIDA2(-5) -0.604791 0.651139 -0.928820 0.3888
R-squared 0.302140 Mean dependent var 0.176354
Adj .R-squared -0.279410 S.D. dependent var 0.296892
S.E. of regression 0.335818 Akaike info criterion -1.875520
Sum squared resid 0.676642 Schwarz criterion -1.633066
Log likelihood 0.225857 F-statistic 0.519543
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.219817 Prob(F-statistic) 0.755362
A good historical forecasting power of the equation besides strongly 




Actual: DNX Forecast: DNXF 
Sample: 1972 1988 
Include observations: 17
Root Mean Squared Error 0.433595
Mean Absolute Error 0.347449
Mean Absolute Percentage Error 195.1514





FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES TO APPENDIX II
^ “Econometric Method”, by Johnston, Jack, and John Dinardo, Me Graw Hill, 1997, ~ ■ 
pp 117-126 and “Applied Econometric Techniques”, by Cuthbertson, Keith, Stephen 
G. Hall and Mark P.Taylor Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, pp. 115-116.
R.I.D. Harris, “Using Cointegration Analysis in Economic Modelling”. Prentice 
Hall, 1995, pp. 62-63.
3)} The first order of this test is the most common form, see Cuthbertson, Keith, et.al. 
Ibid. pp. 112.
Robert s. Pindyick & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Econometric Models & Economic 
Forecasts/ ’ McGraw-Hill, Third Edition, 1991, p. 341.
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